

Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning



13 April 2017

V0.7

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

FOREWORD

[Proposed draft to be prepared following initial staffing]

Paul J. Selva
General, United States Air Force
Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Today, the United States is in a worldwide competition with emerging and resurgent global powers, aspiring regional hegemony, and non-state actors seeking to undermine aspects of the post-World War II international order. For the foreseeable future, adversaries will continue to creatively combine conventional and non-conventional methods to achieve their objectives. Many will operate below a threshold that invokes a direct military response from the U.S. while retaining the capability to engage in more conventional armed conflict.

That operating environment presents the Department of Defense with a difficult military challenge: to develop a methodology and associated capabilities that enable the Joint Force to collaborate and synchronize with interorganizational partners and conduct globally integrated operations to achieve acceptable and sustainable outcomes. Furthermore, any solution to the military challenge must account for several additional factors: the complexity of the environment; interactions with adaptive adversaries; the persistence of enduring competitions; transregional challenges; emerging patterns of competitions below the threshold of armed combat; and the challenge of integrating military activities within the DoD and aligning those activities with interorganizational partners.

The response to the military challenge is the central idea of *Integrated Campaigning*. The JCIC defines *integrated campaigning* as Joint Force and interorganizational partner efforts to enable the achievement and maintenance of policy aims by integrating military activities and aligning non-military activities of sufficient scope, scale, simultaneity, and duration across multiple domains. The Joint Force integrates among staff elements and service components within a command, among different combatant commands, and within the DoD, while also aligning with interorganizational and multi-national partners.

The central idea consists of four interrelated elements that broadly describe how the Joint Force and its partners can effectively campaign:

- **Understand the Operating Environment** through the lens of the competition continuum and the use of a new lexicon to foster civil-military dialogue
- **Design and Construct the Campaign** using the Factors of Campaign Design and Competition Mechanisms to align military and non-military activities
- **Employ the Integrated Force & Secure Gains** in campaigns

tailored to the new operating environment

- **Assess & Adapt the Campaign** based on the continuous analysis of results in relation to expectations, to enhance understanding and update campaign objectives.

The foundational idea of the JCIC is an *expanded view of the operating environment* that includes a *competition continuum*. This competition continuum offers an alternative to the obsolete peace/war binary with a new model of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. These are not mutually exclusive conditions. They are states of relationships with other actors that can exist concurrently. The JCIC's *new lexicon* provides further specificity to aid civil-military dialogue.


A key supporting idea of this concept is *factors of campaign design* that collectively provide a conceptual framework for the Joint Force to apply across the competition continuum. Additionally, *competition mechanisms* complement the factors of campaign design by suggesting additional ways for the Joint Force to achieve desired policy objectives. These ideas combined with the imperative for the Joint Force to *align efforts with interorganizational non-military activities* are essential to the success of integrated campaigning.

The JCIC addresses some of the unique aspects of integrated campaigning and securing gains when engaged in cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. The common imperative linking them all is the need to *follow through* to ensure the maintenance of desired policy aims.

Finally, the concept describes how commanders and staffs must conduct *continual assessment* of the operating environment. This requires a disciplined approach working with non-military partners.

In summary, the *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning* improves how Joint Force leaders and interorganizational partners integrate military efforts and align military with non-military activities to achieve acceptable and sustainable strategic outcomes.

Logic Map



Contents

Foreword.....iii

Executive Summary..... iv

1. Introduction..... 1

2. Scope..... 1

3. Future Operating Environment 2

4. The Military Challenge. 5

5. The Central Idea: A Construct for Integrated Campaigning 6

6. Concept Required Capabilities..... 29

7. Risks of Adopting this Concept..... 31

8. Conclusion..... 32

Glossary..... 33

Bibliography..... 35

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

41 U.S. national strategy and enables the Joint Force to compete with or defeat
42 adversaries who are seeking to alter the international order in ways that are
43 adverse to U.S. interests. The concept emphasizes the importance of aligning
44 Joint Force activities with the efforts of interorganizational and international
45 partners.
46
47

48 **3. Future Operating Environment**

49 **Recent, Ongoing, and Emerging Challenges**

51
52 During the early and mid-1990s, the Joint Force began to institutionalize
53 many of the lessons of operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM. As DoD
54 prepared for future regional conflicts in the post-Cold War environment, Joint
55 Force doctrine and practices generally came to reflect an expectation that
56 DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM would be the model for future employment
57 of the force. However, over the past 25 years, the Joint Force's experience in
58 armed conflict unfolded in a different, and often more challenging, manner
59 than expected. The great lesson of recent conflicts has been that successful
60 execution of "dominating activities" does not automatically lead to the
61 achievement of desired political objectives.
62

63 Translating military success into the aims of policy is the ultimate
64 purpose of armed conflict. Yet in an age of constant competition, gains will
65 rarely go unchallenged. Thus, the maintenance of hard-won gains will require
66 continued commitment, often of considerable duration. This "follow through"
67 requires methodical transitions occurring over years or even decades to ensure
68 the perpetuation of favorable outcomes.
69

70 Strategic challenges such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are
71 employing coercive methods to accomplish objectives in the competitive space
72 between peace and war. These competitors aim to change international norms
73 with operations characterized by uncertainty to create ambiguity meant to
74 confuse public opinion, paralyze political decision making, subvert legal
75 frameworks, and avoid crossing the threshold of military response.
76

77 China's rapid construction of artificial islands in the disputed Spratly
78 Island chain is an example of the type of aggressive action revisionist states are
79 taking today to further their interests, often at the expense of neighboring
80 countries. While avoiding a direct military confrontation for the time being,
81 China's island building activities are in contravention of accepted international
82 norms and are a threat to regional stability.
83

84 Russia's aggression against Ukraine highlights how Moscow employs a
85 combination of diplomatic, informational, military (both conventional and
86 irregular), and economic means to achieve its aims. The precise mixture varies
87 with the situation but seems calculated to achieve maximum effect without
88 provoking a direct military response by the West.

89
90 Iran's involvement in Lebanon and Syria provides another example of a
91 state expanding its regional influence using a combination of direct and
92 indirect military and non-military activities. Since the 1980s, Iran has supplied
93 Hezbollah in Lebanon with substantial amounts of military training, weapons,
94 political, and financial aid and is also directly involved with Hezbollah in the
95 Syrian civil war. These actions are part of a larger effort on behalf of Iran to use
96 aggressive diplomacy, economic overtures, and military action to pursue core
97 national interests while limiting the risk of direct retaliation from global actors.

98
99 North Korea is a small, regional power using a range of threats to
100 undermine U.S. and partner interests.² Some of North Korea's provocations are
101 relatively covert: employment of cyber warfare, unconventional warfare,
102 clandestine subversion, and assassinations. Others, however, are overt, such
103 as frequent tests and demonstrations of nuclear weapons and long-range
104 missiles at all ranges, artillery strikes against military and civilian targets in
105 South Korea, and the sinking of the *Cheonan*. These actions demonstrate that
106 challenges below armed conflict can take many forms.

107
108 The *Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested*
109 *and Disordered World*, envisions a future with challenges significantly different
110 from those of recent decades. The two overarching challenges are *contested*
111 *norms* and *persistent disorder*; both have significant implications for how the
112 Joint Force will campaign in the future.

113
114 In short, adversaries will continue to creatively combine conventional and
115 non-conventional methods to achieve objectives by operating below a threshold
116 that would invoke a direct military response from the U.S. while retaining the
117 capability to engage in more conventional armed conflict.

118 **Implications of Recent, Ongoing, and Emerging Challenges**

119
120
121 The future operating environment will present leaders and planners with
122 unfamiliar problem sets, challenge DoD resourcing systems, and test the Joint
123 Force's ability to maintain the strategic initiative. Analysis suggests several
124 implications that are particularly pertinent for integrated campaigning.

² *Joint Operating Environment 2035*, (14 July 2016), 28.

- 126
- 127
- 128
- 129
- 130
- 131
- 132
- 133
- 134
- 135
- 136
- 137
- 138
- 139
- 140
- 141
- 142
- 143
- 144 • **The Joint Force must eliminate institutional remnants of the**
 - 145 **obsolete peace/war binary conception of the operating environment.**
 - 146 For over two centuries, the U.S. military has conducted operations
 - 147 outside of conventional armed conflict. Nonetheless, many Joint Force
 - 148 processes operate wholly or in part on the assumption of operations
 - 149 taking place in either distinct states of peace or war.³ For instance,
 - 150 combatant commands report difficulty in securing resources to counter
 - 151 revisionist powers, even when this is a national priority, if the resource
 - 152 request cannot be tied to a specific contingency plan.⁴ In short, some
 - 153 processes reflect residual assumptions that conventional warfare is the
 - 154 natural outcome of competition, and thus resources, authorities, and
 - 155 actions should be focused on deterring that conflict. In fact, revisionist
 - 156 powers seek to achieve all of their policy objectives, while avoiding an
 - 157 escalation to armed conflict. The Joint Force has begun to adapt through
 - 158 changes in doctrine and organization, and by developing new
 - 159 capabilities. However, the Joint Force as of yet still lacks an overarching
 - 160 conceptual framework to bring these elements together.
- 144 • **Recognition that following through to accomplish or enable policy**
 - 145 **aims is an inherent element of campaigning in armed conflict as**
 - 146 **well as an essential facet of campaigning outside of armed conflict.**
 - 147 Commanders and planners must understand that the operating
 - 148 environment remains competitive even after the defeat of an enemy's
 - 149 main forces. This is equally true for competition below armed conflict, in
 - 150 which adversaries will typically seek to win advantages over prolonged
 - 151 periods. Therefore, conducting continuing actions to consolidate gains
 - 152 and maintain an acceptable political state is an inherent part of
 - 153 campaigning in all circumstances.
- 155 • **Military power alone is insufficient to achieve sustainable political**
 - 156 **objectives, and there are limited means to achieve integration**
 - 157 **across the instruments of national power.** Overcoming the complex
 - 158 challenges in the operating environment to achieve sustainable political
 - 159 objectives will require the alignment of military and non-military
 - 160 activities. As the DoD articulates how it will integrate and align Joint

³ In remarks at the Air Force Association Air, Space, and Cyber Conference, 21 September 2016, General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., noted, "Our traditional way that we differentiate between peace and war is insufficient to [the dynamic of competition below armed conflict]." See also, remarks at the Association of the U.S. Army Conference, 5 October, 2016, "We think of being at peace or war...our adversaries don't think that way."
<http://secure.afa.org/events/Conference/2016/recordings/Wednesday-830am-Dunford.asp>;
<https://www.ausa.org/news/dunford-challenges-require-more-%E2%80%98buying-new-hardware%E2%80%99>.

⁴ Finding derived from field visits to combatant commands in summer 2016.

161 Force activities, DoD must also plan and provide for support to and
162 coordination with other U.S. departments and agencies, as well as other
163 interorganizational partners.
164

- 165 • **A complex and rapidly changing operating environment will require**
166 **a construct for employing the Joint Force in conditions below**
167 **armed conflict.** CJCSM 3130.01A (Campaign Planning Procedures and
168 Responsibilities) directs GCCs to develop a theater strategy for employing
169 “normal and routine” military activities in conditions short of conflict to
170 achieve strategic objectives.⁵ Planning, coordinating, and resourcing
171 processes for these activities assume a relatively stable strategic context.
172 This pace is sufficient for persistent engagement with partners and
173 deliberate efforts to set the theater to enable the execution of contingency
174 plans, but it is too cumbersome for the agile action required to counter
175 aggressive challengers operating below the threshold of armed conflict.⁶
176 In most cases, U.S. policy concerning a particular state or actor changes
177 relatively slowly. For this majority of instances, a deliberative
178 interorganizational process occurring over months or even years is
179 sufficient. There are a few exceptional states that due to their significant
180 influence, power, and global reach require something different. At any
181 given time, there are likely to be multiple strands of both cooperation and
182 competition between the U.S. and these states, so a coordinated
183 response to changes in the policy context is necessary. Yet when the size
184 and reach of those same states is tied to aggressive opportunism
185 constantly seeking advantage, the policy context can change rapidly.
186 Consequently, these challenges require an unusual degree of
187 coordination and responsiveness.
188
189

190 **4. The Military Challenge.**

191
192 *How do the Joint Force and its interorganizational partners prepare to conduct*
193 *globally integrated operations to achieve acceptable and sustainable outcomes,*
194 *taking into account:*
195

- 196 • the complexity of the environment;
- 197
- 198 • interactions with adaptive adversaries;

⁵ CJCSM 3130.01A *Campaign planning procedures and responsibilities* (2014).
http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/m313001.pdf

⁶ In discussing trans-regional, multi-functional, multi-domain challenges, General Dunford remarked, “I personally don’t believe our current planning and organizational constructs are adequate....Our strategic planning needs to change.” Dunford, 21 October 2016.

199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237

- transregional challenges;
- emerging patterns of competitions below the threshold of traditional armed combat; and
- the challenge of integrating military activities within the DoD and aligning those activities with interorganizational partners.

5. The Central Idea: A Construct for Integrated Campaigning

The central idea for this concept is *Integrated Campaigning*. The JCIC defines *integrated campaigning* as Joint Force and interorganizational partner efforts to enable the achievement and maintenance of policy aims by integrating military activities and aligning non-military activities of sufficient scope, scale, simultaneity, and duration across multiple domains.⁷ The Joint Force integrates among staff elements and service components within a command, among different combatant commands, and within the DoD, while also aligning with interorganizational and multi-national partners.

The central idea consists of four interrelated elements that broadly describe how the Joint Force and its interorganizational partners can effectively campaign:

- Understand the Operating Environment through the lens of the competition continuum and the use of a new lexicon to foster civil-military dialogue and collaboration
- Design and Construct the Campaign using the Factors of Campaign Design and Competition Mechanisms to align military and non-military activities
- Employ the Integrated Force and Secure Gains in campaigns tailored to the new operating environment
- Assess & Adapt the Campaign based on the continuous evaluation of results in relation to expectations, modifying both the understanding and subsequent campaign objectives.

⁷ For comparison, the current definition of a *campaign* is “a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space.” (JP 5-0) The JCIC emphasizes campaigning (verb) over campaigns (noun) in order to highlight the often enduring quality of competition.

238 **Understand the Environment: Expanded View and Lexicon**
239

240 Development of a common understanding of the operating environment
241 serves as the unifying starting point for planning and execution.
242

243 The way the Joint Force views the operating environment in the future
244 should account for more than the binary peace and war model. The JCIC offers
245 a more comprehensive and flexible spectrum of strategic relations—the
246 *competition continuum* of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and
247 armed conflict. The competition continuum is more than simply the
248 substitution of a three-part model for the two-part peace-war dichotomy. The
249 three elements of the continuum (cooperation, competition below armed
250 conflict, and armed conflict) are not exclusive of each other but can co-exist at
251 the same point in time. The implication for the Joint Force is that both plans
252 and actions must take into account this complex reality if they are to have a
253 reasonable chance of securing and maintaining policy objectives.
254

255 The competition continuum recognizes this complexity and provides a
256 lexicon to describe these interactions in order to facilitate shared
257 understanding, accurate communication of intent and risk, and enable sound
258 planning and decision-making. International relations are more complex than a
259 single descriptor, such as competition, can capture. These descriptors must be
260 used in reference to a specific relationship and issue. For instance, it would be
261 incorrect to say that the U.S. is solely in a state of competition with China.
262 Instead, the relationship is one of competition in regard to some interests, such
263 as access to the South China Sea, and cooperation in others, such as counter-
264 piracy in the Indian Ocean. The competition continuum is applicable to both
265 state and non-state actors. For instance, within a failing state, the Joint Force
266 may apply the descriptors to the government and any other significant actors,
267 such as warlords or independent armed factions.
268

269 The JCIC applies to the Joint Force. As a result, the competition
270 continuum is a construct primarily intended to guide military actions, but
271 there is no reason why it cannot inform the application of other instruments of
272 national power (diplomatic, informational, economic.)⁸ Indeed, in practice all
273 function as an interrelated and integrated whole. For instance, competition
274 through military means like freedom of navigation operations might be
275 curtailed in one area against a state, if that same state's diplomatic and
276 economic support is needed elsewhere, such as in the UN Security Council or
277 to uphold sanctions.

⁸ *Joint Publication 1* defines the instruments of national power as “all of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational and military.”

278 Figure 1 depicts the competition continuum, which consists of three
279 states of relations:
280

- 281 • In *armed conflict* the use of violence is the primary means by which an
282 actor seeks to satisfy its interests. Armed conflict varies in intensity and
283 ranges from limited warfare to major wars between great powers.
284

- 285 • *Competition below*
286 *armed conflict* exists
287 when two or more
288 actors in the
289 international system
290 have incompatible
291 interests but neither
292 seeks to escalate to
293 open conflict. The
294 Joint Force will have a
295 great deal of utility in
296 securing strategic
297 objectives in
298 competition, but it will
299 typically offer support
300 to other USG departments and actors.
301



Figure 1: Competition Continuum

- 302 • *Cooperation* includes mutually beneficial relationships between strategic
303 actors with similar or compatible interests. Although interests will only
304 rarely be in complete alignment, relations that are fundamentally
305 cooperative are strategically important for the U.S. because they
306 underpin the international order, enhance collective security, help to
307 ensure access to global commons, enable burden-sharing, and deter
308 conflict.
309

310 The dynamic nature of the strategic context requires a further level of detail
311 within the competition continuum that captures the relative intensity and
312 trajectory of the relationships. The JCIC divides the three elements into sub-
313 elements which form a range of policy aims providing further clarity as to USG
314 intentions when necessary.
315

316 *Armed Conflict*

- 317 • *Defeat*. Create conditions to impose desired policy objectives upon the
318 adversary.
319
- 320 • *Deny*. Frustrate the policy objectives of the adversary.

321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361

- *Degrade*. Reduce the adversary’s ability and will to the greatest extent possible within resource and policy constraints.

Competition below Armed Conflict

- *Improve*. Employ all measures short of those that might reasonably lead to conflict in order to achieve U.S. objectives, deny the competitor the achievement of its aims, and improve the overall strategic position.
- *Counter*. Regulate the competition to ensure the U.S. maintains its relative strategic position and the competitor achieves no further gains; only seek to improve the U.S. position to that achievable given existing resources and authorities, and in a manner that does not jeopardize interests elsewhere.
- *Contest*. Use prudent means to achieve the best possible strategic outcome within given resources or policy constraints, recognizing that this lesser aim entails risk that the competitor will achieve further gains.

Cooperation

- *Engage selectively*. Cooperation is transactional with the sole aim of achieving U.S. aims when the maintenance of a larger relationship with the partner is not desirable or worthwhile.
- *Maintain*. Cooperate in order to maintain relationship and secure bilateral advantage but without significant increase in resources or commitment unless strictly in accord with overriding U.S. interests.
- *Advance*. Expand cooperative activities in the most appropriate manner (e.g. building partner capacity, increasing interoperability, and expanding Joint Force access) to achieve U.S. aims while also enabling or advancing partner interests.⁹

The principal benefit of these expanded elements is the provision of a fuller lexicon that can capture the nuances of prioritization and change within the strategic landscape. This benefit mainly applies competition and cooperation but pertains to conflict as well. For instance, as shown in the example of World War II (see figure 2), the initial Allied approach was to *defeat* Germany while *denying* Japan further gains in the Pacific until more favorable

⁹ In some instances, USG actions may seek to shape a partner’s perception of interests, increasing alignment with US policy objectives.

362 conditions would allow its *defeat*. Establishing and communicating such
363 priorities is the first step to integration, whether within a command, across
364 DoD, across the USG, or within a coalition.
365

Vignette: The Competition Continuum in History

Though the JCIC framework is new, the complexity of the strategic environment is not. The case of World War II illustrates that even in conventional state conflict all three elements of the competition continuum were present. The U.S. was in conflict with the Axis powers. In Europe, it cooperated with the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union, coordinating operations and providing large amounts of arms and equipment. Yet at the same time, there was also a degree of competition with the Soviet Union. U.S.-U.K. policy accounted for a longer-term competition with communism that had existed prior to the war and resumed with much greater intensity afterward. In the Pacific, the Soviets offered minimal cooperation until the very end of the war, and their late entry was arguably motivated more by a desire to compete with the U.S. in the post-war order than to cooperate in the combined effort to defeat Japan. Even in respect to the U.K. and France, a difference in visions for the disposition of former colonies created a state of low-level competition that influenced the conduct of war. The role of both civilian policymakers and military leaders was to understand the nature of these many strategic relationships, weigh their relative importance, tailor military campaigns in accordance with those priorities, and then continually reassess and adjust as the strategic and political situation progressed.



Cooperation, Competition, Conflict: Winston Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Joseph Stalin at the Yalta Conference in 1945

Figure 2. The Competition Continuum in History

366 Conveying prioritization is important. Merely noting that the U.S. is
367 engaged in competition with Russia in eastern Ukraine does not provide
368 sufficient fidelity of intent. The actions of the Joint Force if directed to *improve*
369 would be quite different than if directed to *contest*, even though both fall within
370 the larger state of competition. Furthermore, the policy decision about how
371 aggressively to compete has direct implications for the level of cooperation with

372 Ukraine. For instance, improving the position vis-à-vis Russia could entail a
373 corresponding recommendation to *advance* cooperation with Ukraine.

374
375 The more specific lexicon is also necessary to capture the complexities of
376 changing conditions over time, which is particularly important for extended
377 competition. In those areas where the U.S. is likely to compete with a certain
378 actor for years, the intensity of that competition will vary according to the
379 swings in the overall relationship between the two countries, the degree to
380 which other crises and events divert U.S. resources or require cooperation with
381 the other country, and the desires of allies. The election of an anti-American
382 leader in an ally or partner, for instance, might force a reduction in the level of
383 cooperation with the ally from *advance* to *maintain*, which in turn might
384 require a less ambitious goal for competition against the competitor state due
385 to loss of access or partner capacity.

386
387 In practical terms, the expanded view of the operating environment and
388 its lexicon facilitates the dialogue between civilian policymakers and military
389 leaders, by providing the means to more precisely convey degrees of ambition
390 or restraint. This is particularly valuable in competition below armed conflict,
391 in which a nuanced understanding of both policy aims and constraints is vital.
392 The provision of military advice also benefits from a shared lexicon that allows
393 the Joint Force to identify instances in which it cannot achieve the desired
394 policy aim with the given resources and authorities.

395
396 **Design and Construct the Campaign**

397
398 This element of the integrated campaigning construct focuses on
399 developing a strategy to address the problem, defining the overarching concept
400 for what USG policy is seeking to achieve, and providing the necessary
401 guidance and direction to execute that concept. This may include efforts to
402 identify campaign objectives and then align resources and actions—across the
403 range of partners—to ensure the accomplishment of these objectives.

404
405 Having established a foundation for integrated campaigning by
406 understanding the operating environment, leaders and planners begin to
407 design the campaign. Campaign design begins with recognition that both
408 military and non-military activities are vital for the achievement of acceptable
409 political conditions. Next, leaders and planners must determine the relevant
410 mechanisms for employment. Finally, leaders and planners embed activities to
411 solidify campaign progress to prevent loss of any gains or regression to
412 previous conditions.

413
414

415 *Factors of Campaign Design*

416
417 Across the competition continuum described above, there are common
418 considerations to keep in mind when designing campaigns. Joint doctrine
419 currently describes thirteen elements of operational design which collectively
420 enable Joint leaders to design operations aimed at defeating adversaries' war-
421 making capability in armed conflict (JP 5-0). These design elements are still
422 valid for individual operations, but insufficient to enable Joint leaders to
423 campaign in cooperation, competition, and armed conflict. The JCIC addresses
424 this shortfall through the proposed use of the *Factors of Campaign Design*.
425

426 The Factors of Campaign Design connect with, respond to, and inform
427 evolving policy. A campaign design factor is an element that influences or
428 contributes to a particular result or outcome. The Factors of Campaign Design
429 are an additive array of factors to enable the Joint Force to campaign through
430 the application of military power in concert with the other instruments of
431 power. The factors help guide the development and execution of campaigns
432 across the competition continuum. Furthermore, the factors of campaign
433 design aid in understanding the relationship between civilian guidance and
434 military objectives, facilitate collaboration with essential USG and international
435 partners, and improve the application of operational art beyond a narrow
436 conception of armed conflict. Additionally, these factors provide an intellectual
437 mooring, framework, and feedback loop between the strategic discussion and
438 development and refinement of the operational-level logic and mechanism used
439 to pursue the chosen policy. The factors also connect with, respond to, and
440 inform evolving policy and strategy. Finally, the factors orient on outcomes
441 beyond just military success, while recognizing that definitive political guidance
442 is rare and that clear conclusion and finality are elusive while campaigning
443 across any condition.
444

445 The factors of campaign design allow for an informed application of Joint
446 Force capabilities and strengthen the alignment of the instruments of national
447 power. The factors work in conjunction with existing methodologies to assist
448 the Joint Force in achieving U.S. policy aims. For example, the factors expand
449 the conduct of the military decision making process and other planning
450 techniques. There are twelve factors of campaign design:

451

- 452 • *Diagnosis.* Though difficult to achieve, commanders and staffs should
453 aspire to achieve a true empathy that attunes them to the sources and
454 behavioral vectors of all relevant actors: their perspectives, the
455 underlying logic of their actions; and the fundamental issues being
456 contested.

457

- 458 • *Anticipate consequences.* Successful campaigning requires commanders

459 and staffs to maintain and continually update a realistic appraisal of the
460 range of possible outcomes and consequences. The complexity of a
461 contested operating environment makes it likely that in most cases these
462 assessments will span a range of mixed favorable and unfavorable
463 consequences.

- 464
- 465 • *Effective civil-military dialogue.* In broad terms, the Joint Force furnishes
466 recommendations and alternatives; civilian policymakers provide initial
467 guidance and subsequent modifications. In practical terms, civil-military
468 interactions occur within a continual round of engagement featuring
469 discussion, feedback, adaptation and refinement of policy and actions to
470 achieve an evolving set of desired strategic outcomes.
 - 471
 - 472 • *Outcomes.* Successful campaigning requires a comprehensive vision of
473 the *conditions* and *behaviors* the Joint Force must enable to achieve and
474 sustain acceptable strategic outcomes.
 - 475
 - 476 • *Follow through.* In order to translate military success into acceptable and
477 sustainable strategic outcomes, commanders and staffs must develop
478 and implement a long-term approach that maintains the focus of the
479 campaign over time. One implication of the expanded operating
480 environment is that terms like *post-conflict* are dangerous when they
481 cause the Joint Force to artificially break what should be thought of as a
482 single effort into distinct phases of “war” and “peace.”
 - 483
 - 484 • *Benefits and risks.* Joint Force actions are guided by an appreciation of
485 the short- and long-term opportunities of both success and failure and
486 the risks of employing military force against the specific circumstance.
 - 487
 - 488 • *Narrative.* As part of campaigning, the Joint Force develops and employs
489 a principal and cascading narrative reflecting policy aims. This narrative
490 gives coherence to military actions and activities, shapes other actors’
491 conditions and behaviors, and, ideally, undermines and delegitimizes
492 adversaries’ narratives.
 - 493
 - 494 • *Empowerment.* When properly arrayed, authorizations enable the
495 effective complementary employment of the various instruments of
496 national power. As much as physical capabilities, authorities are an
497 essential means. Commanders and staff must understand how and when
498 authorizations recognized enable successful campaigning.
 - 499
 - 500 • *Alignment.* Organizational boundaries often make full integration of the
501 instruments of national power an unachievable goal. A more realistic goal

502 is to align efforts to achieve acceptable and sustainable strategic
503 outcomes, which in most cases will be sufficient. The nature of alignment
504 varies with the situation, but the Joint Force can capture best practices
505 in doctrine, teach them in PME, and practice them regularly in exercises
506 and operations.

- 507
- 508 • *Resourcing.* Successful campaigning requires synchronized, prioritized,
509 and de-conflicted resourcing. With many competing demands for
510 resources, this is difficult at any given time. Over the extended period of
511 an integrated campaign, it is even more challenging. Nonetheless,
512 achieving sustainable strategic outcomes requires sustained effort.
513
- 514 • *Prevailing logic.* An overarching prevailing logic allows the commanders
515 and staffs to arrange military operations, activities, and actions so that
516 they produce the desired conditions, behaviors, and outcomes. Though
517 the prevailing logic guides the campaign, it is not static but continually
518 updated in response to changes within the operating environment.
519
- 520 • *Multi-domain force architecture.* The proper force architecture enables the
521 necessary command and control of Joint Force required resources and
522 capabilities. There is already a substantial body of operational doctrine
523 and practice that can guide the development of this force architecture.
524 New methods, however, might be required to address transregional,
525 multi-domain, and multi-function challenges. Whatever the nature and
526 the scale of the problem, an architecture should enable each contributing
527 component to play its designated role.
528

529 These factors are essential to the initial and ongoing logic of effective campaign
530 design and adaptive execution in all conditions the Joint Force may face.

531 532 *Competition Mechanisms*

533

534 While the competition continuum can help the Joint Force to understand
535 the environment, mechanisms suggest the ways available to leaders and
536 planners to achieve the desired policy objectives. Selection of the appropriate
537 mix of mechanisms is a fundamental part of designing the campaign.

538

539 JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, 11 August 2011, establishes defeat and
540 stability mechanisms in Joint doctrine. Defeat mechanisms, applicable to
541 armed conflict, focus on defeating armed enemies through the organized
542 application of force. Stability mechanisms, applicable across the competition
543 continuum, are the primary method by which the Joint Force affects the
544 human dimension. Defeat and stability mechanisms have continued utility and
545 are tools for campaign design.

546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588

In recognition of the importance of allies and partners to U.S. national interests and the prominence of competition below armed conflict in the future operating environment, the JCIC introduces a suite of competition mechanisms applicable to the strategic realities of *armed conflict*, *competition below the level of armed conflict*, and *cooperation* as ways to maintain or establish favorable conditions within the international order. In this concept, these mechanisms apply to campaigning. However, most factors are also relevant to subordinate operations. This suite of mechanisms offers US leaders an array of methods to employ the instruments of national power in general and the Joint Force in particular.

Example Competition Mechanisms:

- *Strengthen.* To develop alliances and partnerships and reward actors for siding with friendly forces. This may include military engagement and security cooperation or favorable access to trade and foreign assistance.
- *Create.* To produce a condition where it does not already exist, and its existence could positively impact achievement of national interests or may be essential.
- *Preserve.* To prevent deterioration of a stable situation. Although, there is no assumption of immediate malign intent by other actors, if ignored this condition could lead to the rise of an adversary, challenge or crisis.
- *Weaken.* To recognize, understand, and impose a change in a competitor's behavior using physical and informational aspects of power.
- *Position.* To increase access, influence, and strategic understanding in the environment. It may include the use of intelligence activities, the exchange of information with partners, the frequent rotational deployment of forces during exercises, and the effective positioning of forward based capabilities.
- *Inform.* To develop a shared perspective with partners and identify areas where cooperation would be of mutual benefit, and or convey the limits of acceptability for a competitor's current/future behavior.
- *Persuade.* To shape partners' objectives and competitor behaviors while remaining flexible in the pursuit of secondary objectives.

In applying the competition mechanisms, leaders and planners continuously evaluate the mechanisms' efficacy in relation to policy objectives.

589 Leaders and planners seek to link and align military activities to policy
590 objectives that result in maintaining or altering the current trajectory between
591 the U.S., its partners, and other actors.

592
593 Another aspect of the design, as well as the assessment process, is the
594 identification of authorities needed to conduct the campaign. To expedite
595 approval, leaders and planners work with interorganizational partners and
596 prepare aligned groupings of authorizations for leader approval.

597
598 Finally, leaders and planners ensure proper follow through so
599 campaigning yields acceptable and sustainable outcomes. Military operations
600 are subordinate to policy and must remain oriented on the achievement of
601 acceptable political conditions.

602
603 *Alignment of Military and Non-military Activities*

604
605 Integrated campaigns must develop synchronized efforts across various
606 organizational boundaries to succeed. As stated in the Joint Concept for
607 Human Aspects of Military Operations (JC-HAMO), some goals should be to
608 strengthen the resolve, commitment and resiliency of partners; persuade
609 neutral parties to join the friendly forces' campaign; and convince adversaries
610 to abandon or not engage in an armed struggle. As part of the application of
611 the instruments of national power, Joint Force commanders should operate at
612 multiple levels to integrate operations, activities, and actions within a
613 campaign:

- 614
- 615 • *Psychological:* The psychological element of aligning military and non-
616 military activities is a critical consideration. Physical actions, military
617 and non-military, are inseparable from their psychological effect in
618 supporting a long-term and sustainable campaign. Integrated campaigns
619 must have an advantageous psychological impact on friendly, neutral,
620 and adversary actors in the environment, across the different conditions
621 of the operating environment that is founded on the coordination of
622 military and non-military activities. JCIC facilitates Joint Force
623 commanders' and staffs' focus on the integration of physical and
624 information power as a critical element to enabling globally integrated
625 operations. During the application of the art and science of warfare,
626 campaign planners must take into account the "will" of the adversary,
627 competitor or ally. The joint force must design and conduct campaigns to
628 establish and maintain legitimacy of U.S. and partner actions while
629 simultaneously discrediting, subverting, and/or attacking adversaries'
630 efforts to establish their legitimacy. Planners also use actions and
631 messaging to convey that an antagonist's efforts will eventually end in
632 failure and the U.S. will achieve its objectives. The alignment of military

633 and non-military activities must seek to ingrain in the antagonist that
634 there is no place they are safe from U.S. and partner reach, influence
635 and observation. Campaign design seeks to align military and non-
636 military activities to combine actions over time to overwhelm and/or
637 exhaust the adversary, competitor, or population.
638

639 • *Political.* Military operations should always be in support of overarching
640 policy aims. Efforts to shape the environment and influence key actors
641 must be carefully designed, integrated across the Joint Force, and
642 synchronized with non-Defense USG partners to achieve, and ultimately
643 sustain, desired strategic outcomes. Activities that seek to consolidate
644 gains and enable governance must be seen as legitimate to ensure they
645 receive broad support and are sustained over time. In this regard, the
646 role of information operations is vitally important to explain key actions
647 to diverse stakeholders in the environment. The Joint Force and its
648 partners must draw on modern notions of legitimacy to build support for
649 desired political orders that are both adaptable and sustainable.
650 Concurrently, U.S. leaders should seek to create divisions in an
651 adversary's alliances, while weakening their political support locally,
652 regionally, and, as appropriate, globally.
653

654 • *Logistical.* Aligning military and non-military activities to ensure
655 sustainability of friendly campaigns, and weakening antagonists'
656 sustainability for their campaigns, are critical elements of consideration.
657 Renowned military theorist B.H. Liddell Hart observed that effective
658 commanders recognize that "the aim in war is to weaken resistance
659 before attempting to overcome it."¹⁰ With this aim in mind, military
660 leaders should align their efforts with non-military partners to degrade
661 an adversary's alliances, partnerships, and sources of support, while
662 safeguarding and strengthening those that enable the friendly campaign.
663 The goal is to limit an adversary's freedom of action and resiliency, while
664 increasing U.S. and partner nation options and support. Non-military
665 partners may enable economic sanctions against adversaries, develop
666 new alliances, secure access to ports and overflight routes, and facilitate
667 economic and military aid for state and non-state partners. These
668 measures affect the logistical and sustainment dynamics in the
669 operational environment.
670

671 • *Military.* While this is the traditional level of consideration, design and
672 planning for commanders' and staff, in an increasingly complex,
673 interconnected, and uncertain future, alignment with non-military
674 activities is critical. Military action should shape favorable psychological,

¹⁰ B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1974)

675 political, and logistical dynamics and conditions – in coordination and
676 cooperation with, and in many cases in support of, non-military
677 activities. Military forces should continuously seek positional advantage
678 in the physical and human terrain – often in support of facilitating non-
679 military activities to exploit that positional advantage. The military
680 instrument can rarely achieve sustainable strategic outcomes alone and
681 is most effectual when applied in concert with non-military instruments
682 in pursuit of clear political objectives.

683
684 **Employ the Force and Secure Gains**

685
686 Having designed the campaign, Joint leaders and planners employ the
687 force. Leaders and planners tailor the campaign to the operating environment
688 in order to achieve acceptable and sustainable strategic outcomes.

689
690 *Campaigning in a state of cooperation*

691
692 Joint Force activities in cooperation can create a more favorable security
693 environment. Campaigning in cooperation is typically an enduring activity with
694 no discrete start or end point. Joint Force cooperative activities may entail
695 some combination of strengthening ties with an ally or partner and advancing a
696 broader theater strategy. The Joint Force typically consolidates gains in
697 cooperation through sustained engagement with partners. In some cases,
698 however, limited or selective interaction might be either necessary or
699 preferable.

700
701 The competition mechanisms presented earlier in the document have
702 great utility for the Joint Force while campaigning in cooperation. When
703 applying those or other mechanisms, Joint Force commanders must account
704 for external considerations such as the desired conditions that cooperation
705 should create, the nature of the relevant relationships, and the potential
706 partner’s willingness and capacity. Commanders should also account for
707 internal considerations such as interests, objectives, and priorities of other
708 contributing USG departments; resource limitations; relevant statutory or
709 policy restrictions on the amount, categories, and purposes of U.S. security
710 cooperation expenditure; other statutory or policy on security cooperation that
711 is relevant to the specific case.

712
713 One remnant of the peace/war dichotomy is that some within the Joint
714 Force do not regard cooperative activities as campaigning. Yet just as in armed
715 conflict, employment of the military instrument in a state of cooperation is
716 meant to achieve some policy aim. A campaigning mindset is particularly
717 important in cooperation because of the duration and nature of the
718 engagement. The most productive relationships take time to build. A

719 partnership is unlikely to reach its potential if the Joint Force approaches
720 engagement as discrete events rather than as part of a continuous long-term
721 process. The benefits of relationships (e.g. increased commitment of a foreign
722 military to the rule of law, greater willingness to assist U.S. efforts in a crisis)
723 are often diffuse, intangible, and difficult to assess. Improvements in
724 relationships occur over long periods of time. Therefore, they are often
725 undervalued when measured on an event-by-event cost-benefit basis.
726

727 As they campaign in cooperation, Joint leaders and planners must
728 accurately understand and assess the character of the U.S.'s relationship with
729 each partner. Relationships can be categorized along the following descending
730 scale (see figure 3): *Cooperative, Reinforcing, Inspiring, Establishing, Broaden,*
731 *Leveraging, and Controlling.* In practice, because bilateral relations are complex
732 and include many subordinate elements and span many different activities,
733 several of these designations will likely apply at once. For instance, with a
734 smaller developing country, intelligence agencies might have a deliberately
735 distant relationship, the Air Force might have a limited relationship based on
736 partner capacity, while the Army has an extensive relationship due to partner
737 contributions to operations.
738

739 Combining a deep understanding of the environment and a realistic
740 appraisal of the relevant partner relationships with the policy aim, allows
741 commanders and staffs to derive a range of feasible, productive military options
742 that lead to sustainable and acceptable outcomes. This process is no less
743 purposeful nor less rigorous because it relates to cooperation rather than
744 armed conflict. At any point on the competition continuum, campaigning is a
745 proactive activity meant to achieve favorable conditions and influence other
746 actors' behaviors in support of national interests.
747

Cooperative – Most of the time, the Joint Force works alongside willing partners with similar interests. These actors are not overtly supportive of all the U.S.’ actions and activities, but have specific interests which aligns with ours.

Reinforcing - At times, independent actor(s) may already have taken action, of their own accord, that aligns with our interests. In these cases, we seek to support their actions, and do not necessarily need to take the lead (though that may change with continual assessment).

Inspiring - In contrast to ‘reinforce’, in this case potential actor(s) have not yet taken action, but there is potential that with the proper incentive and signals, that actor could be motivated to initiate action that would be aligned with our interests.

Establishing – A situation unfolds that affects a U.S. issue or interest and we realize that we do not have a partnership with an actor who shares our concerns and the Joint Force must help establish a relationship that is germane

Broadening - When we have an established relationship with an actor, but realize that we must further our relationship without coercion to achieve our desired condition/behavior. In other words, we must strengthen the good terms of our relationship.

Leveraging - Like ‘control’, this is normally applied to those actor(s) who would align counter to our desired condition/behavior. While it may not involve direct influence as with ‘control’, it implies that we have the means and the will to apply that level of influence if necessary.

Controlling - This relationship is rare, but there are cases where the US has a certain level of control in a relationship. Historically, that relationship is undergoing radical transition. This is normally involves direct influence over an actor as a part of an occupation, who would normally not be aligned with our desired conditions.

Figure 3. Cooperative relationships

748
749

750 *Campaigning in a state of competition below armed conflict*

751
752 Like campaigning in cooperation, Joint Force activities in competition
753 below armed conflict must be regarded as part of a larger enduring effort to
754 achieve sustainable and acceptable outcomes. This form of competition arises
755 when one actor chooses to challenge the status quo or existing norms and
756 another chooses to resist. The intensity with which either actor chooses to
757 press the competition will often change in response to the other actor, domestic
758 political considerations, and other events. Thus, a rigid, pre-determined course
759 of military action will often be unsuitable for competition below armed conflict,
760 which will be driven by rapid shifts in the political environment. This creates
761 numerous challenges for the Joint Force as establishing the necessary
762 conditions for employing military forces—administrative and logistical
763 preparations; granting of appropriate authorities and orders; securing access;
764 coordination with interorganizational partners; securing and executing funds—
765 requires considerable time. The art of campaigning in competition below armed
766 conflict, therefore, is in setting the conditions to enable the maximum range of
767 measures to absorb change and respond effectively as the intensity of the
768 political situation changes.

769
770 *A Framework for Competition – Contest, Counter, and Improve.* The fluid
771 political nature of campaigning below armed conflict thus requires a flexible
772 construct for envisioning campaigning. Gains in competition below armed
773 conflict typically take the form of modifications in behavior rather than control
774 of territory. Because behavior can so quickly change, competition below armed
775 conflict requires different ways of thinking about escalation and deterrence.
776 Early recognition of an impending change in an adversary’s behavior provides
777 the best opportunity for deterrence, but for a variety of reasons this might be
778 difficult to achieve in practice. Once the competitor has taken action, the
779 political and military situation becomes more complex; effectively reacting at
780 that point requires the Joint Force to be able to employ a wide variety of
781 capabilities that can be tailored to the situation.

782
783 In *Force without War*, scholars Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan offer
784 one potential framework.¹¹ They advocate an analysis that begins with
785 determining which behaviors the Joint Force wants to reinforce and which it
786 wants to modify. In relation to a hostile power (*antagonist*), reinforcing desired
787 behaviors requires *deterrence* (we desire to enforce continued inaction) and
788 modifying behaviors requires *compellance* (we desire to impose something new.)
789 In relation to a friendly power (*protagonist*), reinforcing desired behaviors
790 requires *assurance* (in order for the behavior to continue) and modifying

¹¹ Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force Without War: U. S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1978), 71-129.

791 behavior requires *inducement* (in order for current behaviors to stop or alter.)
792 Blechman and Kaplan’s model can be applied across the competition
793 continuum with one modification. Their terms *antagonist* and *protagonist* imply
794 a relationship that is either hostile or cooperative. But the expanded view of the
795 operating environment proposed by the JCIC allows for a mixture of
796 cooperative and competitive aspects; thus, the same state might
797 simultaneously be both an antagonist and an protagonist with the appropriate
798 mixture of methods to reinforce desirable and modify undesirable behaviors.
799

800 The methods employed in competition below armed conflict can vary
801 widely but successful action in this state will often feature several
802 characteristics. First, the Joint Force and its partners must possess the best
803 possible understanding of how relevant actors will perceive action. Whether in
804 terms of deterring a competitor or assuring partners, Joint Force operations
805 should lead to the desired behaviors. Second, the Joint Force and its partners
806 should conduct a broad array of activities: establishing access to critical areas,
807 forward positioning units, establishing rotational presence, organizing
808 exercises, sharing intelligence, employing unconventional measures, and
809 conducting information operations to include efforts to counter and undermine
810 the competitor’s narrative. Third, the Joint Force and its partners should
811 ensure the creative and flexible conduct of these various activities in pursuit of
812 desired outcomes within a fluid political situation and pervasive information
813 environment. Fourth, continual objective reassessment of the competitor’s
814 intentions and capabilities in recognition that just as U.S. policy aims could
815 change over time, so the competitor’s aims and thresholds will also likely
816 change.
817

818 Problems within the realm of competition do not readily lend themselves to
819 “winning quickly.”¹² The Joint Force will work in concert with
820 interorganizational partners to achieve acceptable and sustainable outcomes.
821 As described by Blechman and Kaplan in *Force without War*, success in the
822 space between peace and war is characterized by adversaries’ and partners’
823 behaving in a manner commensurate with U.S. policy.
824

825 *Campaigning in a state of armed conflict*

826

827 The characteristics of successful campaigning in armed conflict are the
828 most intuitive, best understood, and generally well covered elsewhere. Yet it is
829 worth noting that one implication of the expanded operating environment is
830 that campaigning in armed conflict does not occur in isolation. So long as the
831 United States fights with allies and partners, campaigning in cooperation will
832 be occurring at the same time. It is possible that campaigning in competition

¹² Ibid.

833 below armed conflict will occur simultaneously as well, particularly if there is
834 an adversarial third party in the conflict. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, for
835 instance, Multi-National Force-Iraq was campaigning in cooperation with the
836 Iraqi government, in conflict with several groups of insurgents, and in
837 competition with Iran, which was trying to extend its influence at the expense
838 of the United States. Commanders and staffs must be aware of the interrelated
839 nature of these various elements and their varying degree of importance. At
840 some points in a conflict, the imperatives of maintaining a cooperative
841 relationship with a partner for political, strategic, or operational reasons might
842 be more important than efforts against the common enemy. The relative
843 importance will vary with the situation; the critical insight is that campaigning
844 in armed conflict is not an isolated activity.

845
846 *Securing Gains*

847
848 Follow through is an essential aspect of campaigning across the
849 competition continuum, not just in armed conflict. All instruments of national
850 power have roles in achieving national strategic objectives. The Joint Force
851 must translate military success, whether combat or non-combat, into
852 acceptable and sustainable outcomes. This responsibility includes continued
853 collaboration with USG partners in securing their objectives through the
854 provision of advice and appropriate military assistance. The past decades
855 demonstrate that successful campaigning requires a sustained commitment to
856 follow through to accomplish and sustain national goals.

857
858 *Cooperative Follow Through*

859
860 As in armed conflict, consolidating the Joint Force's achievements in
861 cooperation is an essential aspect of integrated campaigning. Of course, the
862 form that this consolidation takes in cooperation is different than in
863 competition or in armed conflict. Cooperative follow through could entail
864 solidifying positive aspects of the bilateral relationship, improving partner
865 resiliency, and maintaining support strong enough to resist efforts at
866 subversion. Cooperative follow through takes place at many levels from
867 individual to institutional relationships. Though the immediate benefits of
868 cooperative relationships are not always apparent, history demonstrates that
869 years of engagement often pay dividends in unanticipated ways. For instance,
870 the defense relationship with Saudi Arabia paid unexpected dividends by
871 creating a foundation for cooperation during OPERATION DESERT
872 SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Conversely, relationships cannot be created
873 instantaneously when an unexpected crisis requires cooperation with a
874 previously neglected partner.

875
876 *Competitive Follow Through*

877

878 The enduring nature of integrated campaigning in competition below
879 armed conflict poses unique challenges in following through. Successes rarely
880 mean the end of the overall competition and few gains are reliably permanent.
881 Instead, the situation is somewhat similar to the “Great Game” of the
882 nineteenth century, in which each party continually seeks to improve its
883 position and guard against the competitor undermining the desired order. In
884 that context, following through is an essential on-going task. If done well,
885 following through might reduce overall tensions; competition is not a zero-sum
886 contest. In all cases, competitive follow through should protect and advance
887 national interests and position the Joint Force for the next evolution of
888 competition.

889

890 The trajectory of competition below armed conflict might rapidly turn in
891 reaction to changes in the relationship between the competitors or in reaction
892 to some other event. Regardless of the reason for the change in conditions, the
893 dynamic, ambiguous and uncertain competitive environment demands
894 constant reassessments of campaigning activities and priorities.

895

896 *Conflict Follow Through*

897

898 In armed conflict, the Joint Force must view military operations and the
899 follow through to secure policy aims as an integrated whole. Tactical and
900 operational successes do not possess intrinsic value but are worthwhile only to
901 the extent that they support larger policy aims. Yet historically the translation
902 of military success into acceptable and sustainable outcomes has been one of
903 the most difficult elements of campaigning.

904

905 The problem is not merely conceptual. Commanders and their staffs must
906 account for the changes in political and public atmosphere that commonly take
907 place in the period between the apparent military victory and a true
908 consolidation of gains. In the flush of hard-won triumph, the Joint Force, USG,
909 and American public have in the past experienced some combination of
910 impatience, exuberant optimism, and division about what further aims to
911 pursue. To varying extents, these problems impeded successful follow through
912 in the aftermath of all major conflicts in U.S. history. By their nature, these
913 currents are both unpredictable and largely beyond the control of military
914 commanders. It is possible, however, for the Joint Force to anticipate these
915 shifts and to seek to begin the consolidation of gains as early as possible in
916 order to guard against changes. Commanders and staffs should assume that
917 the withdrawal of resources, imposition of political constraints, and lack of
918 focus will make it more rather than less difficult to achieve acceptable
919 outcomes in the wake of armed conflict. The other consistent theme in history


920 is that by virtue of their size and unique capabilities military forces will
921 continue to play a major role, even if another USG department is in the lead.
922

923 Wars disrupt political, social, and economic structures, networks, and
924 institutions to the point it is often difficult for them to simply return to their
925 pre-conflict state. The destruction of the old order creates the conditions for
926 intense competition between groups seeking to retain or gain power, status, or
927 wealth within the new order as it slowly congeals. Even if they remain peaceful
928 these struggles can create difficulties for Joint Force commanders, who are
929 responsible for achieving policy objectives. In the aftermath of war, political,
930 social, and economic competition can often become violent due to the
931 availability of weapons and former fighters.
932

933 Despite these challenges, the Joint Force must follow through effectively
934 in order to achieve the best possible outcome. This imperative remains valid
935 even when DoD is not the lead agency in the supposed “post-conflict” period
936 that will likely last years if not decades. Figure 4 provides an illustrative
937 depiction of the several periods in armed conflict through securing an
938 advantageous political outcome. Integrated campaigning in armed conflict
939 requires the Joint Force to maintain continuity and focus throughout this
940 entire period even while understanding and accounting for the conditions
941 unique to each of these distinct (though sometimes overlapping) conditions:
942

- 943 1) A re-characterization period where the political stakes in the wake of
944 armed conflict dramatically expand and drive frequent adjustments to
945 the campaign and changes to the range of possible outcomes. This
946 period is filled with risk and uncertainty to the degree that the
947 military victory could be diminished or even rendered irrelevant.
- 948 2) Creation of favorable conditions where the U.S. can effectively bring to
949 bear other elements of national and allied power.
- 950 3) Establishing an acceptable security situation;
- 951 4) Developing partnerships to consolidate the new political order.
- 952 5) Transition to an enduring commitment to perpetuate our gains and
953 realized advantages.

954
955



956
957
958

Figure 4. Illustrative patterns of transitions during consolidation

959 Campaigning in armed conflict thus entails a wider scope than commonly
960 appreciated. The disruptions caused by war mean that even in conflict against
961 a purely conventional enemy, the requirement for successful follow through will
962 entail dealing with the problems of fostering positive perceptions among
963 populations, battling political subversion, and countering violent criminal,
964 insurgent, or resistance organizations, and other actors (including nation-
965 states) intent on advancing their own interests in this fluid environment. Used
966 at the strategic level, *exit strategy* and operational design terms such as
967 *military end state* and *termination criteria* imply an unrealistically fixed political
968 environment that assumes explicit guidance and predetermined geographic,
969 temporal, and policy limits. The acknowledgement that campaigning will occur
970 over long periods to achieve evolving policy objectives under challenging
971 conditions is the actual historical experience of American wars.

972

973 **Assess and Adapt the Campaign**

974

975 This element of the construct for integrated campaigning focuses on
976 coordinating and monitoring implementation of the campaign and adapting the
977 campaign in response to new conditions in order to achieve sustainable
978 outcomes.

979

980 During force employment, ongoing reassessments of the operating
981 environment are an integral aspect of campaigning to ensure the military
982 instrument of national power, working in concert with non-military
983 instruments, remains productively engaged until achievement of the desired
984 strategic outcome. To do this, the Joint Force and its partners must use
985 embedded and disciplined assessments.

986

987 Through early and continuous assessment, the Joint Force and its
988 partners monitor the environment and progress toward the achievement of
989 policy aims. Assessment helps leaders and planners to measure the overall
990 effectiveness of employing non-military and military capabilities to ensure that
991 the campaign approach remains feasible, suitable, and acceptable. If the
992 current approach is failing to establish the desired conditions, or if aspects of
993 the operating environment or problem change significantly, then the leaders
994 and planners may decide to begin a reframing effort that could cause small
995 adjustments to current activities or a significant reorientation with new
996 objectives and organizational realignments.

997

998 Reframing is the process of revisiting earlier design considerations,
999 assumptions, conclusions, and decisions that underpin the current campaign
1000 approach. In essence, reframing reviews what the leaders and planners believe
1001 they understand about the operating environment and the effect campaign

1002 activity has had on the achievement of acceptable policy conditions.

1003

1004 When designing the campaign, leaders and planners developed logic for
1005 why the campaign would work. This logic is the baseline for assessment,
1006 learning, and adaptation. During execution, leaders and planners use aligned
1007 indicators of accomplishment as they continuously monitor and evaluate the
1008 effectiveness of their campaign and activities against this baseline to detect
1009 significant unanticipated changes.

1010

1011 If required, commanders and staffs adjust the campaign approach to
1012 ensure alignment with the desired direction and determine whether that
1013 direction itself remains relevant to the environment and the strategic leaders'
1014 desires and expectations.

1015

1016 Reframing can involve significantly refining or discarding the logic for the
1017 campaign and models that formed the basis of the leaders' campaign approach
1018 and guidance. Potential triggers for reframing:

1019

1020 • An assessment challenges leader and staff understanding of the operating
1021 environment, existing problem, or relevance of the campaign approach

1022

1023 • A scheduled periodic review shows a problem

1024

1025 • Failure to make required progress

1026

1027 • Key assumptions or campaign logic prove invalid

1028

1029 • Unanticipated success

1030

1031 • A major event causes “catastrophic change” in the environment

1032

1033 Information requirements across all echelons have increased
1034 exponentially as the world has grown more complex and volatile. The current
1035 demand for information exceeds the analytical abilities of the Joint Force and is
1036 straining collection assets. Furthermore, military and non-military leaders and
1037 planners have a challenge in collecting, processing, analyzing, and
1038 incorporating information in a timely manner. In order to focus efforts and
1039 provide more accurate assessments, the Joint Force must embed a robust
1040 analysis program into the campaign planning process.

1041

1042 A robust analysis program featuring an assessment plan supported by
1043 an accompanying information collection plan embedded into every step of the
1044 integrated campaigning process is essential. Integrating information collection
1045 and assessment plans into the campaigning process serves three purposes: it

1046 will confirm baseline conditions; it will facilitate real-time monitoring
1047 mechanisms; and it will enable accurate assessments of campaign progress.
1048 Evaluating baseline conditions is paramount to developing an effective
1049 campaign plan. Once a baseline is established, leaders and planners can
1050 develop an effective campaign. As the campaign progresses, a deliberate data
1051 collection and assessment plan allows staffs to accurately monitor the
1052 campaign. Focused collection and assessment efforts provide staffs with
1053 essential information, reducing the flood of superfluous information received
1054 under current practices. Access to the 'right' information at the 'right' time
1055 grants commanders the operational flexibility to react to emerging trends.
1056 Finally, a detailed assessment and collection plan facilitates an accurate
1057 measurement of the campaigns' performance.

1058
1059 Finally, assessment as part of integrated campaigning requires disciplined
1060 approach and behavior. Focus, both in the application of collection activities
1061 and in the resulting evaluation of data, leads to more certainty in assessment
1062 results. This focus only comes through careful and deliberate consideration of
1063 the operating environment, objectives, and available resources during plan
1064 development and execution. Disciplined and thorough thought about what to
1065 measure, how that data relates to the objectives, how to measure it, and how to
1066 analyze it must be done in advance, and continuously updated, in order to reap
1067 the full benefits of assessment as an element of the campaign.

1068
1069

1070 **6. Concept Required Capabilities**

1071
1072 The central idea advocated in this concept entails potentially significant
1073 required capabilities for force development. After analyzing inputs from across
1074 the community of interest, the following capabilities emerged as essential to
1075 implementation of this concept. They constitute an initial proposal, not an
1076 exhaustive or authoritative listing, of required capabilities that need additional
1077 thought and development. Although grouped by components of the key idea for
1078 ease of understanding, many of these required capabilities apply across
1079 solution components. Furthermore, the required capabilities have implications
1080 for DOTMLPF-P as well as for integration with interorganizational partners.
1081 Following concept approval, subsequent analysis of these proposed capability
1082 requirements will provide the basis for developing capability solutions to close
1083 the conceptual gaps this concept addresses.

1084 **Understand the Environment**

- 1085
1086
- 1087 • Required Capability 1: The ability to describe the environment in terms
1088 of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict,

1089 including relevant strategic actors and the relationships with and among
1090 them.

- 1091
- 1092 • Required Capability 2: The ability to forecast potential trends of the
1093 relationships between the U.S. and other strategic actors with respect to
1094 cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict.
- 1095
- 1096 • Required Capability 3: The ability to understand the current foreign
1097 assistance environment in a specified region.
- 1098
- 1099 • Required Capability 4: The ability to identify, understand, and assess
1100 relevant legal authorities, constraints, and limitations.
- 1101
- 1102 • Required Capability 5: The ability to identify and evaluate the interests,
1103 intent, capability, and capacity of relevant actors to support or adversely
1104 affect U.S. interests.
- 1105

1106 **Design and Construct the Campaign**

- 1107
- 1108 • Required Capability 6: The ability to clearly communicate campaign
1109 opportunities, limitations, constraints, and shortfalls to policy makers.
- 1110
- 1111 • Required Capability 7: The ability to design and construct an integrated
1112 campaign based on policy guidance, the operating environment, and
1113 available capabilities, authorities, and resources.
- 1114
- 1115 • Required Capability 8: The ability to select, refine, and apply the relevant
1116 considerations of an integrated campaign design as described in JCIC.
- 1117
- 1118 • Required Capability 9: The ability to develop a coherent campaign
1119 strategy for synchronizing and integrating available resources to the
1120 achievement of strategic outcomes.
- 1121
- 1122 • Required Capability 10: The ability to establish appropriate command and
1123 coordinating relationships and to identify and prepare headquarters
1124 elements.
- 1125
- 1126 • Required Capability 11: The ability to leverage partnerships and
1127 associated relationships towards the achievement of campaign objectives.
- 1128

1129 **Employ the Integrated Force and Secure Gains**

- 1130
- 1131 • Required Capability 12: The ability to engage in continuous civil-military

1132 dialogue with policy makers.

1133

- 1134 • Required Capability 13: The ability to share information across CCMDs,
1135 Services, combat support agencies, interorganizational partners and
1136 others as required.

1137

- 1138 • Required Capability 14: The ability to align the activities of the Joint
1139 Force and interorganizational partners in an integrated campaign
1140 construct.

1141

- 1142 • Required Capability 15: The ability to apply appropriate competition
1143 mechanisms.

1144

- 1145 • Required Capability 16: The ability to synchronize Joint Force and
1146 foreign partner activities in an integrated campaign construct.

1147

- 1148 • Required Capability 17: The ability to follow through and secure gains
1149 throughout the campaign.

1150

1151 **Assess and Adapt the Campaign**

1152

- 1153 • Required Capability 18: The ability to respond to changes in policy with
1154 multiple approaches/options in the campaign design, construct, and
1155 employment.

1156

- 1157 • Required Capability 19: The ability to continually assess the campaign
1158 and adapt it as required, including transregional combatant command
1159 operations.

1160

1161 **7. Risks of Adopting this Concept.**

1162

- 1163 • Interorganizational partners may be unwilling or unable to align and
1164 integrate into global operations. Partners may not align their efforts for
1165 various bureaucratic, organizational, legal, cultural, or financial reasons.
1166 Should alignment not take place, the Joint Force and its partners will not
1167 realize the JCIC vision and approach—with corresponding negative
1168 effects on operational effectiveness. Additionally, if DoD fills gaps created
1169 through failures to align, partners may be incentivized to remain reliant
1170 on DoD, despite responsibilities mandated by law and historical norms.

1171

- 1172 • Risk of escalation and unintended consequences. Actions taken below
1173 the level of armed conflict intended to heighten U.S. security could create
1174 a security dilemma, where other states respond in kind, leading to

1175 heightened tensions or even conflict. However, Joint commanders must
1176 balance this risk with the recognition that a failure to counter actors'
1177 malign activities only reinforces that behavior.
1178

- 1179 • The U.S. could miscalculate an adversary's reaction to our policies and
1180 actions. Since deterrence resides in the mind of the adversary, joint
1181 commanders cannot be certain that campaign activities are creating the
1182 desired effect on the adversary's perceptions. Ongoing assessments are
1183 critical for evaluating the potential impacts of integrated campaigning,
1184 and of other proposed relevant U.S. actions, on an adversary's decision
1185 calculus.
1186
- 1187 • The concept's call for integrated campaigning across geographic
1188 boundaries and in multiple domains could lead to campaigns of
1189 enormous complexity. The fog and friction of war punishes unnecessary
1190 complexity, but transregional, multi-domain, and multi-functional
1191 campaigns are complex by nature. Commanders must be alert to this
1192 tension and must continuously strive for the proper balance.
1193
- 1194 • Joint commanders may not be able to tailor the force for simultaneous
1195 campaigning in cooperation, competition, and armed conflict. The Joint
1196 Force currently organizes its forces and conducts C2 along service and
1197 functional lines. The current arrangements and relationships are not well
1198 suited for ad hoc task organizations or C2 arrangements. This risk is
1199 mitigated by actions taken by the Joint Force to ensure the DOTMLPF
1200 changes as necessary for simultaneous campaigning across the
1201 competition continuum.
1202

1203 **8. Conclusion.**

1205 By developing the capabilities described in this concept and adopting its
1206 operational approaches, the Joint Force will be better prepared to address the
1207 dynamic security environment now and in the future to conduct integrated
1208 campaigning both internally and with interorganizational partners across the
1209 competition continuum. The Joint Force must be prepared to campaign
1210 simultaneously across the competition continuum. This concept enhances the
1211 Joint Force's ability to meet that standard by offering an alternative construct
1212 for understanding and operating within the future operating environment.

1213
1214
1215
1216
1217
1218
1219
1220
1221
1222
1223
1224
1225
1226
1227
1228
1229
1230
1231
1232
1233
1234
1235
1236
1237
1238
1239
1240
1241
1242
1243
1244
1245
1246
1247
1248
1249
1250
1251
1252
1253
1254
1255

Glossary

Alignment: Joint doctrine defaults to the English definition of alignment rather than including it in JP 1-02. According to Merriam-Webster Dictionary, alignment is “the act of aligning or state of being aligned; especially the proper positioning or state of adjustment of parts in relation to each other.”

Campaign: a framework to orchestrate and synchronize simultaneous activities and operations (major or otherwise) aimed at accomplishing or enabling policy aims; the joint forces’ intellectual guide and construct for the informed application of force; the aggregate contribution to a policy regarding armed conflict, competition, and cooperation.

Consolidation: continual and deliberate actions to secure gains and translate military success into the aims of policy; an inherent part of campaigning in armed conflict, competition, and cooperation. Central and essential to the conduct of war and achieving war’s policy.

Integrated Campaigning: (proactive) Joint Force and interorganizational partner efforts to enable the achievement and maintenance of policy aims by integrating military and aligning non-military activities of sufficient scope, scale, simultaneity, and duration across multiple domains.

Integration: the arrangement of military and non-military actions to operate by engaging as a whole.

Interorganizational Partners: Other United States Government departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal government agencies; intergovernmental organizations; foreign security forces and government agencies; nongovernmental organizations; entities of the private sector; non-traditional security entities; and foreign populations and groups.

Major Operation (Revised): A series of tactical actions which may include combat conducted by individual or joint forces, coordinated in time and place, to achieve a logical series of tactical objectives within and across multiple domains in an operational area. Within a campaign’s construct, successful results may lead to attaining an operational-level objective.

Military End State (Revised): Term describing and framing success criteria for military accomplishment associated with a specific operation (major or otherwise). The term is not synonymous with achieving policy aim or creating a sustainable outcomes.

Objective: (JP 5.0 2011) Current -1. The clearly defined, decisive, and

1256 attainable goal toward which every operation is directed. 2. The specific target
1257 of the action taken which is essential to the commander's plan.

1258

1259 **Operational-level Objective:** An animate (ex. behavioral) or inanimate (ex.
1260 positional) purposeful goal toward which a commander designs and directs
1261 action within a campaign's conceptual construct.

1262

1263 **Perpetuation:** Deliberate actions to sustain outcomes without interruption;
1264 occurs within the Post-Aim period.

1265

1266 **Policy Aim:** The intended or desired achievements of a political direction
1267 adopted and pursued by a government, ruler, or other state or non-state
1268 political apparatus.

1269

1270 **Strategic Initiative:** the ability to take action in support of national objectives.

1271

1272 **Strategic-level Objective:** An elastic political value that flows from a policy;
1273 rarely static but pliable and exists in beta-like form. Continually evolves as a
1274 function of political foresight, calculus, compromise, and daring. Collectively,
1275 describes the desired outcomes or aims.

1276

1277 **Sustainable Outcome:** Attainment or realization of a policy's aims. The goal
1278 and orientation of a campaign; not synonymous with end state

1279

1280 **War and Conflict Follow Through and Transition (WCFTT)** (*Replaces the*
1281 *undefined terms of Post-conflict and Post-war*): A period of deliberate action to
1282 secure military victory through consolidation; a long series of methodical and
1283 informed transitions leading to the attainment of strategic objectives and
1284 accomplishment of policy aims, historically reflective of U.S.' successful
1285 transitions. In many cases, the follow through required to attain outcomes
1286 requires a substantive and lengthy commitment.

1287

Bibliography

1288

1289 Blechman, Barry M. and Stephen S. Kaplan. *Force Without War: U. S. Armed*
1290 *Forces as a Political Instrument*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution:
1291 1978.

1292

1293 Buley, Ben. *The New American Way of War: Military Culture and the Political*
1294 *Utility of Force*. London: Routledge, 2007.

1295

1296 von Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, tr. Princeton,
1297 NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.

1298

1299 Cohen, Eliot. *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in*
1300 *Wartime*. New York: Free Press, 2002.

1301

1302 Cohen, Eliot. "Defense in a Disordered World." *The American Interest* (28
1303 October 2015) [http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/10/28/defense-](http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/10/28/defense-in-a-disordered-world/)
1304 [in-a-disordered-world/](http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/10/28/defense-in-a-disordered-world/)

1305

1306 Cronin, Patrick, M., Mira Rapp-Hooper, and Harry Krejsa, *Dynamic Balance: An*
1307 *Alliance Requirements Roadmap for the Asia-Pacific Region*. Washington, D.C.:
1308 Center for a New American Security, 2016.

1309

1310 Freedman, Lawrence. "Calling the Shots: Should Politicians or Generals Run
1311 Our Wars?" *Foreign Affairs* (September-October 2002)
1312 [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2002-09-01/calling-](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2002-09-01/calling-shots-should-politicians-or-generals-run-our-wars)
1313 [shots-should-politicians-or-generals-run-our-wars](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2002-09-01/calling-shots-should-politicians-or-generals-run-our-wars)

1314

1315 Grygiel, Jakub J., & A. Wess Mitchell, A. W. *The Unquiet Frontier: Rising Rivals,*
1316 *Vulnerable Allies, and the Crisis of American Power*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
1317 University Press, 2016.

1318

1319 Rose, Gideon. *How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle*. New York:
1320 Simon & Schuster, 2010.

1321

1322 Scharre, Paul. "Losing the Peace is Still Losing." *War on the Rocks* (16 October
1323 2016) <https://warontherocks.com/2016/10/losing-the-peace-is-still-losing/>

1324

1325 Smith, Rupert. *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*. London:
1326 Allen Lane, 2005.

1327

- 1328 Schadlow, Nadia. (2014, August 18). "Peace and War: The Space Between." *War*
1329 *on the Rocks* (18 August 2014) [http://warontherocks.com/2014/08/peace-](http://warontherocks.com/2014/08/peace-and-war-the-space-between/)
1330 [and-war-the-space-between/](http://warontherocks.com/2014/08/peace-and-war-the-space-between/)
1331
1332 Votel, Joseph L. (2015). *The Gray Zone White Paper*. United States Special
1333 Operations Command, 2015.