

Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning



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FOREWORD

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Today, the United States is in a worldwide competition with emerging and resurgent global powers, aspiring regional hegemons, and non-state actors seeking to challenge aspects of the post-World War II international order. For the foreseeable future, adversaries will continue to creatively combine conventional and non-conventional methods to achieve their objectives. Many will operate below a threshold that invokes a direct military response from the U.S. while retaining the capability to escalate to more conventional armed conflict if desired.

That operating environment presents the Department of Defense with a difficult military challenge: develop a methodology, with associated capabilities that enables the Joint Force to collaborate and synchronize with interorganizational partners and conduct globally integrated operations to achieve acceptable and sustainable outcomes. Furthermore, any solution to the military challenge must account for several additional factors: the complexity of the environment; interactions with adaptive adversaries; the persistence of enduring competitions; transregional challenges; emerging patterns of competitions below the threshold of armed combat; and the challenge of integrating military activities within the DoD and aligning those activities with interorganizational partners.

The response to the military challenge is the central idea of *Integrated Campaigning*. The JCIC defines *integrated campaigning* as Joint Force and interorganizational partner efforts to enable the achievement and maintenance of policy aims by integrating military activities and aligning non-military activities of sufficient scope, scale, simultaneity, and duration across multiple domains. The Joint Force integrates among staff elements and service components within a command, among different combatant commands, and within the DoD, while also aligning with interorganizational and multi-national partners.

The central idea consists of four interrelated elements that broadly describe how the Joint Force and its partners can effectively campaign:

- **Understand the Operating Environment** through the lens of the competition continuum and the use of a new lexicon to foster civil-military dialogue
- **Design and Construct the Campaign** using the Factors of Integrated Campaign Design and Competition Mechanisms to align military and non-military activities
- **Employ the Integrated Force & Secure Gains** in campaigns

tailored to the new operating environment

- **Assess & Adapt the Campaign** based on the continuous analysis of results in relation to expectations, to enhance understanding and update campaign objectives.

The foundational idea of the JCIC is to enable an *expanded view of the operating environment* by proposing the notion of a *competition continuum*. This competition continuum offers an alternative to the obsolete peace/war binary with a new model of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. These are not mutually exclusive conditions. They are states of relationships with other actors that can exist concurrently. The JCIC's *new lexicon* provides further specificity to aid civil-military dialogue.


A key supporting idea of this concept centers on the *factors of integrated campaign design* that collectively provide a conceptual framework for the Joint Force to apply across the competition continuum. These factors provide a tool for the development of a framework that enables the Joint Force to prevent rather than simply react to adversaries' activities. Additionally, *competition mechanisms* complement the factors of integrated campaign design by suggesting additional ways for the Joint Force to achieve desired policy objectives. These ideas combined with the imperative for the Joint Force to *align efforts with interorganizational non-military activities* are essential to the success of integrated campaigning.

The JCIC addresses some of the unique aspects of integrated campaigning and securing gains when engaged in cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. The common imperative linking them all is the need to *follow through* to ensure the maintenance of desired policy aims.

Finally, the concept describes how commanders and staffs must conduct *continual assessment* of the operating environment. This requires a disciplined approach working with non-military partners.

In summary, the *Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning* improves how Joint Force leaders and interorganizational partners integrate military efforts and align military with non-military activities to achieve acceptable and sustainable strategic outcomes.

Logic Map



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1 *But in war more than in any other subject we must begin by looking at*
2 *the nature of the whole; for here more than elsewhere the part and the*
3 *whole must always be thought of together.*

4 *Carl von Clausewitz*

5 **1. Introduction**

6
7 The Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC) provides an
8 intellectual framework for the Joint Force to better achieve and sustain
9 acceptable strategic outcomes in concert with the other instruments of national
10 power.¹ Its purpose is to guide force development and inform how Joint leaders
11 understand, visualize, describe, and direct military efforts and align military
12 and non-military activities. This concept addresses transregional and all-
13 domain challenges while accounting for changes in the operating environment
14 and incorporating lessons and observations from recent, ongoing, and
15 emerging security trends.

16
17 The JCIC aims to institutionalize the mindset and approach required to
18 prevail in the future security environment that is likely to be significantly
19 different than that experienced over the past several decades. Competitors have
20 exploited the vulnerabilities created by an American system optimized for
21 conventional armed conflict. They avoid U.S. strengths and seek to achieve
22 their political objectives in ways not easily countered by the Joint Force.

23
24 With this context in mind, the JCIC continues the process of adapting how
25 the Joint Force campaigns so that military actions better support the
26 achievement of policy objectives. Aligned with interorganizational partners,
27 Joint Force campaigns will contribute to the achievement of sustainable
28 strategic outcomes. War and international competition remain a clash of wills
29 in which each actor attempts to impose its will, an endeavor that is inherently
30 human, political, and uncertain. Therefore, the Joint Force must design and
31 construct campaigns, employ forces, and adopt ideas in a manner consistent
32 with the operating environment and the nature of war and international
33 competition.

34
35
36 **2. Scope**

37
38 This concept focuses on future Joint Force campaigning, which will occur
39 within the context of an increasingly complex international order. It supports
40 Joint Force efforts to prepare for globally integrated operations to achieve

¹ In this context, *Joint Force* refers holistically to the totality of U.S. military forces. This usage contrasts with references to a specific joint force, such as a joint task force.

41 acceptable and sustainable strategic outcomes. The JCIC approach supports
42 U.S. national strategy and enables the Joint Force to compete with or defeat
43 adversaries who are seeking to alter the international order in ways that are
44 counter to U.S. interests. The concept emphasizes the importance of aligning
45 Joint Force activities with the efforts of interorganizational and international
46 partners. It covers the period from the present to the foreseeable future for as
47 long as the description of the operating environment in the next section
48 remains valid.

49
50

51 **3. Future Operating Environment**

52

53 **Recent, Ongoing, and Emerging Challenges**

54

55 During the early and mid-1990s, the Joint Force began to institutionalize
56 many of the lessons of operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM. As DoD
57 prepared for future regional conflicts in the post-Cold War environment, Joint
58 Force doctrine and practices generally came to reflect an expectation that
59 DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM would be the model for future employment
60 of the force. However, over the past 25 years, the Joint Force's experience in
61 armed conflict unfolded in a different, and often more challenging, manner
62 than expected. The great lesson of recent conflicts has been that successful
63 execution of "dominating activities" does not automatically lead to the
64 achievement of desired political objectives.

65

66 Translating military success into the aims of policy is the ultimate
67 purpose of armed conflict. Yet in an age of constant competition, gains will
68 rarely go unchallenged. Thus, the maintenance of hard-won gains will require
69 continued commitment, often of considerable duration. This "follow through"
70 requires methodical transitions occurring over years or even decades to ensure
71 the perpetuation of favorable outcomes.

72

73 Strategic challenges such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are
74 employing coercive methods to accomplish objectives in the competitive space
75 between peace and war. These competitors aim to change international norms
76 with operations characterized by uncertainty to create ambiguity meant to
77 confuse public opinion, paralyze political decision making, subvert legal
78 frameworks, and avoid crossing the threshold of military response.

79

80 China's rapid construction of artificial islands in the disputed Spratly
81 Island chain is an example of the type of aggressive action revisionist states are
82 taking today to further their interests, often at the expense of neighboring
83 countries. While avoiding a direct military confrontation for the time being,

84 China's island building activities are in contravention of accepted international
85 norms and are a threat to regional stability.

86
87 Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2014 highlights how Moscow
88 employs a combination of diplomatic, informational, military (both conventional
89 and irregular), and economic means to achieve its aims. The precise mixture
90 varies with the situation but seems calculated to achieve maximum effect
91 without provoking a direct military response by the West.²

92
93 Iran's involvement in Lebanon and Syria provides another example of a
94 state expanding its regional influence using a combination of direct and
95 indirect military and non-military activities. Since the 1980s, Iran has supplied
96 Hezbollah in Lebanon with substantial amounts of military training, weapons,
97 political, and financial aid and is also directly involved with Hezbollah in the
98 Syrian civil war. These actions are part of a larger effort on behalf of Iran to use
99 aggressive diplomacy, economic overtures, and military action to pursue core
100 national interests while limiting the risk of direct retaliation from global actors.

101
102 North Korea is a small, regional power using a range of threats to
103 undermine U.S. and partner interests.³ Some of North Korea's provocations are
104 relatively covert: employment of cyber warfare, unconventional warfare,
105 clandestine subversion, and assassinations. Others, however, are overt, such
106 as frequent tests and demonstrations of nuclear weapons and long-range
107 missiles, artillery strikes against military and civilian targets in South Korea,
108 and the sinking of the *Cheonan*. These actions demonstrate that challenges
109 below armed conflict can take many forms.

110
111 The *Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested*
112 *and Disordered World*, envisions a future with challenges significantly different
113 from those of recent decades. The two overarching challenges are *contested*
114 *norms* and *persistent disorder*; both have significant implications for how the
115 Joint Force will campaign in the future.

116
117 In short, adversaries will continue to creatively combine conventional and
118 non-conventional methods to achieve objectives by operating below a threshold
119 that would invoke a direct military response from the U.S. while retaining the
120 capability to engage in more conventional armed conflict.

121
122

² Russian methods in Ukraine will likely serve as a template for future action, see (U//FOUO) Executive Summary (U) to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (S/NF) Russian New Generation Warfare Study (U).

³ *Joint Operating Environment 2035* (14 July 2016), 28.

123 **Implications of Recent, Ongoing, and Emerging Challenges**
124

125 The future operating environment will present leaders and planners with
126 both familiar and unfamiliar problem sets, challenge DoD resourcing systems,
127 and test the Joint Force’s ability to maintain the strategic initiative. Analysis
128 suggests several implications that are particularly pertinent for integrated
129 campaigning.
130

131 • **The Joint Force must eliminate institutional remnants of the**
132 **obsolete peace/war binary conception of the operating environment.**

133 For over two centuries, the U.S. military has conducted operations
134 outside of conventional armed conflict. Nonetheless, many Joint Force
135 processes operate wholly or in part on the assumption of operations
136 taking place in either distinct states of peace or war.⁴ For instance,
137 combatant commands report difficulty in securing resources to counter
138 revisionist powers, even when this is a national priority, if the resource
139 request cannot be tied to a specific contingency plan.⁵ In short, some
140 processes reflect residual assumptions that conventional warfare is the
141 natural outcome of competition, and thus resources, authorities, and
142 actions should be focused on deterring that conflict. In fact, revisionist
143 powers seek to achieve all of their policy objectives, while avoiding an
144 escalation to armed conflict. The Joint Force has begun to adapt through
145 changes in doctrine and organization, and by developing new
146 capabilities. However, the Joint Force as of yet still lacks an overarching
147 conceptual framework to bring these elements together.
148

149 • **Recognition that following through to accomplish or enable policy**
150 **aims is an inherent element of campaigning in armed conflict as**
151 **well as an essential facet of campaigning outside of armed conflict.**

152 Commanders and planners must understand that the operating
153 environment remains competitive even after the defeat of an enemy’s
154 main forces. This is equally true for competition below armed conflict, in
155 which adversaries will typically seek to secure advantages over prolonged
156 periods. Therefore, conducting continuing actions to consolidate gains

⁴ In remarks at the Air Force Association Air, Space, and Cyber Conference, 21 September 2016, General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., noted, “Our traditional way that we differentiate between peace and war is insufficient to [the dynamic of competition below armed conflict].” See also, remarks at the Association of the U.S. Army Conference, 5 October, 2016, “We think of being at peace or war...our adversaries don’t think that way.”
<http://secure.afa.org/events/Conference/2016/recordings/Wednesday-830am-Dunford.asp>;
<https://www.ausa.org/news/dunford-challenges-require-more-%E2%80%98buying-new-hardware%E2%80%99>.

⁵ Finding derived from field visits to combatant commands in summer 2016.

157 and maintain an acceptable political state is an inherent part of
158 campaigning in all circumstances.
159

- 160 • **Military power alone is insufficient to achieve sustainable political**
161 **objectives, and there are limited means to achieve integration**
162 **across the instruments of national power.** Overcoming the complex
163 challenges in the operating environment to achieve sustainable political
164 objectives will require the alignment of military and non-military
165 activities. As the DoD articulates how it will integrate and align Joint
166 Force activities, DoD must also plan and provide for support to and
167 coordination with other U.S. departments and agencies, as well as other
168 interorganizational partners.
169
- 170 • **A complex and rapidly changing operating environment will require**
171 **a construct for employing the Joint Force in competition below**
172 **armed conflict.** CJCSM 3130.01A (Campaign Planning Procedures and
173 Responsibilities) directs GCCs to develop a theater strategy for employing
174 “normal and routine” military activities in conditions short of conflict to
175 achieve strategic objectives.⁶ Planning, coordinating, and resourcing
176 processes for these activities assume a relatively stable strategic context.
177 This pace is sufficient for persistent engagement with partners and
178 deliberate efforts to set the theater to enable the execution of contingency
179 plans, but it is too cumbersome for the agile action required to counter
180 aggressive challengers operating below the threshold of armed conflict.⁷
181 In most cases, U.S. policy concerning a particular state or actor changes
182 relatively slowly. For this majority of instances, a deliberative
183 interorganizational process occurring over months or even years is
184 sufficient. There are a few exceptional states that due to their significant
185 influence, power, and global reach require a different approach. At any
186 given time, there are likely to be multiple strands of both cooperation and
187 competition between the U.S. and these states, so a coordinated
188 response to changes in the policy context is necessary. Yet when the size
189 and reach of those same states is tied to aggressive opportunism
190 constantly seeking advantage, the policy context can change rapidly.
191 Consequently, these challenges require an enhanced degree of
192 coordination and responsiveness. Achieving these qualities will be made
193 more difficult by the often overlapping responsibilities and legal
194 constraints that apply in competition below armed conflict. The Joint

⁶ CJCSM 3130.01A *Campaign planning procedures and responsibilities* (2014).

http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/m313001.pdf

⁷ In discussing trans-regional, multi-functional, multi-domain challenges, General Dunford remarked, “I personally don’t believe our current planning and organizational constructs are adequate....Our strategic planning needs to change.” Dunford, 21 October 2016.

195 Force must work in close cooperation with USG and international
196 partners. The Department of State will often function as lead in
197 situations involving competition short of armed conflict.
198
199

200 **4. The Military Challenge.**

201
202 *How do the Joint Force and its interorganizational partners prepare to conduct*
203 *globally integrated operations to achieve acceptable and sustainable outcomes,*
204 *taking into account:*

- 205
- 206 • the complexity of the environment;
- 207
- 208 • interactions with adaptive adversaries;
- 209
- 210 • transregional challenges;
- 211
- 212 • emerging patterns of competition below the threshold of armed conflict;
- 213 and
- 214
- 215 • the challenge of integrating military activities within the DoD and
- 216 aligning those activities with interorganizational partners.
- 217

218

219 **5. The Central Idea: A Construct for Integrated Campaigning**

220
221 The central idea for this concept is *Integrated Campaigning*. The JCIC
222 defines *integrated campaigning* as Joint Force and interorganizational partner
223 efforts to enable the achievement and maintenance of policy aims by
224 integrating military activities and aligning non-military activities of sufficient
225 scope, scale, simultaneity, and duration across multiple domains.⁸ The Joint
226 Force integrates among staff elements and service components within a
227 command, among different combatant commands, and within the DoD, while
228 also aligning with interorganizational and multi-national partners.
229

230 The central idea consists of four interrelated elements that broadly
231 describe how the Joint Force and its interorganizational partners can effectively
232 campaign:
233

⁸ For comparison, the current definition of a *campaign* is “a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space.” (JP 5-0) The JCIC emphasizes campaigning (verb) over campaigns (noun) in order to highlight the often enduring quality of competition.

- 234 • Understand the Operating Environment through the lens of the
235 competition continuum and the use of a new lexicon to foster civil-
236 military dialogue and collaboration
237
- 238 • Design and Construct the Campaign using the factors of integrated
239 campaign design and competition mechanisms to align military and non-
240 military activities
241
- 242 • Employ the Integrated Force and Secure Gains in campaigns tailored to
243 the new operating environment
244
- 245 • Assess & Adapt the Campaign based on the continuous evaluation of
246 results in relation to expectations, modifying both the understanding and
247 subsequent campaign objectives.
248

249 **Element #1. Understand the Operating Environment: Expanded View and**
250 **Lexicon**

251
252 Development of a common understanding of the operating environment
253 serves as the unifying starting point for planning and execution.
254

255 The way the Joint Force views the operating environment in the future
256 should account for more than the binary peace and war model. The JCIC offers
257 a more comprehensive and flexible spectrum of strategic relations—the
258 *competition continuum* of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and
259 armed conflict. The competition continuum is more than simply the
260 substitution of a three-part model for the two-part peace-war dichotomy. The
261 three elements of the continuum (cooperation, competition below armed
262 conflict, and armed conflict) are not exclusive of each other but can co-exist at
263 the same point in time. The implication for the Joint Force is that both plans
264 and actions must take into account this complex reality if they are to have a
265 reasonable chance of securing and maintaining policy objectives.
266

267 The competition continuum recognizes this complexity and provides a
268 lexicon to describe these interactions in order to facilitate shared
269 understanding, accurate communication of intent and risk, and enable sound
270 planning and decision-making. International relations are more complex than a
271 single descriptor, such as competition, can capture. These descriptors must be
272 used in reference to a specific relationship and issue. For instance, it would be
273 incorrect to say that the U.S. is solely in a state of competition with China.
274 Instead, the relationship is one of competition in regard to some interests, such
275 as access to the South China Sea, and cooperation in others, such as counter-
276 piracy in the Indian Ocean. The competition continuum is applicable to both
277 state and non-state actors. For instance, within a failing state, the Joint Force

278 may apply the descriptors to the government and any other significant actors,
279 such as warlords or independent armed factions.

280
281 The JCIC applies to the Joint Force. As a result, the competition
282 continuum is a construct primarily intended to guide military actions, but
283 there is no reason why it cannot inform the application of other instruments of
284 national power (diplomatic, informational, economic.)⁹ Indeed, in practice all
285 function as an interrelated and integrated whole. For instance, competition
286 through military means like freedom of navigation operations might be
287 curtailed in one area against a state, if that same state's diplomatic and
288 economic support is needed elsewhere, such as in the UN Security Council or
289 to uphold sanctions.

290
291 Figure 1 depicts the competition continuum, which consists of three
292 states of relations:

293
294 • In *armed conflict* the use of violence is the primary means by which an
295 actor seeks to satisfy its interests. Armed conflict varies in intensity and
296 ranges from limited warfare to major wars between great powers.

297
298 • *Competition below*
299 *armed conflict* exists
300 when two or more
301 actors in the
302 international system
303 have incompatible
304 interests but neither
305 seeks to escalate to
306 armed conflict. The
307 Joint Force will have a
308 great deal of utility in
309 securing strategic
310 objectives in
311 competition, but it will
312 typically offer support
313 to other USG departments and actors.¹⁰



Figure 1: Competition Continuum

314
315 • *Cooperation* includes mutually beneficial relationships between strategic

⁹ *Joint Publication 1* defines the instruments of national power as “all of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational and military.”

¹⁰ As noted above, these descriptors apply to a specific relationship between actors. Thus, if two state actors are using proxies to advance their interests, they are in competition below armed conflict. The proxies are in armed conflict.

316 actors with similar or compatible interests. Although interests will only
317 rarely be in complete alignment, relations that are fundamentally
318 cooperative are strategically important for the U.S. because they
319 underpin the international order, enhance collective security, help to
320 ensure access, enable burden-sharing, and deter conflict.

321
322 The dynamic nature of the strategic context requires a further level of detail
323 within the competition continuum that captures the relative intensity and
324 trajectory of the relationships. The JCIC divides the three elements into sub-
325 elements which form a range of policy aims providing further clarity as to USG
326 intentions when necessary.

327
328 *Armed Conflict*

- 329 • *Defeat.* Create conditions to impose desired policy objectives upon the
330 adversary.
- 331
- 332 • *Deny.* Frustrate the policy objectives of the adversary.
- 333
- 334 • *Degrade.* Reduce the adversary's ability and will to the greatest extent
335 possible within resource and policy constraints.
- 336

337 *Competition below Armed Conflict*

- 338
- 339 • *Improve.* Employ all measures short of those that might reasonably lead
340 to conflict in order to achieve U.S. objectives, prevent the competitor from
341 achieving its aims, and improve the overall strategic position.
- 342
- 343 • *Counter.* Regulate the competition to ensure the U.S. maintains its
344 relative strategic position and the competitor achieves no further gains;
345 only seek to improve the U.S. position to that achievable given existing
346 resources and authorities, and in a manner that does not jeopardize
347 interests elsewhere.
- 348
- 349 • *Contest.* Use prudent means to achieve the best possible strategic
350 outcome within given resources or policy constraints, recognizing that
351 this lesser aim entails risk that the competitor will achieve further gains.
- 352

353 *Cooperation*

- 354
- 355 • *Engage selectively.* Cooperation is transactional with the sole aim of
356 achieving U.S. aims when the maintenance of a larger relationship with
357 the partner is not desirable or worthwhile.
- 358

- 359 • *Maintain.* Cooperate in order to maintain relationship and secure
360 bilateral advantage but without significant increase in resources or
361 commitment unless strictly in accord with overriding U.S. interests.
362
 - 363 • *Advance.* Expand cooperative activities in the most appropriate manner
364 (e.g. building partner capacity, increasing interoperability, and expanding
365 Joint Force access) to achieve U.S. aims while also enabling or advancing
366 partner interests.¹¹
367
- 368 The principal benefit of these expanded elements is the provision of a

Vignette: The Competition Continuum in History

Though the JCIC framework is new, the complexity of the strategic environment is not. The case of World War II illustrates that even in conventional state conflict all three elements of the competition continuum were present. The U.S. was in conflict with the Axis powers. In Europe, it cooperated with the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union, coordinating operations and providing large amounts of arms and equipment. Yet at the same time, there was also a degree of competition with the Soviet Union. U.S.-U.K. policy accounted for a longer-term competition with communism that had existed prior to the war and resumed with much greater intensity afterward. In the Pacific, the Soviets offered minimal cooperation until the very end of the war, and their late entry was arguably motivated more by a desire to compete with the U.S. in the post-war order than to cooperate in the combined effort to defeat Japan. Even in respect to the U.K. and France, a difference in visions for the disposition of former colonies created a state of low-level competition that influenced the conduct of war. The role of both civilian policymakers and military leaders was to understand the nature of these many strategic relationships, weigh their relative importance, tailor military campaigns in accordance with those priorities, and then continually reassess and adjust as the strategic and political situation progressed.



Cooperation, Competition, Conflict: Winston Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Joseph Stalin at the Yalta Conference in 1945

Figure 2. The Competition Continuum in History

¹¹ In some instances, USG actions may seek to shape a partner's perception of interests, increasing alignment with US policy objectives.

369 fuller lexicon that can capture the nuances of prioritization and change within
370 the strategic landscape. This benefit mainly applies to competition and
371 cooperation but pertains to conflict as well. For instance, as shown in the
372 example of World War II (see figure 2), the initial Allied approach was to *defeat*
373 Germany while *denying* Japan further gains in the Pacific until more favorable
374 conditions would allow its *defeat*. Establishing and communicating such
375 priorities is the first step to integration, whether within a command, across
376 DoD, across the USG, or within a coalition.

377
378 The United States and its allies lack the means to fully achieve all aims
379 in every instance of competition across the world at any given time. Even when
380 there are sufficient resources available, there might be a policy choice to not
381 expend all possible means in a specific instance. This will be particularly the
382 case in competition below armed conflict when the United States might opt not
383 to take available actions due to the risk of escalation, the desire to use
384 resources elsewhere, or the need to husband limited means for use in case of a
385 major armed conflict. The lexicon outlined above provides a common language
386 to better communicate the tolerance for risk and willingness to expend
387 resources in a specific case. What balance policymakers choose to strike will
388 vary with circumstances, and is beyond the scope of this concept.

389
390 Conveying prioritization and degree of ambition or restraint is important.
391 Merely noting that the U.S. is engaged in competition with Russia in places like
392 eastern Ukraine does not provide sufficient fidelity of intent. The actions of the
393 Joint Force if directed to *improve* would be quite different than if directed to
394 *contest*, even though both fall within the larger state of competition.
395 Furthermore, the policy decision about how aggressively to compete has direct
396 implications for the level of cooperation with Ukraine. For instance, improving
397 the position vis-à-vis Russia could entail a corresponding recommendation to
398 *advance* cooperation with Ukraine.

399
400 The more specific lexicon is also necessary to capture the complexities of
401 changing conditions over time, which is particularly important for extended
402 competition. In those areas where the U.S. is likely to compete with a certain
403 actor for years, the intensity of that competition will vary according to the
404 swings in the overall relationship between the two countries, the degree to
405 which other crises and events divert U.S. resources or require cooperation with
406 the other country, and the desires of allies. The election of an anti-American
407 leader in an ally or partner, for instance, might force a reduction in the level of
408 cooperation with the ally from *advance* to *maintain*, which in turn might
409 require a less ambitious goal for competition against the competitor state due
410 to loss of access or partner capacity.

411
412 In practical terms, the expanded view of the operating environment and

413 its lexicon facilitates the dialogue between civilian policymakers and military
414 leaders, by providing the means to more precisely convey degrees of ambition
415 or restraint. This is particularly valuable in competition below armed conflict,
416 in which a nuanced understanding of both policy aims and constraints is vital.
417 The provision of military advice also benefits from a shared lexicon that allows
418 the Joint Force to identify instances in which it cannot achieve the desired
419 policy aim with the given resources and authorities.

420

421 **Element #2. Design and Construct the Campaign**

422

423 This element of the integrated campaigning construct focuses on
424 developing a strategy to address the operational challenge in the environment,
425 outlining the overarching concept for how the USG will achieve its aims, and
426 providing the necessary guidance and direction to execute that vision. This
427 may include efforts to identify physical and cognitive campaign objectives and
428 then align resources and actions—across the range of partners—to ensure the
429 accomplishment of these objectives.

430

431 Having established a foundation for integrated campaigning by
432 understanding the operating environment, leaders and planners design the
433 campaign. Campaign design begins with recognition that both military and
434 non-military activities are vital for the achievement of acceptable political
435 conditions. Next, leaders and planners must determine the relevant
436 mechanisms for employment. Finally, leaders and planners embed activities to
437 solidify campaign progress to prevent loss of any gains or regression to
438 previous conditions.

439

440 *Factors of Integrated Campaign Design*

441

442 Across the competition continuum described above, there are common
443 considerations to keep in mind when designing campaigns. Joint doctrine
444 currently describes thirteen elements of operational design which collectively
445 enable Joint leaders to design operations aimed at defeating adversaries' war-
446 making capability in armed conflict (JP 5-0). These design elements are still
447 valid for individual operations, but insufficient to enable Joint leaders to
448 campaign in cooperation, competition, and armed conflict. The JCIC addresses
449 this shortfall through the proposed use of the *factors of integrated campaign*
450 *design*.

451

452 The factors of integrated campaign design connect with, respond to, and
453 inform evolving policy. An integrated campaign design factor is an element that
454 influences or contributes to a particular result or outcome. The factors of
455 integrated campaign design are an additive array of factors to enable the Joint
456 Force to campaign through the application of military power in concert with the

457 other instruments of power. The factors help guide the development and
458 execution of campaigns across the competition continuum. Furthermore, the
459 factors of integrated campaign design aid in understanding the relationship
460 between civilian guidance and military objectives, facilitate collaboration with
461 essential USG and international partners, and improve the application of
462 operational art beyond a narrow conception of armed conflict. Additionally,
463 these factors provide an intellectual mooring, framework, and feedback loop
464 between the strategic discussion and development and refinement of the
465 operational-level logic and mechanism used to pursue the chosen policy. The
466 factors also connect with, respond to, and inform evolving policy and strategy.
467 Finally, the factors orient on outcomes beyond just military success, while
468 recognizing that political guidance continually evolves and that definitive
469 conclusions are rare in most circumstances.

470

471 The factors of integrated campaign design allow for an informed
472 application of Joint Force capabilities and strengthen the alignment of the
473 instruments of national power. The factors work in conjunction with existing
474 methodologies to assist the Joint Force in achieving U.S. policy aims. For
475 example, the factors expand the conduct of the military decision making
476 process and other planning techniques. There are twelve factors of integrated
477 campaign design:

478

- 479 • *Diagnosis.* Though difficult to achieve, commanders and staffs should
480 aspire to achieve a true empathy that attunes them to the sources and
481 behavioral vectors of all relevant actors: their perspectives, the
482 underlying logic of their actions; and the fundamental issues being
483 contested.
- 484
- 485 • *Anticipate consequences.* Successful campaigning requires commanders
486 and staffs to maintain and continually update a realistic appraisal of the
487 range of possible outcomes and consequences. The complexity of a
488 contested operating environment makes it likely that in most cases these
489 assessments will span a range of mixed favorable and unfavorable
490 consequences.
- 491
- 492 • *Effective civil-military dialogue.* In broad terms, the Joint Force furnishes
493 recommendations and alternatives; civilian policymakers provide initial
494 guidance and subsequent modifications. In practical terms, civil-military
495 interactions occur within a continual round of engagement featuring
496 discussion, feedback, adaptation and refinement of policy and actions to
497 achieve an evolving set of desired strategic outcomes.
- 498
- 499 • *Outcomes.* Successful campaigning requires a comprehensive vision of
500 the *conditions* and *behaviors* the Joint Force must enable to achieve and

- 501 sustain acceptable strategic outcomes.
502
- 503 • *Follow through.* In order to translate military success into acceptable and
504 sustainable strategic outcomes, commanders and staffs must develop
505 and implement a long-term approach that maintains the focus of the
506 campaign over time. One implication of the expanded operating
507 environment is that terms like *post-conflict* are dangerous when they
508 cause the Joint Force to artificially break what should be thought of as a
509 single effort into distinct phases of “war” and “peace.”
510
 - 511 • *Benefits and risks.* Joint Force actions are guided by an appreciation of
512 the short- and long-term opportunities of both success and failure and
513 the risks of employing military force against the specific circumstance.
514
 - 515 • *Narrative.* As part of campaigning, the Joint Force develops and employs
516 a principal and cascading narrative reflecting policy aims. This narrative
517 gives coherence to military actions and activities, shapes other actors’
518 conditions and behaviors, and, ideally, undermines and delegitimizes
519 adversaries’ narratives.
520
 - 521 • *Empowerment.* When properly arrayed, authorizations enable the
522 effective complementary employment of the various instruments of
523 national power. As much as physical capabilities, authorities are an
524 essential means. Commanders and staff must understand how and when
525 authorizations recognized enable successful campaigning.
526
 - 527 • *Alignment.* Organizational boundaries often make full integration of the
528 instruments of national power an unachievable goal. A more realistic goal
529 is to align efforts to achieve acceptable and sustainable strategic
530 outcomes, which in most cases will be sufficient. The nature of alignment
531 varies with the situation, but the Joint Force can capture best practices
532 in doctrine, teach them in PME, and practice them regularly in exercises
533 and operations.
534
 - 535 • *Resourcing.* Successful campaigning requires synchronized, prioritized,
536 and de-conflicted resourcing. With many competing demands for
537 resources, this is difficult at any given time. Over the extended period of
538 an integrated campaign, it is even more challenging. Nonetheless,
539 achieving sustainable strategic outcomes requires sustained effort.
540
 - 541 • *Prevailing logic.* An overarching prevailing logic allows the commanders
542 and staffs to arrange military operations, activities, and actions so that
543 they produce the desired conditions, behaviors, and outcomes. Though

544 the prevailing logic guides the campaign, it is not static but continually
545 updated in response to changes within the operating environment.
546

- 547 • *Multi-domain force architecture.* The proper force architecture enables the
548 necessary command and control of Joint Force required resources and
549 capabilities. There is already a substantial body of operational doctrine
550 and practice that can guide the development of this force architecture.
551 New methods, however, might be required to address transregional,
552 multi-domain, and multi-function challenges. Whatever the nature and
553 the scale of the problem, an architecture should enable each contributing
554 component to play its designated role.
555

556 These factors are essential to the initial and ongoing logic of effective integrated
557 campaign design and adaptive execution in all conditions the Joint Force may
558 face.
559

560 *Competition Mechanisms*

561

562 While the competition continuum can help the Joint Force to understand
563 the environment, mechanisms suggest the ways available to leaders and
564 planners to achieve the desired policy objectives. Selection of the appropriate
565 mix of mechanisms is a fundamental part of designing the campaign.
566

567 JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, 16 June 2017, establishes defeat and
568 stability mechanisms in Joint doctrine. Defeat mechanisms, applicable to
569 armed conflict, focus on defeating armed enemies through the organized
570 application of force.¹² Stability mechanisms, applicable across the competition
571 continuum, are the primary method by which the Joint Force affects the
572 human dimension.¹³ Defeat and stability mechanisms have continued utility
573 and are tools for integrated campaign design.
574

575 In recognition of the importance of allies and partners to U.S. national
576 interests and the prominence of competition below armed conflict in the future
577 operating environment, the JCIC introduces a suite of competition mechanisms
578 applicable to the strategic realities of *armed conflict*, *competition below the level*
579 *of armed conflict*, and *cooperation* as ways to maintain or establish favorable
580 conditions within the international order. In this concept, these mechanisms
581 apply to campaigning. However, most factors are also relevant to subordinate
582 operations. This suite of mechanisms offers US leaders an array of methods to
583 employ the instruments of national power in general and the Joint Force in
584 particular.

¹² The defeat mechanisms are destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, and isolate. *JP 5-0*, IV-31.

¹³ The stability mechanisms are compel, control, influence, and support. *Ibid.*, IV-32.

585 *Example Competition Mechanisms:*

586

587 • *Strengthen.* To develop alliances and partnerships and reward actors for
588 siding with friendly forces. This may include military engagement and
589 security cooperation or favorable access to trade and foreign assistance.

590

591 • *Create.* To produce a condition where it does not already exist, and its
592 existence could positively impact achievement of national interests or
593 may be essential.

594

595 • *Preserve.* To prevent deterioration of a stable situation. Although, there is
596 no assumption of immediate malign intent by other actors, if ignored this
597 condition could lead to the rise of an adversary, challenge or crisis.

598

599 • *Weaken.* To recognize, understand, and impose a change in a
600 competitor's behavior using physical and informational aspects of power.

601

602 • *Position.* To increase access, influence, and strategic understanding in
603 the environment. It may include the use of intelligence activities, the
604 exchange of information with partners, the frequent rotational
605 deployment of forces during exercises, and the effective positioning of
606 forward based capabilities.

607

608 • *Inform.* To develop a shared perspective with partners and identify areas
609 where cooperation would be of mutual benefit, and or convey the limits of
610 acceptability for a competitor's current/future behavior.

611

612 • *Persuade.* To shape partners' objectives and competitor behaviors while
613 remaining flexible in the pursuit of secondary objectives.

614

615 In applying the competition mechanisms, leaders and planners
616 continuously evaluate the mechanisms' efficacy in relation to policy objectives.
617 Leaders and planners seek to link and align military activities to policy
618 objectives that result in maintaining or altering the current trajectory between
619 the U.S., its partners, and other actors.

620

621 Another aspect of the design, as well as the assessment process, is the
622 identification of authorities needed to conduct the campaign. To expedite
623 approval, leaders and planners work with interorganizational partners and
624 prepare aligned groupings of authorizations for leader approval.

625

626 Finally, leaders and planners ensure proper follow through so
627 campaigning yields acceptable and sustainable outcomes. Military operations

628 are subordinate to policy and must remain oriented on the achievement of
629 acceptable political conditions.

630
631 *Alignment of Military and Non-military Activities*

632
633 Integrated campaigns must develop synchronized efforts across various
634 organizational boundaries to succeed. As stated in the Joint Concept for
635 Human Aspects of Military Operations (JC-HAMO), some goals should be to
636 strengthen the resolve, commitment and resiliency of partners; persuade
637 neutral parties to join the friendly forces' campaign; and convince adversaries
638 to abandon or not engage in an armed struggle. As part of the application of
639 the instruments of national power, Joint Force commanders should operate at
640 multiple levels to integrate operations, activities, and actions within a
641 campaign:

- 642
643 • *Psychological:* The psychological element of aligning military and non-
644 military activities is a critical consideration. Physical actions, military
645 and non-military, are inseparable from their psychological effect in
646 supporting a long-term and sustainable campaign. Integrated campaigns
647 must have an advantageous psychological impact on friendly, neutral,
648 and adversary actors in the environment, across the different conditions
649 of the operating environment that is founded on the coordination of
650 military and non-military activities. JCIC facilitates Joint Force
651 commanders' and staffs' focus on the integration of physical and
652 information power as a critical element to enabling globally integrated
653 operations. During the application of the art and science of warfare,
654 campaign planners must take into account the "will" of the adversary,
655 competitor or ally. The joint force must design and conduct campaigns to
656 establish and maintain legitimacy of U.S. and partner actions while
657 simultaneously discrediting, subverting, and/or attacking adversaries'
658 efforts to establish their legitimacy. Planners also use actions and
659 messaging to convey that an antagonist's efforts will eventually end in
660 failure and the U.S. will achieve its objectives. The alignment of military
661 and non-military activities must seek to ingrain in the antagonist that
662 there is no place they are safe from U.S. and partner reach, influence
663 and observation. Integrated campaign design seeks to align military and
664 non-military activities to combine actions over time to overwhelm and/or
665 exhaust the adversary, competitor, or population.
- 666
667 • *Political:* Military operations should always be in support of overarching
668 policy aims. Efforts to shape the environment and influence key actors
669 must be carefully designed, integrated across the Joint Force, and
670 synchronized with non-Defense USG partners to achieve, and ultimately
671 sustain, desired strategic outcomes. Activities that seek to consolidate

672 gains and enable governance must be seen as legitimate to ensure they
673 receive broad support and are sustained over time. In this regard, the
674 role of information operations is vitally important to explain key actions
675 to diverse stakeholders in the environment. The Joint Force and its
676 partners must draw on modern notions of legitimacy to build support for
677 desired political orders that are both adaptable and sustainable.
678 Concurrently, U.S. leaders should seek to create divisions in an
679 adversary's alliances, while weakening their political support locally,
680 regionally, and, as appropriate, globally.

681

- 682 • *Logistical.* Aligning military and non-military activities to ensure
683 sustainability of friendly campaigns, and weakening antagonists'
684 sustainability for their campaigns, are critical elements of consideration.
685 Renowned military theorist B.H. Liddell Hart observed that effective
686 commanders recognize that "the aim in war is to weaken resistance
687 before attempting to overcome it."¹⁴ With this aim in mind, military
688 leaders should align their efforts with non-military partners to degrade
689 an adversary's alliances, partnerships, and sources of support, while
690 safeguarding and strengthening those that enable the friendly campaign.
691 The goal is to limit an adversary's freedom of action and resiliency, while
692 increasing U.S. and partner nation options and support. Non-military
693 partners may enable economic sanctions against adversaries, develop
694 new alliances, secure access to ports and overflight routes, and facilitate
695 economic and military aid for state and non-state partners. These
696 measures affect the logistical and sustainment dynamics in the
697 operational environment.

698

- 699 • *Military.* While this is the traditional level of consideration, design and
700 planning for commanders' and staff', in a complex, interconnected, and
701 uncertain future, alignment with non-military activities is critical.
702 Military action should shape favorable psychological, political, and
703 logistical dynamics and conditions – in coordination and cooperation
704 with, and in many cases in support of, non-military activities. Military
705 forces should continuously seek positional advantage in the physical and
706 human terrain – often in support of facilitating non-military activities to
707 exploit that positional advantage. The military instrument can rarely
708 achieve sustainable strategic outcomes alone and is most effectual when
709 applied in concert with non-military instruments in pursuit of clear
710 political objectives.

711
712
713

¹⁴ B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1974)

714 **Element #3. Employ the Force and Secure Gains**

715

716 Having designed the campaign, Joint leaders and planners employ the
717 force. Leaders and planners tailor the campaign to the operating environment
718 in order to achieve acceptable and sustainable strategic outcomes.

719

720 *Campaigning in a state of cooperation*

721

722 Joint Force activities in cooperation can create a more favorable security
723 environment. Campaigning in cooperation is typically an enduring activity with
724 no discrete start or end point. Joint Force cooperative activities may entail
725 some combination of strengthening ties with an ally or partner and advancing a
726 broader theater strategy. The Joint Force typically consolidates gains in
727 cooperation through sustained engagement with partners. In some cases,
728 however, limited or selective interaction might be either necessary or
729 preferable.

730

731 The competition mechanisms presented earlier in the document have
732 great utility for the Joint Force while campaigning in cooperation. When
733 applying those or other mechanisms, Joint Force commanders must account
734 for external considerations such as the desired conditions that cooperation
735 should create, the nature of the relevant relationships, and the potential
736 partner's willingness and capacity. Commanders should also account for
737 internal considerations such as interests, objectives, and priorities of other
738 contributing USG departments; resource limitations; relevant statutory or
739 policy restrictions on the amount, categories, and purposes of U.S. security
740 cooperation expenditure; or other statutory or policy limitations on security
741 cooperation that are relevant to the specific case.

742

743 Just as in armed conflict, employment of the military instrument in a
744 state of cooperation is meant to achieve some policy aim. A campaigning
745 mindset is particularly important in cooperation because of the duration and
746 nature of the engagement. The most productive relationships take time to
747 build. A partnership is unlikely to reach its potential if the Joint Force
748 approaches engagement as discrete events rather than as part of a continuous
749 long-term process. The benefits of relationships (e.g., increased commitment of
750 a foreign military to the rule of law, greater willingness to assist U.S. efforts in
751 a crisis) are often diffuse, intangible, and difficult to assess. Improvements in
752 relationships occur over long periods of time. Therefore, they are often
753 undervalued when measured on an event-by-event cost-benefit basis.

754

755 As they campaign in cooperation, Joint leaders and planners must
756 accurately understand and assess the character of the U.S.'s relationship with
757 each partner. Cooperative relationships can be categorized along the following

758 descending scale (see figure 3): *Cooperative, Reinforcing, Inspiring, Establishing,*
759 *Broadening, Leveraging, and Controlling.* In practice, because bilateral relations
760 are complex and include many subordinate elements and span many different
761 activities, several of these designations will likely apply at once. For instance,
762 with a smaller developing country, intelligence agencies might have a
763 deliberately distant relationship, the Air Force might have a limited relationship
764 based on partner capacity, while the Army has an extensive relationship due to
765 partner contributions to operations.

766
767 Combining a deep understanding of the environment and a realistic
768 appraisal of the relevant partner relationships with the policy aim, allows
769 commanders and staffs to derive a range of feasible, productive military options
770 that lead to sustainable and acceptable outcomes. This process is no less
771 purposeful nor less rigorous because it relates to cooperation rather than
772 armed conflict. At any point on the competition continuum, campaigning is a
773 proactive activity meant to achieve favorable conditions and influence other
774 actors' behaviors in support of national interests.

775
776 *Campaigning in a state of competition below armed conflict*

777
778 Like campaigning in cooperation, Joint Force activities in competition
779 below armed conflict must be regarded as part of a larger enduring effort to
780 achieve sustainable and acceptable outcomes. This form of competition arises
781 when one actor chooses to challenge the status quo or existing norms and
782 another chooses to resist. The intensity with which either actor chooses to
783 press the competition will often change in response to the other actor, domestic
784 political considerations, and other events. Thus, a rigid, pre-determined course
785 of military action will often be unsuitable for competition below armed conflict,
786 which will be driven by rapid shifts in the political environment. This creates
787 numerous challenges for the Joint Force as establishing the necessary
788 conditions for employing military forces—administrative and logistical
789 preparations; granting of appropriate authorities and orders; securing access;
790 coordination with interorganizational partners; securing and executing funds—
791 requires considerable time. The art of campaigning in competition below armed
792 conflict, therefore, is in setting the conditions to enable the maximum range of
793 measures to absorb change and respond effectively as the intensity of the
794 political situation changes.

795
796

Cooperative – Most of the time, the Joint Force works alongside willing partners with similar interests. These actors are not overtly supportive of all the U.S.’ actions and activities, but have specific interests which aligns with ours.

Reinforcing - At times, independent actor(s) may already have taken action, of their own accord, that aligns with our interests. In these cases, we seek to support their actions, and do not necessarily need to take the lead (though that may change with continual assessment).

Inspiring - In contrast to ‘reinforce’, in this case potential actor(s) have not yet taken action, but there is potential that with the proper incentive and signals, that actor could be motivated to initiate action that would be aligned with our interests.

Establishing – A situation unfolds that affects a U.S. issue or interest and we realize that we do not have a partnership with an actor who shares our concerns and the Joint Force must help establish a relationship that is germane

Broadening - When we have an established relationship with an actor, but realize that we must further our relationship without coercion to achieve our desired condition/behavior. In other words, we must strengthen the good terms of our relationship.

Leveraging - Like ‘control’, this is normally applied to those actor(s) who would align counter to our desired condition/behavior. While it may not involve direct influence as with ‘control’, it implies that we have the means and the will to apply that level of influence if necessary.

Controlling - This relationship is rare, but there are cases where the US has a certain level of control in a relationship. Historically, that relationship is undergoing radical transition. This is normally involves direct influence over an actor as a part of an occupation, who would normally not be aligned with our desired conditions.

Figure 3. Cooperative relationships

797
798

799 *A Framework for Competition – Contest, Counter, and Improve.* The fluid
800 political nature of campaigning below armed conflict thus requires a flexible
801 construct for envisioning campaigning. Gains in competition below armed
802 conflict typically take the form of modifications in behavior rather than control
803 of territory. Because behavior can so quickly change, competition below armed
804 conflict requires different ways of thinking about escalation and deterrence.
805 Early recognition of an impending change in an adversary’s behavior provides
806 the best opportunity for deterrence, but for a variety of reasons this might be
807 difficult to achieve in practice. Once the competitor has taken action, the
808 political and military situation becomes more complex; effectively reacting at
809 that point requires the Joint Force to be able to employ a wide variety of
810 capabilities that can be tailored to the situation.

811
812 In *Force without War*, scholars Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan offer
813 one potential framework.¹⁵ They advocate an analysis that begins with
814 determining which behaviors the Joint Force wants to reinforce and which it
815 wants to modify. In relation to a hostile power (*antagonist*), reinforcing desired
816 behaviors requires *deterrence* (we desire to enforce continued inaction) and
817 modifying behaviors requires *compellance* (we desire to impose something new.)
818 In relation to a friendly power (*protagonist*), reinforcing desired behaviors
819 requires *assurance* (in order for the behavior to continue) and modifying
820 behavior requires *inducement* (in order for current behaviors to stop or alter.)
821 Blechman and Kaplan’s model can be applied across the competition
822 continuum with one modification. Their terms *antagonist* and *protagonist* imply
823 a relationship that is either hostile or cooperative. But the expanded view of the
824 operating environment proposed by the JCIC allows for a mixture of
825 cooperative and competitive aspects; thus, the same state might
826 simultaneously be both an antagonist and a protagonist with the appropriate
827 mixture of methods to reinforce desirable and modify undesirable behaviors.
828

829 The methods employed in competition below armed conflict can vary
830 widely but successful action in this state will often feature several
831 characteristics. First, the Joint Force and its partners must possess the best
832 possible understanding of how relevant actors will perceive action. Whether in
833 terms of deterring a competitor or assuring partners, Joint Force operations
834 should lead to the desired behaviors. Second, the Joint Force and its partners
835 should conduct a broad array of activities: establishing access to critical areas,
836 forward positioning units, establishing appropriate and timely presence,
837 organizing exercises, sharing intelligence, employing unconventional measures,
838 and conducting information operations to include efforts to counter and
839 undermine the competitor’s narrative. Third, the Joint Force and its partners

¹⁵ Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force Without War: U. S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1978), 71-129.

840 should ensure the creative and flexible conduct of these various activities in
841 pursuit of desired outcomes within a fluid political situation and pervasive
842 information environment. Fourth, continual objective reassessment of the
843 competitor's intentions and capabilities in recognition that just as U.S. policy
844 aims could change over time, so the competitor's aims and thresholds will also
845 likely change.

846
847 Problems within the realm of competition do not readily lend themselves to
848 "winning quickly."¹⁶ The Joint Force will work in concert with
849 interorganizational partners to achieve acceptable and sustainable outcomes.
850 As described by Blechman and Kaplan in *Force without War*, success in the
851 space between peace and war is characterized by adversaries' and partners'
852 behaving in a manner commensurate with U.S. policy.

853
854 *Campaigning in a state of armed conflict*

855
856 The characteristics of successful campaigning in armed conflict are the
857 most intuitive, best understood, and generally well covered elsewhere. Yet it is
858 worth noting that one implication of the expanded operating environment is
859 that campaigning in armed conflict does not occur in isolation. So long as the
860 United States fights with allies and partners, campaigning in cooperation will
861 be occurring at the same time. It is possible that campaigning in competition
862 below armed conflict will occur simultaneously as well, particularly if there is
863 are adversarial third parties in the conflict. During Operation Iraqi Freedom,
864 for instance, Multi-National Force-Iraq was campaigning in cooperation with
865 the Iraqi government, in conflict with several groups of insurgents, and in
866 competition with Iran, which was trying to extend its influence at the expense
867 of the United States and regional rivals. Commanders and staffs must be aware
868 of the interrelated nature of these various elements and their varying degree of
869 importance. At some points in a conflict, the imperatives of maintaining a
870 cooperative relationship with a partner for political, strategic, or operational
871 reasons might be more important than efforts against the common enemy. The
872 relative importance will vary with the situation; the critical insight is that
873 campaigning in armed conflict is not an isolated activity.

874
875 *Securing Gains*

876
877 Follow through is an essential aspect of campaigning across the
878 competition continuum, not just in armed conflict. All instruments of national
879 power have roles in achieving national strategic objectives. The Joint Force
880 must translate military success, whether combat or non-combat, into
881 acceptable and sustainable outcomes. This responsibility includes continued

¹⁶ Ibid.

882 collaboration with USG partners in securing their objectives through the
883 provision of advice and appropriate military assistance. The past decades
884 demonstrate that successful campaigning requires a sustained commitment to
885 follow through to accomplish and sustain national goals.

886

887 *Cooperative Follow Through*

888

889 As in armed conflict, consolidating the Joint Force's achievements in
890 cooperation is an essential aspect of integrated campaigning. Of course, the
891 form that this consolidation takes in cooperation is different than in
892 competition or in armed conflict. Cooperative follow through could entail
893 solidifying positive aspects of the bilateral relationship, improving partner
894 resiliency, and maintaining support strong enough to resist efforts at
895 subversion. Cooperative follow through takes place at many levels from
896 individual to institutional relationships. Though the immediate benefits of
897 cooperative relationships are not always apparent, history demonstrates that
898 years of engagement often pay dividends in unanticipated ways. For instance,
899 the defense relationship with Saudi Arabia paid unexpected dividends by
900 creating a foundation for cooperation during OPERATION DESERT
901 SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Conversely, relationships cannot be created
902 instantaneously when an unexpected crisis requires cooperation with a
903 previously neglected partner.

904

905 *Competitive Follow Through*

906

907 The enduring nature of integrated campaigning in competition below
908 armed conflict poses unique challenges in following through. Successes rarely
909 mean the end of the overall competition and few gains are reliably permanent.
910 Instead, the situation is somewhat similar to the "Great Game" of the
911 nineteenth century, in which each party continually seeks to improve its
912 position and guard against the competitor undermining the desired order. In
913 that context, following through is an essential on-going task. If done well,
914 following through might reduce overall tensions; competition is not a zero-sum
915 contest. In all cases, competitive follow through should protect and advance
916 national interests and position the Joint Force for the next evolution of
917 competition.

918

919 The trajectory of competition below armed conflict might rapidly turn in
920 reaction to changes in the relationship between the competitors or in reaction
921 to some other event. Regardless of the reason for the change in conditions, the
922 dynamic, ambiguous and uncertain competitive environment demands
923 constant reassessments of campaigning activities and priorities.

924

925 *Armed Conflict Follow Through*

926

927 In armed conflict, the Joint Force must view military operations and the
928 follow through to secure policy aims as an integrated whole. Tactical and
929 operational successes do not possess intrinsic value but are worthwhile only to
930 the extent that they support larger policy aims. Yet historically the translation
931 of military success into acceptable and sustainable outcomes has been one of
932 the most difficult elements of campaigning.

933

934 The problem is not merely conceptual. Commanders and their staffs must
935 account for the changes in the political and public atmosphere that commonly
936 take place in the period between the apparent military victory and a true
937 consolidation of gains. In the flush of hard-won triumph, the Joint Force, USG,
938 and American public have in the past experienced some combination of
939 impatience, exuberant optimism, and division about what further aims to
940 pursue. To varying extents, these problems impeded successful follow through
941 in the aftermath of all major conflicts in U.S. history. By their nature, these
942 currents are both unpredictable and largely beyond the control of military
943 commanders. It is possible, however, for the Joint Force to anticipate these
944 shifts and to seek to begin the consolidation of gains as early as possible in
945 order to guard against changes. Commanders and staffs should assume that
946 the withdrawal of resources, imposition of political constraints, and lack of
947 focus will make it more rather than less difficult to achieve acceptable
948 outcomes in the wake of armed conflict. The other consistent theme in history
949 is that by virtue of their size and unique capabilities military forces will
950 continue to play a major role, even if another USG department is in the lead.

951

952 Wars disrupt political, social, and economic structures, networks, and
953 institutions to the point it is often difficult for them to simply return to their
954 pre-conflict state. The destruction of the old order creates the conditions for
955 intense competitions among various internal, regional, and global actors
956 seeking to retain or gain power, status, or strategic advantage within the new
957 order as it slowly congeals. Even if they remain peaceful these struggles can
958 create difficulties for Joint Force commanders, who are responsible for
959 achieving policy objectives. In the aftermath of war, political, social, and
960 economic competition can often become violent due to the availability of
961 weapons and former fighters.

962

963 Despite these challenges, the Joint Force follow through effectively in
964 order to achieve the best possible outcome, overcoming the challenges created
965 by the various competitions among both internal and external actors arising
966 from armed conflict. The imperative to follow through remains valid even when
967 DoD is not the lead agency in the deceptively named “post-conflict” period that
968 will likely last years if not decades. Figure 4 provides an illustrative depiction of

969 the patterns of unfolding circumstances reflective of past national experience in
970 armed conflict. Integrated campaigning in armed conflict requires the Joint
971 Force to maintain continuity and focus throughout this entire period even
972 while understanding and accounting for the conditions unique to each of these
973 distinct (though sometimes overlapping) conditions:

- 974
- 975 1) A re-characterization period where the political stakes in the wake of
976 armed conflict dramatically expand and drive frequent adjustments to
977 the campaign and changes to the range of possible outcomes. This
978 period is filled with risk and uncertainty to the degree that the
979 military victory could be diminished or even rendered irrelevant.
 - 980 2) Creation of favorable conditions where the U.S. can effectively bring to
981 bear other elements of national and allied power.
 - 982 3) Establishing an acceptable security situation;
 - 983 4) Developing partnerships to consolidate the new political order.
 - 984 5) Transition to an enduring commitment to perpetuate our gains and
985 realized advantages.
- 986

987 Campaigning in armed conflict thus entails a wider scope than commonly
988 appreciated. The disruptions caused by war mean that even in conflict against
989 a purely conventional enemy, the requirement for successful follow through will
990 entail dealing with the problems of fostering positive perceptions among
991 populations, battling political subversion, and countering violent criminal,
992 insurgent, or resistance organizations, and other actors (including nation-
993 states) intent on advancing their own interests in this fluid environment. Used
994 at the strategic level, *exit strategy* and operational design terms such as
995 *military end state* and *termination criteria* imply an unrealistically fixed political
996 environment that assumes explicit guidance and predetermined geographic,
997 temporal, and policy limits. The acknowledgement that campaigning will occur
998 over long periods to achieve evolving policy objectives under challenging
999 conditions is the actual historical experience of American wars.

1000

1001 **Element #4. Assess and Adapt the Campaign**


1002

1003 This element of the construct for integrated campaigning focuses on
1004 coordinating and monitoring implementation of the campaign and adapting the
1005 campaign in response to new conditions in order to achieve sustainable
1006 outcomes.

1007

1008 During force employment, ongoing reassessments of the operating
1009 environment are an integral aspect of campaigning to ensure the military
1010 instrument of national power, working in concert with non-military
1011 instruments, remains productively engaged until achievement of the desired
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Figure 4. Illustrative patterns of known transitions during consolidation

1018 strategic outcome.¹⁷ To do this, the Joint Force and its partners must use
1019 embedded and disciplined assessments.

1020
1021 Through early and continuous assessment, the Joint Force and its
1022 partners monitor the environment and progress toward the achievement of
1023 policy aims. Assessment helps leaders and planners to measure the overall
1024 effectiveness of employing non-military and military capabilities to ensure that
1025 the campaign approach remains feasible, suitable, and acceptable. If the
1026 current approach is failing to establish the desired conditions, or if aspects of
1027 the operating environment or problem change significantly, then the leaders
1028 and planners may decide to begin a reframing effort that could cause small
1029 adjustments to current activities or a significant reorientation with new
1030 objectives and organizational realignments.

1031
1032 Adapting is the process of revisiting earlier design considerations,
1033 assumptions, conclusions, and decisions that underpin the current campaign
1034 approach. In essence, reframing reviews what the leaders and planners believe
1035 they understand about the operating environment and the effect campaign
1036 activity has had on the achievement of acceptable policy conditions.

1037
1038 When designing the campaign, leaders and planners developed logic for
1039 why the campaign would work. This logic is the baseline for assessment,
1040 learning, and adaptation. The logic also helps ensure that the Joint Force
1041 selects meaningful, relevant indicators that advance, rather than hinder,
1042 understanding. During execution, leaders and planners use aligned indicators
1043 of accomplishment as they continuously monitor and evaluate the effectiveness
1044 of their campaign and activities against this baseline to detect significant
1045 unanticipated changes.

1046
1047 If required, commanders and staffs adjust the campaign approach to
1048 ensure alignment with the desired direction and determine whether that
1049 direction itself remains relevant to the environment and the strategic leaders'
1050 desires and expectations.

1051
1052 Adapting can involve significantly refining or discarding the logic for the
1053 campaign and models that formed the basis of the leaders' campaign approach
1054 and guidance. Potential triggers for reframing:

- 1055
1056
- New policy direction or guidance

¹⁷ A number of joint and service doctrinal publications discuss operation assessment. The Air Land Sea Application Center offers a joint compilation of these practices in a useful document, *Operation Assessment: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Operation Assessment*, ATP 5-.03/MCRP 5-1C/NTTP 5-01.3/AFTTP 3-2.87 (August 2015).

- 1057
- 1058 • An assessment challenges leader and staff understanding of the operating
- 1059 environment, existing problem, or relevance of the campaign approach
- 1060
- 1061 • A scheduled periodic review shows a problem
- 1062
- 1063 • Failure to make required progress
- 1064
- 1065 • Key assumptions or campaign logic prove invalid
- 1066
- 1067 • Unanticipated success
- 1068
- 1069 • A major event causes “catastrophic change” in the environment
- 1070

1071 Information requirements across all echelons have increased
1072 exponentially along with the ability to create and gather information. The
1073 current demand for information exceeds the analytical abilities of the Joint
1074 Force and is straining collection assets. Furthermore, military and non-military
1075 leaders and planners have a challenge in collecting, processing, analyzing, and
1076 incorporating information in a timely manner. In order to focus efforts and
1077 provide more accurate assessments, the Joint Force must embed a robust
1078 analysis program into the campaign planning process.

1079

1080 A robust analysis program featuring an assessment plan supported by
1081 an accompanying information collection plan embedded into every step of the
1082 integrated campaigning process is essential. Integrating information collection
1083 and assessment plans into the campaigning process serves three purposes: it
1084 will confirm baseline conditions; it will facilitate real-time monitoring
1085 mechanisms; and it will enable accurate assessments of campaign progress.
1086 Evaluating baseline conditions is paramount to developing an effective
1087 campaign plan. Once a baseline is established, leaders and planners can
1088 develop an effective campaign. As the campaign progresses, a deliberate data
1089 collection and assessment plan allows staffs to accurately monitor the
1090 campaign. Focused collection and assessment efforts provide staffs with
1091 essential information, reducing the flood of superfluous information received
1092 under undisciplined practices. Access to the ‘right’ information at the ‘right’
1093 time grants commanders the operational flexibility to react to emerging trends.
1094 Finally, a detailed assessment and collection plan facilitates an accurate
1095 measurement of the campaigns’ performance.

1096

1097 Finally, assessment as part of integrated campaigning requires disciplined
1098 approach and behavior. Focus, both in the application of collection activities
1099 and in the resulting evaluation of data, leads to more certainty in assessment
1100 results. This focus only comes through careful and deliberate consideration of

1101 the operating environment, objectives, and available resources during plan
1102 development and execution. Disciplined and thorough thought about what to
1103 measure, how that data relates to the objectives, how to measure it, and how to
1104 analyze it must be done in advance, and continuously updated, in order to reap
1105 the full benefits of assessment as an element of the campaign.

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1108 **6. Concept Required Capabilities**

1109

1110 The central idea advocated in this concept entails potentially significant
1111 required capabilities for force development. After analyzing inputs from across
1112 the community of interest, the following capabilities emerge as essential to
1113 implementation of this concept. They constitute an initial proposal, not an
1114 exhaustive or authoritative listing, of required capabilities that need additional
1115 thought and development. Although grouped by components of the key idea to
1116 mirror the organization of the concept, many of these required capabilities
1117 apply across solution components. Furthermore, the required capabilities have
1118 implications for DOTMLPF-P as well as for integration with interorganizational
1119 partners. Following concept approval, subsequent analysis of these proposed
1120 capability requirements will provide the basis for developing capability
1121 solutions to close the conceptual gaps this concept addresses.

1122

1123 **Understand the Environment**

1124

- 1125 • Required Capability 1: The ability to describe the environment in terms
1126 of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict,
1127 including relevant strategic actors and the relationships with and among
1128 them.
- 1129
- 1130 • Required Capability 2: The ability to forecast potential trends of the
1131 relationships between the U.S. and other strategic actors with respect to
1132 cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict.
- 1133
- 1134 • Required Capability 3: The ability to understand the current foreign
1135 assistance environment in a specified region.
- 1136
- 1137 • Required Capability 4: The ability to identify, understand, and assess
1138 relevant legal authorities, constraints, and limitations.
- 1139
- 1140 • Required Capability 5: The ability to identify and evaluate the interests,
1141 intent, capability, and capacity of relevant actors to support or adversely
1142 affect U.S. interests.
- 1143

1144 **Design and Construct the Campaign**

- 1145
- 1146 • Required Capability 6: The ability to clearly communicate campaign
1147 opportunities, limitations, constraints, and shortfalls to policy makers.
1148
 - 1149 • Required Capability 7: The ability to design and construct an integrated
1150 campaign based on policy guidance, the operating environment, and
1151 available capabilities, authorities, and resources.
1152
 - 1153 • Required Capability 8: The ability to select, refine, and apply the relevant
1154 considerations of an integrated campaign.
1155
 - 1156 • Required Capability 9: The ability to develop a coherent campaign
1157 strategy for synchronizing and integrating available resources to the
1158 achievement of strategic outcomes.
1159
 - 1160 • Required Capability 10: The ability to establish appropriate command and
1161 coordinating relationships and to identify and prepare headquarters
1162 elements.
1163
 - 1164 • Required Capability 11: The ability to leverage partnerships and
1165 associated relationships towards the achievement of campaign objectives.
1166

1167 **Employ the Integrated Force and Secure Gains**

- 1168
- 1169 • Required Capability 12: The ability to engage in continuous civil-military
1170 dialogue with policy makers.
1171
 - 1172 • Required Capability 13: The ability to share information across CCMDs,
1173 Services, combat support agencies, interorganizational partners and
1174 others as required.
1175
 - 1176 • Required Capability 14: The ability to align the activities of the Joint
1177 Force and interorganizational partners in an integrated campaign
1178 construct.
1179
 - 1180 • Required Capability 15: The ability to apply appropriate competition
1181 mechanisms.
1182
 - 1183 • Required Capability 16: The ability to synchronize Joint Force and
1184 foreign partner activities in an integrated campaign construct.
1185
 - 1186 • Required Capability 17: The ability to follow through and secure gains

1187 throughout the campaign.

1188

1189 **Assess and Adapt the Campaign**

1190

1191 • Required Capability 18: The ability to respond to changes in policy with
1192 multiple approaches/options in the integrated campaign design,
1193 construct, and employment.

1194

1195 • Required Capability 19: The ability to continually assess the campaign
1196 and adapt it as required, including transregional combatant command
1197 operations.

1198

1199

1200 **7. Risks of Adopting this Concept.**

1201

1202 • Interorganizational partners may be unwilling or unable to align and
1203 integrate into global operations. Partners may not align their efforts for
1204 various bureaucratic, organizational, legal, cultural, or financial reasons.
1205 Should alignment not take place, the Joint Force and its partners will not
1206 realize the JCIC vision and approach—with corresponding negative
1207 effects on operational effectiveness. Additionally, if DoD fills gaps created
1208 through failures to align, partners may be incentivized to remain reliant
1209 on DoD, despite responsibilities mandated by law and historical norms.

1210

1211 • Risk of escalation and unintended consequences. Actions taken below
1212 the level of armed conflict intended to heighten U.S. security could create
1213 a security dilemma, where other states respond in kind, leading to
1214 heightened tensions or even conflict. Joint Force activities to counter an
1215 adversary's coercive actions could cause an inadvertent escalation to
1216 armed conflict. Joint Force commanders will need to calculate risk very
1217 carefully when proposing and executing activities short of armed conflict.
1218 However, Joint commanders must recognize that a failure to counter
1219 actors' malign activities may reinforce that behavior and may not give
1220 national leaders the range of options they need to achieve national
1221 objectives without resorting to armed conflict.

1222

1223 • The U.S. could miscalculate an adversary's reaction to our policies and
1224 actions. Since deterrence resides in the mind of the adversary, joint
1225 commanders cannot be certain that campaign activities are creating the
1226 desired effect on the adversary's perceptions. Ongoing assessments are
1227 critical for evaluating the potential impacts of integrated campaigning,
1228 and of other proposed relevant U.S. actions, on an adversary's decision
1229 calculus.

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- The concept's call for integrated campaigning across geographic boundaries and in multiple domains could lead to campaigns of enormous complexity. The fog and friction of war penalizes unnecessary complexity, but transregional, multi-domain, and multi-functional campaigns are complex by nature. Commanders must be alert to this tension and must continuously strive for the proper balance.
- Joint commanders may not be able to tailor the force for simultaneous campaigning in cooperation, competition, and armed conflict. The Joint Force currently organizes its forces and conducts C2 along service and functional lines. The current arrangements and relationships are not well suited for ad hoc task organizations or C2 arrangements. This risk is mitigated by actions taken by the Joint Force to ensure the DOTMLPF changes as necessary for simultaneous campaigning across the competition continuum.
- The concept's call for additional resources or repurposing of capabilities intended for competition short of armed conflict pose a potential risk for the Joint Force to be unprepared to execute major operations. There is also a requirement in national strategy to protect and advance national interests in competition below armed conflict. The balance between these risks must be carefully weighed in senior-level deliberations to strike the correct balance both globally and in specific theaters.

8. Conclusion.

By developing the capabilities described in this concept and adopting its operational approaches, the Joint Force will be better prepared to address the dynamic security environment now and in the future to conduct integrated campaigning both internally and with interorganizational partners across the competition continuum. The Joint Force must be prepared to campaign simultaneously across the competition continuum. This concept provides an intellectual framework for the Joint Force to meet that standard by offering an alternative construct for understanding and operating within the future operating environment.

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Glossary

Alignment: Joint doctrine defaults to the English definition of alignment rather than including it in JP 1-02. According to Merriam-Webster Dictionary, alignment is “the act of aligning or state of being aligned; especially the proper positioning or state of adjustment of parts in relation to each other.”

Campaign: a framework to orchestrate and synchronize simultaneous activities and operations (major or otherwise) aimed at accomplishing or enabling policy aims; the joint forces’ intellectual guide and construct for the informed application of force; the aggregate contribution to a policy regarding armed conflict, competition, and cooperation.

Consolidation: continual and deliberate actions to secure gains and translate military success into the aims of policy; an inherent part of campaigning in armed conflict, competition, and cooperation. Central and essential to the conduct of war and achieving war’s policy.

Integrated Campaigning: (proactive) Joint Force and interorganizational partner efforts to enable the achievement and maintenance of policy aims by integrating military and aligning non-military activities of sufficient scope, scale, simultaneity, and duration across multiple domains.

Integration: the arrangement of military and non-military actions to operate by engaging as a whole.

Interorganizational Partners: Other United States Government departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal government agencies; intergovernmental organizations; foreign security forces and government agencies; nongovernmental organizations; entities of the private sector; non-traditional security entities; and foreign populations and groups.

Major Operation (Revised): A series of tactical actions which may include combat conducted by individual or joint forces, coordinated in time and place, to achieve a logical series of tactical objectives within and across multiple domains in an operational area. Within a campaign’s construct, successful results may lead to attaining an operational-level objective.

Military End State (Revised): Term describing and framing success criteria for military accomplishment associated with a specific operation (major or otherwise). The term is not synonymous with achieving policy aim or creating a sustainable outcomes.

Objective: (JP 5.0 2011) Current -1. The clearly defined, decisive, and

1309 attainable goal toward which every operation is directed. 2. The specific target
1310 of the action taken which is essential to the commander's plan.

1311

1312 **Operational-level Objective:** An animate (ex. behavioral) or inanimate (ex.
1313 positional) purposeful goal toward which a commander designs and directs
1314 action within a campaign's conceptual construct.

1315

1316 **Perpetuation:** Deliberate actions to sustain outcomes without interruption;
1317 occurs within the Post-Aim period.

1318

1319 **Policy Aim:** The intended or desired achievements of a political direction
1320 adopted and pursued by a government, ruler, or other state or non-state
1321 political apparatus.

1322

1323 **Strategic Initiative:** the ability to take action in support of national objectives.

1324

1325 **Strategic-level Objective:** An elastic political value that flows from a policy;
1326 rarely static but pliable and exists in beta-like form. Continually evolves as a
1327 function of political foresight, calculus, compromise, and daring. Collectively,
1328 describes the desired outcomes or aims.

1329

1330 **Sustainable Outcome:** Attainment or realization of a policy's aims. The goal
1331 and orientation of a campaign; not synonymous with end state

1332

1333 **War and Conflict Follow Through and Transition (WCFTT)** (*Replaces the*
1334 *undefined terms of Post-conflict and Post-war*): A period of deliberate action to
1335 secure military victory through consolidation; a long series of methodical and
1336 informed transitions leading to the attainment of strategic objectives and
1337 accomplishment of policy aims, historically reflective of U.S.' successful
1338 transitions. In many cases, the follow through required to attain outcomes
1339 requires a substantive and lengthy commitment.

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