

## ARCIC Professional Reading List

*He made notes on all the important books he read, both in the books themselves and on reference cards, and he was as deeply interested in some of the unsuccessful campaigns, trying to ferret out the secret of their unsuccess, as he was in the successful ones.*

Beatrice Ayer Patton (General George Patton's Wife), on General Patton's reading program. From "A Soldier's Reading," *Armor Magazine*, November-December 1952.

[http://www.benning.army.mil/armor/earmor/content/issues/2013/JUL\\_SEP/Articles/Patton.pdf](http://www.benning.army.mil/armor/earmor/content/issues/2013/JUL_SEP/Articles/Patton.pdf)

Army leader development across the institutional, operational, and self-development domains is essential to the adaptive and innovative leader. Collectively, the works contained within this reading list will stimulate and advance the thinking for all.

**The importance of reading** is highlighted by the following two articles:

*General James 'Mad Dog' Mattis About Being 'Too Busy To Read'*

<http://www.businessinsider.com/viral-james-mattis-email-reading-marines-2013-5>

*The Need to Read* – Wall Street Journal

<http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-need-to-read-1480083086>

This ARCIC professional reading list is organized in nine main sections: (1) Threats (2) Future War (3) Technology (4) Think (5) Learn (6) Analyze, (7) Implement, (8) Canon and (9) Additional Daily, Weekly, Monthly, and Quarterly Resources. Each section contains the books, articles, videos, in this order. The last section contains additional daily, weekly, monthly, and quarterly resources.

### Threats

*The Unquiet Frontier: Rising Rivals, Vulnerable Allies, and the Crisis of American Power*, by Jakub J. Grygiel and A. Wess Mitchell. From the Baltic to the South China Sea, newly assertive authoritarian states sense an opportunity to resurrect old empires or build new ones at America's expense. Hoping that U.S. decline is real, nations such as Russia, Iran, and China are testing Washington's resolve by targeting vulnerable allies at the frontiers of American power.

*A Sense of the Enemy: The High Stakes History of Reading Your Rival's Mind*, by Zachary Shore. In *A Sense of the Enemy*, Zachary Shore examines how certain government leaders have tried to think like their enemies. In doing so he poses two questions: What produces strategic empathy (the skill of understanding what drives and constrains one's adversary)? How has strategic empathy, or the lack of it, shaped pivotal periods in twentieth-century conflict? The author argues that, while it remains important

to be aware of prior patterns of leader decision-making, what is most important is to identify when and how leaders break from those patterns.

*Organizations at War in Afghanistan & Beyond*, by Abdulkader H. Sinno. In *Organizations at War*, Abdulkader Sinno observes that 'ethnic groups, social classes, civilizations, religions, and nations do not engage in conflict or strategy interaction – organizations do. He argues that because engaging in conflict requires 'coordination, mobilization, and manipulation of information', detailed studies of organizations are necessary to understand 'how conflicts begin, evolve, and conclude.

*Beyond Coast Artillery: Cross-Domain Denial and the Army*, by Eric Lindsey. In "Beyond Coast Artillery: Cross-Domain Denial and the Army," Eric Lindsey argues that threats impel the Army to "get back into the business of cross-domain denial." Lindsey makes the case that land forces are uniquely suited to deny and control multiple domains through their ability to disperse, harden, and conceal themselves.

<https://arcic.tradoc.army.mil/sites/arcic/Professional%20Reading/>

## **Future War**

*The Future of Land Warfare*, by Michael E. O'Hanlon. In *The Future of Land Warfare*, Michael O'Hanlon, research director at the Brookings Institution and author of many books on defense issues, argues against the conventional wisdom that large-scale ground warfare is passé. Instead, he concludes that 'ground warfare does have a future and a significant one at that.

*The Future of War: The Re-Enchantment of War in the Twenty-First Century*, by Christopher Coker. Christopher Coker's book investigates whether citizens are "disenchanted" with state-generated warfare. Coker predicates his argument on two assumptions: future warriors will remain human, and some human beings are born to be natural fighters. Coker argues that as long as other humans honor their fallen, people will always be willing to assume the role of the warrior. Coker credits modern technology as well as the media for abating the enchantment over killing.

*Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War*, by Peter Singer and August Cole. In *Ghost Fleet*, P.W. Singer, a strategist at New America, and August Cole, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, imagine a world war between the United States and a Russo-Sino alliance. While many readers will be interested in the new technologies they describe and the way these influence the conflict, the authors' depiction of the interaction between people and technologies in the context of a high-stakes competition is arguably the most compelling feature of the book.

*Harbingers of Future War: Implications for the Army*. Lieutenant General McMaster and Center for Strategic Studies, 4 May 2016. Lieutenant General McMaster on the future of warfare and possible threats.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nGuJ8fsmTGw>

## Technology

*Tactical Cyber: How to Move Forward*, by Andrew Metcalf and Christopher Barber. Is it time for the U.S. to think harder about the practical implications of using its cyber capabilities at the tactical level of war? Andrew Metcalf and Christopher Barber think so. If it doesn't, they argue, it will be at a disadvantage in conflicts where cyber assets are used at all levels.

*The Army after Next: The First Postindustrial Army*, by Thomas Adams. An examination of the way the U.S. Army and Department of Defense (DOD) have tried to create the capabilities promised by the high-tech Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). It is also the only in-depth account of the effect RMA and transformation concepts had on the American operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

*Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century*, by Peter Singer. We are beginning to see a massive shift in military technology that threatens to make the stuff of *I, Robot* and the Terminator real. Pilots in Nevada are killing terrorists in Afghanistan remotely. Scientists are debating how smart and how lethal to make their current robotic prototypes.

*Cybersecurity and Cyberwar*, by Peter Singer. Dependence on computers has had a transformative effect on human society. Cybernetics is woven into the core functions of virtually every basic institution, including our oldest ones. War is one such institution, and the digital revolution's impact on it has been profound. The American military, which has no peer, is almost completely reliant on high-tech computer systems.

*The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000* by William Hardy McNeill. William H. McNeill explores a millennium of human upheaval and traces the path by which we have arrived at the dilemmas that now confront us. McNeill moves from the crossbow - banned by the Church in 1139 as too lethal for Christians to use against one another - to the nuclear missile, from the sociological consequences of drill in the seventeenth century to the emergence of the military-industrial complex in the twentieth.

*U.S. Army Space Capabilities Enabling the Force of Decisive Action*. This Torchbearer National Security Report discusses how the Army is inextricably linked to space-based capabilities, which are involved with all aspects of the prevent, shape, and win framework that guides the Army, both in current conflicts and in its future vision. As the DOD's new strategic guidance highlights, the Army will be part of a joint force that is smaller and leaner but more agile, flexible and technologically enabled.

*Technology and War: from 2000 B.C. to the present*, by Martin Van Creveld. This book provides an analysis of the impact of technology on warfare throughout the centuries. In this impressive work, Martin van Creveld considers man's use of

technology over the past 4,000 years and its impact on military organization, weaponry, logistics, intelligence, communications, transportation, and command.

*A Rage for Order, the Middle East in Turmoil, from Tahrir Square to ISIS*, by Robert F. Worth. This book tracks the tormented legacy of what was once called the Arab Spring. Writing with bold literary ambition, the distinguished *New York Times* correspondent Robert F. Worth introduces a riveting cast of characters. Combining dramatic storytelling with an original analysis of the Arab world today, *A Rage for Order* captures the psychological and actual civil wars raging throughout the Middle East and explains how the dream of an Arab renaissance gave way to a new age of discord

*On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace*, by Donald Kagan. By lucidly revealing the common threads that connect the ancient confrontations between Athens and Sparta and between Rome and Carthage with the two calamitous world wars of the 20th century and the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kagan reveals new insights into the nature of war--and peace--that are vitally important and often surprising.

*Waging War: A World History from Prehistory to the Present*, by Wayne E. Lee. In *Waging War*, Wayne E. Lee describes the emergence of military innovations and systems, examining how they were created and then how they moved or affected other societies. These innovations are central to most historical narratives, including the development of social complexity, the rise of the state, the role of the steppe horseman, the spread of gunpowder, the rise of the west, the bureaucratization of military institutions, the industrial revolution and the rise of firepower, strategic bombing and nuclear weapons, and the creation of "people's war."

*Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present*, by Max Boot. In *Invisible Armies*, author Max Boot, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of two previous books on related topics, examines guerrilla warfare from ancient times to the present day, concluding that "it is a form of combat that has been immanent in all cultures, at all times, whenever one side was too weak to face another in open battle.

*The Science of War: Defense Budgeting, Military Technology, Logistics, and Combat Outcomes*, by Michael E. O'Hanlon. In *The Science of War*, Michael O'Hanlon observes that "recognizing scientific methods in defense analysis to be imprecise, we must nonetheless strive to understand, improve, and employ them." At the same time, he notes that "studying the science of war should never be seen as a substitute for studying the art, history, and contemporary aspects of warfare."

## **Think**

*The Ten Faces of Innovation -- Strategies for Heightening Creativity*, by Tom Kelley with Jonathan Littman. Drawing on nearly 20 years of experience managing IDEO, Kelley identifies ten roles people can play in an organization to foster innovation and new ideas while offering an effective counter to naysayers. Among these

approaches are the *Anthropologist*—the person who goes into the field to see how customers use and respond to products, to come up with new innovations; the *Cross-pollinator* who mixes and matches ideas, people, and technology to create new ideas that can drive growth; and the *Hurdler*, who instantly looks for ways to overcome the limits and challenges to any situation.

*Preparing for War: The Emergence of the Modern U.S. Army, 1815-1917*, by Lieutenant Colonel J. P. Clark. Nineteenth-century officers believed that generalship and battlefield command were more a matter of innate ability than anything institutions could teach. By World War I, however, Progressive Era concepts of professionalism had infiltrated the Army. Younger officers took for granted that war's complexity required them to be trained to think and act alike—a notion that would have offended earlier generations. *Preparing for War* concludes by demonstrating how these new notions set the conditions for many of the successes—and some of the failures—of General Pershing's American Expeditionary Forces.

*Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*, by Williamson Murray and Allan Millet. During the interwar period, however, the armed forces grew increasingly asymmetrical, developing different approaches to the same problems. This study of major military innovations in the 1920s and 1930s explores differences in exploitation by the seven major military powers. The comparative essays investigate how and why innovation occurred or did not occur, and explain much of the strategic and operative performance of the Axis and Allies in World War II.

*The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050*, by MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray. *The Dynamics of Military Revolution* bridges a major gap in the emerging literature on revolutions in military affairs. It suggests that two very different phenomena have been at work over the past centuries: "military revolutions," which are driven by vast social and political changes, and "revolutions in military affairs," which military institutions have directed, although usually with great difficulty and ambiguous results.

*The Seventh Sense: Power, Fortune, and Survival in the Age of Networks*, by Joshua Cooper Ramo. According to Joshua Ramo, this is a time of disruption that lends itself to "seventh sense" thinking—in less trendy terms, the ability to discern how things connect to other things in nodes and networks, "to look at any object and see the way in which it is changed by connection."

## Learn

*Educating for National Security*, by Jakub Grygiel. National security is not simply a matter of technical skills and university degrees. To maintain power, engineering skills and knowledge of math are undoubtedly indispensable, but so is a solid understanding of, and appreciation for, the state's civilizational underpinnings—the religious beliefs, political ideals, and moral virtues. An education for national security must start from the desire to learn and understand one's own national culture and tradition to be able to

identify what one is supposed to defend. And herein lies our biggest challenge: we are becoming increasingly more skilled at how to defend ourselves, but we are losing the tools to understand what we are expected to protect. We can do a lot but we are uncertain why we should.

[https://www.sais-jhu.edu/sites/default/files/orbis%20spring%202013\\_0.pdf](https://www.sais-jhu.edu/sites/default/files/orbis%20spring%202013_0.pdf)

*The Moment of Clarity -- Using the Human Sciences to Solve your Toughest Business Problems*, by Christian Madsbjerg and Mikkel B. Rasmussen. In this book the authors examine the business world's assumptions about human behavior and show how these assumptions can lead businesses off track. But the authors chart a way forward. Using theories and tools from the human sciences—anthropology, sociology, philosophy, and psychology—the book introduces a practical framework called *sensemaking*. Sensemaking's nonlinear problem-solving approach gives executives a better way to understand business challenges involving shifts in human behavior.

In *War from the Ground Up*, by Emile Simpson, a former British Army officer who completed three combat tours of duty in southern Afghanistan, distinguishes between the use of armed force to accomplish military objectives that contribute to political solutions, and the use of armed force to directly achieve political outcomes. The latter, he argues, has become the norm. Simpson connects a clear and compelling description of the political nature of combat at the tactical level to the need for strategy to ensure consistency between policy and military operations

*Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*, by Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian. In *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*, the editors focus on the history of counterinsurgency from the late nineteenth century to examine how different strategies were developed and to evaluate whether those strategies contributed to the success or failure of counterinsurgency efforts. In general, the contributors place each conflict in social, cultural and political context, and avoid sweeping conclusions and simplistic analogies.

*The Echo of Battle: The Army's Way of War*, by Brian McAllister Linn. In the face of radically new ways of waging war, Brian Linn surveys the past assumptions—and errors—that underlie the army's many visions of warfare up to the present day. He explores the army's forgotten heritage of deterrence, its long experience with counter-guerrilla operations, and its successive efforts to transform itself. Distinguishing three martial traditions—each with its own concept of warfare, its own strategic views, and its own excuses for failure—he locates the visionaries who prepared the army for its battlefield triumphs and the reactionaries whose mistakes contributed to its defeats.

*34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon*, by Amos Harel, Avi Issacharoff. Comprehensive account of the Second Lebanese War's progression, from the border abduction of an Israeli soldier on July 12, 2006, through the hasty decision for an aggressive response; the fateful discussions in the Cabinet and the senior Israeli command; to the heavy fighting in south Lebanon and the raging diplomatic battles in Paris, Washington and New York.

*How the Limited Use of Lessons Learned Failed to Form a Cohesive Strategy in Operation Enduring Freedom*, by Joel Lawton. The United States, with its endeavor in Afghanistan, has taken the course of many strategies that made diminutive positive impacts to the country. Initially, this paper reveals that strategy, policy, or even doctrine development has failed to synthesize knowledge of lessons learned from similar global or U.S. driven approaches. <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/how-the-limited-use-of-lessons-learned-failed-to-form-a-cohesive-strategy-in-operation-endu>.

## Analyze

*"Big Five" Lessons for Today and Tomorrow*, by Colonel David C. Trybula. Like most legends, the legend of the "Big Five" has its roots in actual events but also grows grander as memories of missteps, challenges, and problems fade in light of the final successes that continue to appear and reinforce their greatness. An examination of these programs demonstrates that while unequivocally successful in the end, each program would not have been described as successful at some point in its acquisition. They all had to overcome major challenges and morphed into what we know today. <http://www.benning.army.mil/Library/content/NS%20P-4889.pdf>

*Finding the Target: The Transformation of American Military Policy*, by Frederick W. Kagan. In *Finding the Target*, Frederick Kagan describes the three basic transformations within the U.S. military since Vietnam. First was the move to an all-volunteer force and a new generation of weapons systems in the 1970s. Second was the emergence of stealth technology and precision-guided munitions in the 1980s. Third was the information technology that followed the fall of the Soviet Union and the first Gulf War. This last could have insured the U.S. continuing military preeminence, but this goal was compromised by Clinton's drawing down of our armed forces in the 1990s and Bush's response to 9/11 and the global war on terror.

*Concrete Hell: Urban Warfare from Stalingrad to Iraq*, by Louis A. DiMarco. In *Concrete Hell*, Louis DiMarco, a retired US Army lieutenant colonel and author of key tactical manuals, describes the evolution of urban combat across the last half of the twentieth century. He makes a compelling argument that future conflict will "largely occur in cities" and that the "keys to understanding the conflicts of the future are illustrated in the urban battlefields of the past." In particular, the author predicts that future urban combat will combine elements of conventional combat, such as that seen in Stalingrad in 1942, with unconventional combat.

*The Psychology of Strategy: Exploring Rationality in the Vietnam War*, by Kenneth Payne. In *Psychology of Strategy*, Kenneth Payne argues that 'making and enacting strategy is an inherently psychological activity'. He uses the wartime deliberations of U.S. presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon to examine how psychological factors influence decision-making and the development of strategy.

*The Lost Meaning of Strategy* by Hew Strachan, *Survival*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Autumn 2005): pages 33-54. Strategy is a word which has lost its meaning, too often being used

as a synonym for policy. Between the late eighteenth century and the end of the First World War, it described the conduct of war as exercised at the level of the military commander. But the scale of the two world wars and the influence of maritime powers, like the United States and Britain, prompted the evolution of 'grand strategy' to enable the coordination of allies in different theatres of war.

*Force Planning: The Crossroads of Strategy and the Political Process* by Mackubin Thomas Owens. While force planners must think about what the future security environment might look like, what technologies might be available, and how future forces might leverage these emerging technologies to meet the challenges of a future security environment, they must always be cognizant of domestic structural factors. The author argues that a force planner must always be guided by a coherent strategic logic. Structural factors can never be eliminated but a strong strategic rationale can minimize them.

<http://www.fpri.org/article/2015/07/force-planning-the-crossroads-of-strategy-and-the-political-process/>

## Implement

*Recalibrating Requirements* by Steve Stark and Margaret Roth in Army AL&T Magazine, January - March 2017. <http://usaasc.armyalt.com/?iid=149666#folio=28> With the help of groundbreaking efforts by professional combat developers, requirements writers and program managers, ARCIC is looking to thaw the glacial pace of acquisition and speed capabilities to the warfighter as the Army warms to new ways of doing business, welcoming innovation and involving industry early and often.

*Elvis's Army*, by Brian McAllister Linn. In an era that threatened Soviet-American thermonuclear annihilation, the army declared it could limit atomic warfare to the battlefield. It not only adopted a radically new way of fighting but also revamped its equipment, organization, concepts, and training practices. From massive garrisons in Germany and Korea to nuclear tests to portable atomic weapons, the army reinvented itself. In *Elvis's Army*, Brian Linn traces the origins, evolution, and ultimate failure of the army's attempt to transform itself for atomic warfare.

*Fast Tank and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945*, by David E. Johnson. Johnson examines the U.S. Army's innovations for both armor and aviation between the world wars, arguing that the tank became a captive of the conservative infantry and cavalry branches, while the airplane's development was channeled by air power insurgents bent on creating an independent air force

*France's War in Mali Lessons for an Expeditionary Army* by Michael Shurkin. Retrieved from. France fielded a relatively small force put together using small, scalable combined arms task organized units as basic building blocks and conducted a campaign that emphasized speed and maneuver over force protection.

<https://arcic.tradoc.army.mil/sites/arcic/Professional%20Reading/>

*Transforming the Force: The 11<sup>th</sup> Air Assault Division (Test) from 1963-65* by Major Tom C. Graves. The paper is an in-depth study of the 11<sup>th</sup> Air Assault Division (Test) from 1963-65 when the Army conducted extensive experimentation with airmobility and helicopter operations. This led to fundamental precepts of airmobility doctrine for the U.S. Army. <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a381779.pdf>

## Canon

*On War, by Carl von Clausewitz.* Carl von Clausewitz's *On War* is considered by most as the definitive work on war and warfare. The book is an extraordinary attempt to construct an all-embracing theory of how war works. Its coherence and ambition are unmatched by other military literature. *On War* is full of sharp observation, biting irony, and memorable phrases.

*History of the Peloponnesian War, by Thucydides.* This book is a historical account of the Peloponnesian War fought between the Peloponnesian League (led by Sparta) and the Delian League (led by Athens). It was written by Thucydides, an Athenian historian who served as an Athenian general during the war. His account of the conflict is considered a classic and regarded as one of the earliest scholarly works of history. The histories are divided into eight books by editors of later antiquity.

*The Art of War, by Sun Tzu.* Perhaps the most prestigious and influential book of strategy in the world, as eagerly studied in Asia by modern politicians and executives as it has been by military leaders since ancient times. As a study of the anatomy of organizations in conflict, *The Art of War* applies to competition and conflict in general, on every level from the interpersonal to the international.

*Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice* by David Galula. Drawn from the observations of a French officer, David Galula, who witnessed guerrilla warfare on three continents, the book remains relevant today as American policymakers, military analysts, and members of the public look to the counterinsurgency era of the 1960s for lessons to apply to the current situations and the future.

<http://louisville.edu/armyrotc/files/Galula%20David%20-%20Counterinsurgency%20Warfare.pdf>

## Additional Daily, Weekly, Monthly, and Quarterly Resources

### Daily/Weekly:

**ARCIC Weekly Professional Reading List Archives:** A complete list of the weekly articles is found at: <http://www.arcic.army.mil/LPD/FullArchives/>

### Newspapers/Magazines

(1) The New York Times <http://www.nytimes.com/>

- (2) The Wall Street Journal <http://www.wsj.com/>
- (3) Economist <http://www.economist.com/>

### **Influential Blogs.**

- (1) Tom Rick's Best Defense. <http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/>
- (2) War on the Rocks. <http://warontherocks.com/>
- (3) Defense One. <http://www.defenseone.com/>
- (4) The War Council Blog. <http://mwi.usma.edu/blog/>
- (5) The Bridge. <https://medium.com/the-bridge>
- (6) Small Wars Journal. <http://smallwarsjournal.com/>
- (7) Institute for the Study of War. <http://www.understandingwar.org/>

### **Monthly and quarterly reading.**

- (1) Parameters. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/Parameters/>
- (2) Joint Forces Quarterly. <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq.htm>
- (3) Military Review. <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/>
- (4) Army Magazine. <http://www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine>
- (5) Air Force Magazine. <http://www.airforcemag.com/Pages/HomePage.aspx>
- (6) Navy Proceedings. <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings>
- (7) The Marine Corps Gazette. <https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette>
- (8) The National Interest. <http://nationalinterest.org/>
- (9) Combat Studies Institute. <http://usacac.army.mil/organizations/cace/csi>
- (10) Naval War College Review. <https://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval-War-College-Review.aspx>