Professional Readings Full Archives

Series: 154
Extending the Battlefield
10/1/2017
Series: 153
Army showcases stealthy, hydrogen fuel cell vehicle
9/18/2017
Series: 152
Objective Metropolis: the Future of Dense Urban Operational Environments
8/31/2017
Series: 151
The Strange Tale of the Norden Bombsight
8/14/2017
Series: 150
Risk Culture: Similarities & Differences between State and DoD
8/4/2017
Series: 149
Defense is from Mars, State is from Venus: Improving Communications and Promoting National Security
7/31/2017
Series: 148
Military Review October 1992
7/17/2017
Series: 147
Revitalizing Wargaming is Necessary to Be Prepared for Future Wars
7/2/2017
Series: 146
The End of the Asian Century: War, Stagnation, and the Risks to the World’s Most Dynamic Region
6/16/2017
Series: 145
Reflections on TRADOC’s Analysis of the Yom Kippur War (pages 220-225)
6/6/2017
Series: 144
Some New, Some Old, All Necessary: The Multi-Domain Imperative
5/13/2017
Series: 143
Lethality Upgrade: Why a New Stryker Variant is Needed on the Modern Battlefield
5/13/2017
Series: 142
The Indo-Asia Pacific and the Multi-Domain Battle Concept
5/8/2017
Series: 141
What the Past Teaches about the Future
5/1/2017
Series: 140
That Elusive Operational Concept
4/22/2017
Series: 139
Grant’s Disengagement from Cold Harbor (pages 176-209 found in the book Cold Harbor to the Crater)
4/18/2017
Series: 138
Countering the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Threat
4/10/2017
Series: 137
Thinking Like a Russian Officer
4/1/2017
Series: 136
The Future of the Army
3/27/2017
Series: 135
Letter to President George W. Bush et al re Predicting the Future
3/20/2017
Series: 134
The Culture of Strategic Thought Behind Russia’s Modern Approach to Warfare
2/13/2017
Series: 133
Expeditionary Land Power: Lessons from the Mexican-American War
3/6/2017
Series: 132
Running Things
2/27/2017
Series: 131
Selected Foreign Counterparts of U.S. Army Ground Combat Systems and Implications for Combat Operations and Modernization
2/21/2017
Series: 130
The Strategic Value of Conventional Land Forces
2/13/2017
Series: 129
Tooth to Tail
2/6/2017
Series: 128
Transforming the Force: The 11th Air Assault Division (Test) from 1963-1965
1/30/2017
Series: 127
Cyber Beyond Third Offset: A Call for Warfighter-Led Innovation
1/23/2017
Series: 126
NATO's Land Forces: Strength and Speed Matter
1/18/2017
Series: 125
The Institutional Level of War
1/4/2017
Series: 124
Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant v1 Chapters XXXII & XXXIII
1/4/2017
Series: 123
Landpower and American Credibility
12/27/2016
Series: 122
The US Army’s Postwar Recoveries
12/19/2016
Series: 121
The Panther Brigade in Operation Inherent Resolve
12/12/2016
Series: 120
The Area Under the Curve
12/5/2016
Series: 119
US Naval Forces Before and Beyond Battle
11/28/2016
Series: 118
The Islamic State's Militarization of Children
11/21/2016
Series: 117
Turkey’s Operation Euphrates Shield: An Exemplar of Joint Combined Arms Maneuver
11/14/2016
Series: 116
The Future Operating Environment 2050 - Chaos, Complexity and Competition
11/7/2016
Series: 115
War Goes Viral
10/31/2016
Series: 114
Mobility, Vigilance, and Justice: The US Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946-1953
11/24/2016
Series: 113
Is the Conduct of War a Business?
10/18/2016
Series: 112
Putin's Information Warfare in Ukraine
10/11/2016
Series: 111
Beyond Coastal Artillery
10/4/2016
Series: 110
The Battle of Manila (pages 91-122)
9/27/2016
Series: 109
Precision and Consequences for the Modern Battlefield
9/19/2016
Series: 108 A
Rediscovering the Art of Strategic Thinking
9/6/2016
Series: 108 B
The Strategic Development of Tactical #Leadership
9/6/2016
Series: 107
What It Means to be Expeditionary
9/6/2016
Series: 106
NATO's Next Act
8/29/2016
Series: 105
Vicksburg and Multi-Domain Battle
8/23/2016
Series: 104 A
Innovation: Past and Future
8/17/2016
Series: 104 B
The Relevance of Culture
8/17/2016
Series: 103
Cross-Domain Synergy-Advancing Jointness
8/9/2016
Series: 102 A
Into the Greasy Grass
8/2/2016
Series: 102 B
The Uncertain Role of the Tank in Modern War: Lessons from the Israeli Experience in Hybrid Warfare
8/2/2016
Series: 101
Hawks, Doves and Canaries: Women and Conflict
7/26/2016
Series: 99
The 1974 Paracels Sea Battle and China's Maritime Militia
7/11/2016
Series: 100
The Mud of Verdun
7/18/2016
Series: 98
Cheap Technology Will Challenge U.S. Tactical Dominance
7/6/2016
Series: 97
Landpower and American Credibility
6/25/2016
Series: 96
The Lure of Strike
6/22/2016
Series: 95
The Hell After ISIS
6/14/2016
Series: 94
Tactics and Mechanization
6/7/2016
Series: 93
Cyberwar in the Underworld - Anonymous versus Los Zetas in Mexico
5/30/2016
Series: 92
Strategic Landpower in the Indo-Asia-Pacific
5/23/2016
Series: 91
The Next Korean War: Drawing Lessons From Israel’s Experience in the Middle East
5/10/2016
Series: 90
A Retrospect on Close Air Support (Chapter 11 Page 535)
5/10/2016
Series: 89 A
The Future Is Growing Brighter For U.S. Combat Vehicles
6/22/2016
Series: 89 B
Reimagining and Modernizing U.S. Airborne Forces for the 21st Century
6/22/2016
Series: 88 A
Israel’s Operation Protective Edge
4/27/2016
Series: 88 B
Aerial Interdiction: Air Power and the Land Battle in Three American Wars
4/26/2016
Series: 87
Confronting the Threat of Corruption and Organized Crime in Afghanistan
4/20/2016
Series: 86
Eurasia's Coming Anarchy
4/12/2016
Series: 85
Cyber Threats and Russian Information Warfare
4/4/2016
Series: 84
The U.S. Is Losing the Social Media War
3/29/2016
Series: 83
Colombia - A Political Economy of War to an Inclusive Peace
3/21/2016
Series: 82 A
Definition of ‘Decisive’ Depends on Context
3/15/2016
Series: 82 B
How Should We Think About “Gray-Zone” Wars
3/15/2016
Series: 81
The Contemporary Spectrum of Conflict: Protracted, Gray Zone, Ambiguous, and Hybrid Modes of War
3/8/2016
Series: 80
Concepts, Doctrine, Principles from "Technology and Military Doctrine Essays (Essay 3 Page 19)
2/27/2016
Series: 79
The Sinister Shadow of Escalating Middle East Sectarianism
2/22/2016
Series: 78
Strategy and Grand Strategy: What Students and Practitioners Need to Know
2/17/2016
Series: 77
Arming Our Allies: The Case for Offensive Capabilities
2/9/2016
Series: 76
Forging Australian Land Power: A Primer
2/2/2016
Series: 75
How to Win Outnumbered
1/25/2016
Series: 74
Frontline Allies: War and Change in Central Europe
1/21/2016
Series: 73
To Change an Army
1/12/2016
Series: 72
The Use and Abuse of Military History
1/5/2016
Series: 71
ARCIC Professional Reading #29 and Professional Reading #43
12/30/2015
Series: 70
Gaming the "System of Systems”
12/22/2015
Series: 69
Chief of Staff of the Army’s Speech to the National Guard Association of the United States
12/14/2015
Series: 68
Information Warfare: What Is It and How to Win It?
12/9/2015
Series: 67
War and the Art of Governance
12/1/2015
Series: 66 A
General James 'Mad Dog' Mattis Email About Being 'Too Busy To Read' Is A Must-Read
11/24/2015
Series: 66 B
Fiction Belongs on Military Reading Lists
11/24/2015
Series: 65
How the U.S. Army Remains the Master of Landpower
11/18/2015
Series: 64
Testimony of Walter Russell Mead to the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services
11/10/2015
Series: 63
In Defense of Classical Geopolitics
11/3/2015
Series: 62
The Islamic State and Information Warfare
10/26/2015
Series: 61
Wake Up, America, to a Strategic New World
10/19/2015
Series: 60
Limiting Regret: Building the Army We Will Need
10/14/2015
Series: 59
The Use of Indigenous Forces in Stability Operations (page 69)
10/3/2015
Series: 58
Pursuing Strategic Advantage: The Utility of Armed Forces in Peace, War, and Everything In Between
9/26/2015
Series: 57
Gangs of Karachi
9/21/2015
Series: 56
Experimental Units: The Historical Record
9/12/2015
Series: 55
Governing the Caliphate: the Islamic State Picture
9/5/2015
Series: 54
Will Humans Matter in the Wars of 2030?
8/29/2015
Series: 53
The Case for Deterrence by Denial
8/25/2015
Series: 52
Precision Firepower - Smart Bombs, Dumb Strategy
8/20/2015
Series: 51
Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age
8/11/2015
Series: 50
Hybrid Warfare and Challenges
8/4/2015
Series: 49
Experimentation in the Period Between the Two World Wars: Lessons for the Twenty-First Century
7/26/2015
Series: 48
Chapter 3, Shape, Engage, and Consolidate Gains from Army Field Manual 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations
7/1/2015
Series: 47
Predicting Future War
7/12/2015
Series: 45
UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE ARMED SERVICES, Hearing, Tuesday, April 28, 2014, United States Policy on Europe
6/30/2015
Series: 44
Top Russian General Lays Bare Putin's Plan for Ukraine
6/22/2015
Series: 43
8 Unique Values: Why America Needs the Army
6/16/2015
Series: 42
Post Crimea Europe: NATO In the Age of Limited Wars
6/9/2015
Series: 41
American Landpower and the Two-war Construct
6/2/2015
Series: 40
Operations of the Natural Resources Counterinsurgency Cell (NRCC): Theory and Practice Implementing Non-lethal Unconventional Warfare Approaches in Eastern Afghanistan
5/28/2015
Series: 39
Bridging the Planning Gap: Incorporating Cyberspace into Operational Planning
5/18/2015
Series: 38
Defeating the Islamic State: A Financial-Military Strategy
5/11/2015
Series: 37
Superiority
5/5/2015
Series: 36
Clausewitz Out, Computer In: Military Culture and Technological Hubris.
4/30/2015
Series: 35
Robotics on the Battlefield Part II: The Coming Swarm
4/23/2015
Series: 34
Why Wargaming Works
4/15/2015
Series: 33
Louisiana Maneuvers (1940 - 41)
4/8/2015
Series: 32
'It Just Took a Few': the Tank in New Guinea Campaign
3/30/2015
Series: 31
The Shadow Commander
3/23/2015
Series: 30
Rethinking Operation Protective Edge, The 2014 Gaza War
3/18/2015
Series: 29
Why do we need an Army?
3/12/2015
Series: 28
DARPA: Nobody's safe on the Internet
3/2/2015
Series: 27
States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders
2/23/2015
Series: 26
The Future of Military Innovation Studies
2/16/2015
Series: 25
A Case Study in Innovation
2/9/2015
Series: 24
The Joint Force Commander's Guide to Cyberspace Operations and FireEye Cyber Threat Map
2/2/2015
Series: 23
The Power of Discourse
1/26/2015
Series: 22
Management's New Paradigms
1/20/2015
Series: 21
The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050; Chapter 10
1/12/2015
Series: 20
To Change an Army
1/5/2015
Series: 19
Where Good Ideas Come From
12/15/2014
Series: 18
Superiority
12/8/2014
Series: 18
When Superiority Goes Wrong: Science Fiction and Offset Strategies
12/8/2014
Series: 17
Thinking About Innovation
12/1/2014
Series: 17
The Anatomy of Change: Why Armies Succeed or Fail at Transformation
12/1/2014
Series: 16 A
The M1 Abrams Today Tomorrow
11/24/2014
Series: 16 B
Bringing Mobility to the Infantry Brigade Combat Team
11/24/2014
Series: 16 C
Losing Our Way The Disassociation of Reconnaissance and Security Organizations from Screen, Guard, and Cover Missions
11/24/2014
Series: 15
The Rhyme of History Lessons of the Great War
11/17/2014
Series: 14
France's War in Mali, Lessons for an Expeditionary Army
11/10/2014
Series: 13
More Small Wars Counterinsurgency Is Here to Stay
11/3/2014
Series: 12
"Big Five" Lessons for Today and Tomorrow
10/27/2014
Series: 11
The Human Dimension White Paper
10/20/2014
Series: 10
The Great Revamp: 11 Trends Shaping Future Conflict
10/13/2014
Series: 9
Threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), al-Qa'ida, and other Islamic extremists; written testimony of General James M. Mattis, USMC (Ret.), former commander of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
10/6/2014
Series: 8
Land Warfare Doctrine 1; The Fundamentals of Land Power 2014
9/29/2014
Series: 7
The Strategic Utility of Land Power
9/22/2014
Series: 6
Observations on the Long War
9/15/2014
Series: 5
The Nightmare Years to Come?
9/8/2014
Series: 4
Ensuring a strong US Defense in the future
8/18/2014
Series: 2
Toward a Secure and Stable Northern Mali
8/4/2014
Series: 1
Groupthink: The Brainstorming Myth
7/21/2014

Series: 154 10/1/2017

"Rapid military modernization, the proliferation of advanced capabilities, including long-range precision missiles and advanced sensors, and their spreading into the hands of potential adversaries has resulted in a need for land forces to adapt to the diverse range of challenges we will face."

Dr. Albert Palazzo & Lt. Col. David McClain - MDB: New Concept for Land Forces

"Multi-domain battle is more than the ability to work in multiple domains. We already do this quite effectively in today's Air Operations Centers. It is also more than operations in one domain supporting or complementing operations in another domain. An advanced multi-domain operating concept (CONOPS) will exploit current and new capabilities as well as integrate joint and coalition capabilities across all military operations. It will allow us to both see more opportunities and generate more options for our nation's leaders."

Gen. David Goldfein, Air Force Chief of Staff

Team,

U.S. military dominance is increasingly contested in the land, air, maritime, space and cyberspace domains. While the U.S. has been engaged in counter-insurgency operations for the last 15 years, potential adversaries have modernized and studied how we fight, and will seek to threaten our critical capabilities through multiple domains. Multi-Domain Battle is an emerging concept with our Joint partners to help maintain American military dominance in a battlefield that is extended into all five domains - land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace, and across the electromagnetic spectrum.

In this week’s professional reading, “Extending the Battlefield,” General Donn A. Starry describes the extended battlefield concept he envisioned necessary to engage Soviet second echelon and follow-on forces. General Starry’s challenge was not unlike the challenge posed to the United States of a future battlefield expanded across multiple domains. Recognizing this threat, MG Bill Hix, Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy for the Army G-3/5/7, recently emphasized (1) the Army must begin aggressively restructuring, reorganizing, and modernizing to meet the challenges posed by near-peer adversaries such as Russia and China. He further stated that counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations have shaped Army force structure, defined system development, and focused science and technology efforts “on near-term requirements” and that during the same time Russia and China have embarked on major military modernization efforts and have significantly closed the capabilities gap with the U.S. He concluded that those investments now pose a risk to the Army in “every domain of war” and that “a deliberate examination of how the Army should reorganize is long overdue. Hard thinking, aggressive study and concept development, coupled with science and technology programs to develop options” for the next two decades “will ensure the U.S. Army is favorably disposed to meet this future head-on.” Multi-Domain Battle is the emerging multi-service concept to meet these future challenges.

Although GEN Starry’s article has a primary focus on the integration off deep strike capabilities, Starry offers several ideas important to the development of the emerging Multi-Domain Battle (MDB) concept. First, MDB, building on the Army Operating Concept (AOC), must enable the military to win. He argues that once “political authorities commit military forces in pursuit of political aims, military forces must win or there is no basis from which political authorities can bargain to win politically.” He states that the purpose of military operations “cannot be to simply avert defeat, but, rather, it must be to win.”

Second, Starry describes a battlefield that is extended in both depth and forward in time. As such he describes the need to conduct operations across the breadth and depth of the battle field simultaneously to maximize the likelihood of winning the close-in battle over time. Applying Starry’s notion of extended depth and time to today’s changing operating environment, rapidly evolving technologies, and adversaries’ adaptations to them requires consideration of battlespace convergence and compression. Converged battlespace is a product of the adversary’s ability to integrate capabilities across many domains, environments, and functions in time to achieve effects at any geographic location. The ability of adversaries to both extend the battlespace and converge capabilities compresses the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war for Joint Force and allied commanders. Thus, strategic to tactical compression is a result of adversaries’ extended-range of conventional capabilities, information warfare, and unconventional capabilities that place friendly formations at risk from multiple systems, both lethal and nonlethal, operating in dispersed locations, often outside the range of the friendly formation’s systems and authority. Multi-domain battle must consider how to overcome this compression shortens friendly commanders’ decision cycles and severely inhibits the Joint Force’s ability to identify, maneuver on, and isolate adversary capabilities geographically, functionally, or by domain.

Third, Starry argues that the “capability to conduct extended attacks must be an integral part of every combat unit’s capability.” This is important because the goal of collapsing the enemy’s ability to fight requires a unified employment of a wide range of systems and organizations. To conduct Multi-Domain Battle, all domains and warfighting functions must be integrated to deliver a holistic solution to the problem. Because Multi-Domain Battle extends the battlespace to strategic areas for both friendly and enemy forces, it expands the targeting landscape based on the extended ranges and lethality delivered at range by integrated air defenses, cross-domain fire support, and cyber/electronic warfare systems.

Finally, Starry argues that the extended battlefield concept was necessary to serve as a “unifying idea which pulls all these emerging capabilities together so that, together, they can allow us to realize their full combined potential for winning.” He further argued that “the time for implementation is now.” In concert with MG Hix’s statement that we conduct “hard thinking, aggressive study and concept development, coupled with science and technology programs to develop options”, Starry emphasized that now was the time to field and learn to use the concept on the ground with real troops, real equipment, and the real world problems of field commanders.”

Today, current U.S. force posture, coupled with the demand for globally integrated operations, presents a myriad of challenges to regional Joint Force Commanders tasked to contest and defeat peer adversaries in support of U.S. national interests. To mitigate these challenges, the U.S. Joint Force must evolve its combined arms mindset to incorporate capabilities from all Services and functions, operating in all domains and environments to develop comprehensive and complementary combined arms solutions for periods of competition below armed conflict and during armed conflict. As a “unifying idea,” Multi-Domain Battle Concept is an important collaborative and innovative effort across our Services that we will ensure our forces are prepared to “win” short of armed conflict when possible, and to prevail against our adversaries when war is unavoidable.

During the AUSA National Symposium and Exposition, GEN Perkins will lead a group of esteemed panelists in a discussion on Multi-Domain Battle. The panel is titled "Converged and Integrated Solutions for the Future" and will be live-streamed for those unable to attend the event.

To learn more about Multi-Domain Battle and contribute to conversation, access the following link: http://www.tradoc.army.mil/MultiDomainBattle/index.asp

The following Army Warfighting Challenges are directly related to this week's topic:
#1 Develop Situational Understanding:

How to develop and sustain a high degree of situational understanding while operating in complex environments against determined, adaptive enemy organizations.

#2 Shape the Security Environment:

How does the Army influence the security environment and engage key actors and local/regional forces in order to consolidate gains and achieve sustainable security outcomes in support of Geographic Combatant Commands and Joint requirements.

#7 Conduct Space, Cyberspace, Electronic Warfare, and Communications Operations :

How to assure access to and integrity of critical data and information, across multiple domains, in an increasingly contested and congested operational environment, while simultaneously denying the same to the enemy.

#8 Enhance Realistic Training:

How to train Soldiers, leaders and units to ensure they are prepared to accomplish the mission across the range of military operations while operating in complex environments against determined, adaptive enemy organizations.

#10 Develop Agile and Adaptive Leaders:

How to develop agile, adaptive, and innovative leaders who thrive in conditions of uncertainty and chaos and are capable of visualizing, describing, directing, and leading and assessing operations in complex environments and against adaptive enemies.

#11 Conduct Air-Ground Reconnaissance and Security Operations:

How to conduct effective air-ground combined arms reconnaissance and security operations to develop the situation rapidly in close contact with the enemy and civilian populations.

#12 Conduct Joint Expeditionary Maneuver and Entry Operations:

How does the Army deploy and project forces, conduct forcible and early entry, and set conditions across multiple domains to rapidly transition to offensive operations to ensure access and seize the initiative.

#14 Ensure Interoperability and Operate in JIM Environment:

How to integrate joint, inter-organizational, and multi-national partner capabilities and campaigns to ensure unity of effort and accomplish missions across the range of military operations.

#15 Conduct Joint Combined Arms Maneuver:

How to conduct combined arms air-ground maneuver to defeat enemy organizations and accomplish missions in complex operational environments.

#16 Set the Theater Sustain Operations and Maintain Freedom of Movement:

How to set the theater, provide strategic agility to the joint force, and maintain freedom of movement and action during sustained and high tempo operations at the end of extended lines of communication in austere environments.

#17 Employ Cross-Domain Fires:

How to employ cross-domain fires to defeat the enemy and preserve freedom of action across the range of military operations (ROMO).

#19 Exercise Mission Command:

How to understand, visualize, describe, and direct operations consistent with the philosophy of mission command to seize the initiative over the enemy and accomplish the mission across the range of military operations.

#20 Develop Capable Formations:

How to design Army formations capable of rapidly deploying and conducting operations for ample duration and in sufficient scale to accomplish the mission.

Continuous feedback, collaboration, and teamwork are keys to the success of the Campaign of Learning and driving innovation in the Army. Please use the Army Warfighting Challenges as the framework to contribute your ideas and recommendations with respect to this topic to improve our ability to innovate as we develop the current and future force.

The Army Warfighting Challenges (AWFC) framework may be accessed here:

Please contribute to the Army Warfighting Challenges.

  • Public site (not requiring a CAC or password): ARCIC Website
  • MilBook collaboration site
  • SIPR Net collaboration site: https://intellipedia.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Army_Warfighting_Challenges

For previous weekly readings go to: ARCIC Professional Readings

All the best,

Bo