Professional Readings Full Archives

Series: 154
Extending the Battlefield
Series: 153
Army showcases stealthy, hydrogen fuel cell vehicle
Series: 152
Objective Metropolis: the Future of Dense Urban Operational Environments
Series: 151
The Strange Tale of the Norden Bombsight
Series: 150
Risk Culture: Similarities & Differences between State and DoD
Series: 149
Defense is from Mars, State is from Venus: Improving Communications and Promoting National Security
Series: 148
Military Review October 1992
Series: 147
Revitalizing Wargaming is Necessary to Be Prepared for Future Wars
Series: 146
The End of the Asian Century: War, Stagnation, and the Risks to the World’s Most Dynamic Region
Series: 145
Reflections on TRADOC’s Analysis of the Yom Kippur War (pages 220-225)
Series: 144
Some New, Some Old, All Necessary: The Multi-Domain Imperative
Series: 143
Lethality Upgrade: Why a New Stryker Variant is Needed on the Modern Battlefield
Series: 142
The Indo-Asia Pacific and the Multi-Domain Battle Concept
Series: 141
What the Past Teaches about the Future
Series: 140
That Elusive Operational Concept
Series: 139
Grant’s Disengagement from Cold Harbor (pages 176-209 found in the book Cold Harbor to the Crater)
Series: 138
Countering the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Threat
Series: 137
Thinking Like a Russian Officer
Series: 136
The Future of the Army
Series: 135
Letter to President George W. Bush et al re Predicting the Future
Series: 134
The Culture of Strategic Thought Behind Russia’s Modern Approach to Warfare
Series: 133
Expeditionary Land Power: Lessons from the Mexican-American War
Series: 132
Running Things
Series: 131
Selected Foreign Counterparts of U.S. Army Ground Combat Systems and Implications for Combat Operations and Modernization
Series: 130
The Strategic Value of Conventional Land Forces
Series: 129
Tooth to Tail
Series: 128
Transforming the Force: The 11th Air Assault Division (Test) from 1963-1965
Series: 127
Cyber Beyond Third Offset: A Call for Warfighter-Led Innovation
Series: 126
NATO's Land Forces: Strength and Speed Matter
Series: 125
The Institutional Level of War
Series: 124
Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant v1 Chapters XXXII & XXXIII
Series: 123
Landpower and American Credibility
Series: 122
The US Army’s Postwar Recoveries
Series: 121
The Panther Brigade in Operation Inherent Resolve
Series: 120
The Area Under the Curve
Series: 119
US Naval Forces Before and Beyond Battle
Series: 118
The Islamic State's Militarization of Children
Series: 117
Turkey’s Operation Euphrates Shield: An Exemplar of Joint Combined Arms Maneuver
Series: 116
The Future Operating Environment 2050 - Chaos, Complexity and Competition
Series: 115
War Goes Viral
Series: 114
Mobility, Vigilance, and Justice: The US Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946-1953
Series: 113
Is the Conduct of War a Business?
Series: 112
Putin's Information Warfare in Ukraine
Series: 111
Beyond Coastal Artillery
Series: 110
The Battle of Manila (pages 91-122)
Series: 109
Precision and Consequences for the Modern Battlefield
Series: 108 A
Rediscovering the Art of Strategic Thinking
Series: 108 B
The Strategic Development of Tactical #Leadership
Series: 107
What It Means to be Expeditionary
Series: 106
NATO's Next Act
Series: 105
Vicksburg and Multi-Domain Battle
Series: 104 A
Innovation: Past and Future
Series: 104 B
The Relevance of Culture
Series: 103
Cross-Domain Synergy-Advancing Jointness
Series: 102 A
Into the Greasy Grass
Series: 102 B
The Uncertain Role of the Tank in Modern War: Lessons from the Israeli Experience in Hybrid Warfare
Series: 101
Hawks, Doves and Canaries: Women and Conflict
Series: 99
The 1974 Paracels Sea Battle and China's Maritime Militia
Series: 100
The Mud of Verdun
Series: 98
Cheap Technology Will Challenge U.S. Tactical Dominance
Series: 97
Landpower and American Credibility
Series: 96
The Lure of Strike
Series: 95
The Hell After ISIS
Series: 94
Tactics and Mechanization
Series: 93
Cyberwar in the Underworld - Anonymous versus Los Zetas in Mexico
Series: 92
Strategic Landpower in the Indo-Asia-Pacific
Series: 91
The Next Korean War: Drawing Lessons From Israel’s Experience in the Middle East
Series: 90
A Retrospect on Close Air Support (Chapter 11 Page 535)
Series: 89 A
The Future Is Growing Brighter For U.S. Combat Vehicles
Series: 89 B
Reimagining and Modernizing U.S. Airborne Forces for the 21st Century
Series: 88 A
Israel’s Operation Protective Edge
Series: 88 B
Aerial Interdiction: Air Power and the Land Battle in Three American Wars
Series: 87
Confronting the Threat of Corruption and Organized Crime in Afghanistan
Series: 86
Eurasia's Coming Anarchy
Series: 85
Cyber Threats and Russian Information Warfare
Series: 84
The U.S. Is Losing the Social Media War
Series: 83
Colombia - A Political Economy of War to an Inclusive Peace
Series: 82 A
Definition of ‘Decisive’ Depends on Context
Series: 82 B
How Should We Think About “Gray-Zone” Wars
Series: 81
The Contemporary Spectrum of Conflict: Protracted, Gray Zone, Ambiguous, and Hybrid Modes of War
Series: 80
Concepts, Doctrine, Principles from "Technology and Military Doctrine Essays (Essay 3 Page 19)
Series: 79
The Sinister Shadow of Escalating Middle East Sectarianism
Series: 78
Strategy and Grand Strategy: What Students and Practitioners Need to Know
Series: 77
Arming Our Allies: The Case for Offensive Capabilities
Series: 76
Forging Australian Land Power: A Primer
Series: 75
How to Win Outnumbered
Series: 74
Frontline Allies: War and Change in Central Europe
Series: 73
To Change an Army
Series: 72
The Use and Abuse of Military History
Series: 71
ARCIC Professional Reading #29 and Professional Reading #43
Series: 70
Gaming the "System of Systems”
Series: 69
Chief of Staff of the Army’s Speech to the National Guard Association of the United States
Series: 68
Information Warfare: What Is It and How to Win It?
Series: 67
War and the Art of Governance
Series: 66 A
General James 'Mad Dog' Mattis Email About Being 'Too Busy To Read' Is A Must-Read
Series: 66 B
Fiction Belongs on Military Reading Lists
Series: 65
How the U.S. Army Remains the Master of Landpower
Series: 64
Testimony of Walter Russell Mead to the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services
Series: 63
In Defense of Classical Geopolitics
Series: 62
The Islamic State and Information Warfare
Series: 61
Wake Up, America, to a Strategic New World
Series: 60
Limiting Regret: Building the Army We Will Need
Series: 59
The Use of Indigenous Forces in Stability Operations (page 69)
Series: 58
Pursuing Strategic Advantage: The Utility of Armed Forces in Peace, War, and Everything In Between
Series: 57
Gangs of Karachi
Series: 56
Experimental Units: The Historical Record
Series: 55
Governing the Caliphate: the Islamic State Picture
Series: 54
Will Humans Matter in the Wars of 2030?
Series: 53
The Case for Deterrence by Denial
Series: 52
Precision Firepower - Smart Bombs, Dumb Strategy
Series: 51
Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age
Series: 50
Hybrid Warfare and Challenges
Series: 49
Experimentation in the Period Between the Two World Wars: Lessons for the Twenty-First Century
Series: 48
Chapter 3, Shape, Engage, and Consolidate Gains from Army Field Manual 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations
Series: 47
Predicting Future War
Series: 45
UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE ARMED SERVICES, Hearing, Tuesday, April 28, 2014, United States Policy on Europe
Series: 44
Top Russian General Lays Bare Putin's Plan for Ukraine
Series: 43
8 Unique Values: Why America Needs the Army
Series: 42
Post Crimea Europe: NATO In the Age of Limited Wars
Series: 41
American Landpower and the Two-war Construct
Series: 40
Operations of the Natural Resources Counterinsurgency Cell (NRCC): Theory and Practice Implementing Non-lethal Unconventional Warfare Approaches in Eastern Afghanistan
Series: 39
Bridging the Planning Gap: Incorporating Cyberspace into Operational Planning
Series: 38
Defeating the Islamic State: A Financial-Military Strategy
Series: 37
Series: 36
Clausewitz Out, Computer In: Military Culture and Technological Hubris.
Series: 35
Robotics on the Battlefield Part II: The Coming Swarm
Series: 34
Why Wargaming Works
Series: 33
Louisiana Maneuvers (1940 - 41)
Series: 32
'It Just Took a Few': the Tank in New Guinea Campaign
Series: 31
The Shadow Commander
Series: 30
Rethinking Operation Protective Edge, The 2014 Gaza War
Series: 29
Why do we need an Army?
Series: 28
DARPA: Nobody's safe on the Internet
Series: 27
States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders
Series: 26
The Future of Military Innovation Studies
Series: 25
A Case Study in Innovation
Series: 24
The Joint Force Commander's Guide to Cyberspace Operations and FireEye Cyber Threat Map
Series: 23
The Power of Discourse
Series: 22
Management's New Paradigms
Series: 21
The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050; Chapter 10
Series: 20
To Change an Army
Series: 19
Where Good Ideas Come From
Series: 18
Series: 18
When Superiority Goes Wrong: Science Fiction and Offset Strategies
Series: 17
Thinking About Innovation
Series: 17
The Anatomy of Change: Why Armies Succeed or Fail at Transformation
Series: 16 A
The M1 Abrams Today Tomorrow
Series: 16 B
Bringing Mobility to the Infantry Brigade Combat Team
Series: 16 C
Losing Our Way The Disassociation of Reconnaissance and Security Organizations from Screen, Guard, and Cover Missions
Series: 15
The Rhyme of History Lessons of the Great War
Series: 14
France's War in Mali, Lessons for an Expeditionary Army
Series: 13
More Small Wars Counterinsurgency Is Here to Stay
Series: 12
"Big Five" Lessons for Today and Tomorrow
Series: 11
The Human Dimension White Paper
Series: 10
The Great Revamp: 11 Trends Shaping Future Conflict
Series: 9
Threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), al-Qa'ida, and other Islamic extremists; written testimony of General James M. Mattis, USMC (Ret.), former commander of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
Series: 8
Land Warfare Doctrine 1; The Fundamentals of Land Power 2014
Series: 7
The Strategic Utility of Land Power
Series: 6
Observations on the Long War
Series: 5
The Nightmare Years to Come?
Series: 4
Ensuring a strong US Defense in the future
Series: 2
Toward a Secure and Stable Northern Mali
Series: 1
Groupthink: The Brainstorming Myth

Series: 154 10/1/2017

"Rapid military modernization, the proliferation of advanced capabilities, including long-range precision missiles and advanced sensors, and their spreading into the hands of potential adversaries has resulted in a need for land forces to adapt to the diverse range of challenges we will face."

Dr. Albert Palazzo & Lt. Col. David McClain - MDB: New Concept for Land Forces

"Multi-domain battle is more than the ability to work in multiple domains. We already do this quite effectively in today's Air Operations Centers. It is also more than operations in one domain supporting or complementing operations in another domain. An advanced multi-domain operating concept (CONOPS) will exploit current and new capabilities as well as integrate joint and coalition capabilities across all military operations. It will allow us to both see more opportunities and generate more options for our nation's leaders."

Gen. David Goldfein, Air Force Chief of Staff


U.S. military dominance is increasingly contested in the land, air, maritime, space and cyberspace domains. While the U.S. has been engaged in counter-insurgency operations for the last 15 years, potential adversaries have modernized and studied how we fight, and will seek to threaten our critical capabilities through multiple domains. Multi-Domain Battle is an emerging concept with our Joint partners to help maintain American military dominance in a battlefield that is extended into all five domains - land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace, and across the electromagnetic spectrum.

In this week’s professional reading, “Extending the Battlefield,” General Donn A. Starry describes the extended battlefield concept he envisioned necessary to engage Soviet second echelon and follow-on forces. General Starry’s challenge was not unlike the challenge posed to the United States of a future battlefield expanded across multiple domains. Recognizing this threat, MG Bill Hix, Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy for the Army G-3/5/7, recently emphasized (1) the Army must begin aggressively restructuring, reorganizing, and modernizing to meet the challenges posed by near-peer adversaries such as Russia and China. He further stated that counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations have shaped Army force structure, defined system development, and focused science and technology efforts “on near-term requirements” and that during the same time Russia and China have embarked on major military modernization efforts and have significantly closed the capabilities gap with the U.S. He concluded that those investments now pose a risk to the Army in “every domain of war” and that “a deliberate examination of how the Army should reorganize is long overdue. Hard thinking, aggressive study and concept development, coupled with science and technology programs to develop options” for the next two decades “will ensure the U.S. Army is favorably disposed to meet this future head-on.” Multi-Domain Battle is the emerging multi-service concept to meet these future challenges.

Although GEN Starry’s article has a primary focus on the integration off deep strike capabilities, Starry offers several ideas important to the development of the emerging Multi-Domain Battle (MDB) concept. First, MDB, building on the Army Operating Concept (AOC), must enable the military to win. He argues that once “political authorities commit military forces in pursuit of political aims, military forces must win or there is no basis from which political authorities can bargain to win politically.” He states that the purpose of military operations “cannot be to simply avert defeat, but, rather, it must be to win.”

Second, Starry describes a battlefield that is extended in both depth and forward in time. As such he describes the need to conduct operations across the breadth and depth of the battle field simultaneously to maximize the likelihood of winning the close-in battle over time. Applying Starry’s notion of extended depth and time to today’s changing operating environment, rapidly evolving technologies, and adversaries’ adaptations to them requires consideration of battlespace convergence and compression. Converged battlespace is a product of the adversary’s ability to integrate capabilities across many domains, environments, and functions in time to achieve effects at any geographic location. The ability of adversaries to both extend the battlespace and converge capabilities compresses the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war for Joint Force and allied commanders. Thus, strategic to tactical compression is a result of adversaries’ extended-range of conventional capabilities, information warfare, and unconventional capabilities that place friendly formations at risk from multiple systems, both lethal and nonlethal, operating in dispersed locations, often outside the range of the friendly formation’s systems and authority. Multi-domain battle must consider how to overcome this compression shortens friendly commanders’ decision cycles and severely inhibits the Joint Force’s ability to identify, maneuver on, and isolate adversary capabilities geographically, functionally, or by domain.

Third, Starry argues that the “capability to conduct extended attacks must be an integral part of every combat unit’s capability.” This is important because the goal of collapsing the enemy’s ability to fight requires a unified employment of a wide range of systems and organizations. To conduct Multi-Domain Battle, all domains and warfighting functions must be integrated to deliver a holistic solution to the problem. Because Multi-Domain Battle extends the battlespace to strategic areas for both friendly and enemy forces, it expands the targeting landscape based on the extended ranges and lethality delivered at range by integrated air defenses, cross-domain fire support, and cyber/electronic warfare systems.

Finally, Starry argues that the extended battlefield concept was necessary to serve as a “unifying idea which pulls all these emerging capabilities together so that, together, they can allow us to realize their full combined potential for winning.” He further argued that “the time for implementation is now.” In concert with MG Hix’s statement that we conduct “hard thinking, aggressive study and concept development, coupled with science and technology programs to develop options”, Starry emphasized that now was the time to field and learn to use the concept on the ground with real troops, real equipment, and the real world problems of field commanders.”

Today, current U.S. force posture, coupled with the demand for globally integrated operations, presents a myriad of challenges to regional Joint Force Commanders tasked to contest and defeat peer adversaries in support of U.S. national interests. To mitigate these challenges, the U.S. Joint Force must evolve its combined arms mindset to incorporate capabilities from all Services and functions, operating in all domains and environments to develop comprehensive and complementary combined arms solutions for periods of competition below armed conflict and during armed conflict. As a “unifying idea,” Multi-Domain Battle Concept is an important collaborative and innovative effort across our Services that we will ensure our forces are prepared to “win” short of armed conflict when possible, and to prevail against our adversaries when war is unavoidable.

During the AUSA National Symposium and Exposition, GEN Perkins will lead a group of esteemed panelists in a discussion on Multi-Domain Battle. The panel is titled "Converged and Integrated Solutions for the Future" and will be live-streamed for those unable to attend the event.

To learn more about Multi-Domain Battle and contribute to conversation, access the following link:

The following Army Warfighting Challenges are directly related to this week's topic:
#1 Develop Situational Understanding:

How to develop and sustain a high degree of situational understanding while operating in complex environments against determined, adaptive enemy organizations.

#2 Shape the Security Environment:

How does the Army influence the security environment and engage key actors and local/regional forces in order to consolidate gains and achieve sustainable security outcomes in support of Geographic Combatant Commands and Joint requirements.

#7 Conduct Space, Cyberspace, Electronic Warfare, and Communications Operations :

How to assure access to and integrity of critical data and information, across multiple domains, in an increasingly contested and congested operational environment, while simultaneously denying the same to the enemy.

#8 Enhance Realistic Training:

How to train Soldiers, leaders and units to ensure they are prepared to accomplish the mission across the range of military operations while operating in complex environments against determined, adaptive enemy organizations.

#10 Develop Agile and Adaptive Leaders:

How to develop agile, adaptive, and innovative leaders who thrive in conditions of uncertainty and chaos and are capable of visualizing, describing, directing, and leading and assessing operations in complex environments and against adaptive enemies.

#11 Conduct Air-Ground Reconnaissance and Security Operations:

How to conduct effective air-ground combined arms reconnaissance and security operations to develop the situation rapidly in close contact with the enemy and civilian populations.

#12 Conduct Joint Expeditionary Maneuver and Entry Operations:

How does the Army deploy and project forces, conduct forcible and early entry, and set conditions across multiple domains to rapidly transition to offensive operations to ensure access and seize the initiative.

#14 Ensure Interoperability and Operate in JIM Environment:

How to integrate joint, inter-organizational, and multi-national partner capabilities and campaigns to ensure unity of effort and accomplish missions across the range of military operations.

#15 Conduct Joint Combined Arms Maneuver:

How to conduct combined arms air-ground maneuver to defeat enemy organizations and accomplish missions in complex operational environments.

#16 Set the Theater Sustain Operations and Maintain Freedom of Movement:

How to set the theater, provide strategic agility to the joint force, and maintain freedom of movement and action during sustained and high tempo operations at the end of extended lines of communication in austere environments.

#17 Employ Cross-Domain Fires:

How to employ cross-domain fires to defeat the enemy and preserve freedom of action across the range of military operations (ROMO).

#19 Exercise Mission Command:

How to understand, visualize, describe, and direct operations consistent with the philosophy of mission command to seize the initiative over the enemy and accomplish the mission across the range of military operations.

#20 Develop Capable Formations:

How to design Army formations capable of rapidly deploying and conducting operations for ample duration and in sufficient scale to accomplish the mission.

Continuous feedback, collaboration, and teamwork are keys to the success of the Campaign of Learning and driving innovation in the Army. Please use the Army Warfighting Challenges as the framework to contribute your ideas and recommendations with respect to this topic to improve our ability to innovate as we develop the current and future force.

The Army Warfighting Challenges (AWFC) framework may be accessed here:

Please contribute to the Army Warfighting Challenges.

  • Public site (not requiring a CAC or password): ARCIC Website
  • MilBook collaboration site
  • SIPR Net collaboration site:

For previous weekly readings go to: ARCIC Professional Readings

All the best,