Professional Readings Full Archives

Series: 159
From Talent Management To Talent Optimization
2/21/2018
Series: 158
Tet Offensive from Karnow's "Vietnam - a History"
2/2/2018
Series: 157
The Big Picture: Combat Development Experiment Center (Video)
12/8/2017
Series: 156
An Advanced Engagement Battlespace: Tactical, Operational and Strategic Implications for the Future Operational Environment
11/29/2017
Series: 155
Adapting to Strategic Change: Organizational Change and Adaptation in the US Army
10/1/2017
Series: 154
Extending the Battlefield
10/1/2017
Series: 153
Army showcases stealthy, hydrogen fuel cell vehicle
9/18/2017
Series: 152
Objective Metropolis: the Future of Dense Urban Operational Environments
8/31/2017
Series: 151
The Strange Tale of the Norden Bombsight
8/14/2017
Series: 150
Risk Culture: Similarities & Differences between State and DoD
8/4/2017
Series: 149
Defense is from Mars, State is from Venus: Improving Communications and Promoting National Security
7/31/2017
Series: 148
Military Review October 1992
7/17/2017
Series: 147
Revitalizing Wargaming is Necessary to Be Prepared for Future Wars
7/2/2017
Series: 146
The End of the Asian Century: War, Stagnation, and the Risks to the World’s Most Dynamic Region
6/16/2017
Series: 145
Reflections on TRADOC’s Analysis of the Yom Kippur War (pages 220-225)
6/6/2017
Series: 144
Some New, Some Old, All Necessary: The Multi-Domain Imperative
5/13/2017
Series: 143
Lethality Upgrade: Why a New Stryker Variant is Needed on the Modern Battlefield
5/13/2017
Series: 142
The Indo-Asia Pacific and the Multi-Domain Battle Concept
5/8/2017
Series: 141
What the Past Teaches about the Future
5/1/2017
Series: 140
That Elusive Operational Concept
4/22/2017
Series: 139
Grant’s Disengagement from Cold Harbor (pages 176-209 found in the book Cold Harbor to the Crater)
4/18/2017
Series: 138
Countering the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Threat
4/10/2017
Series: 137
Thinking Like a Russian Officer
4/1/2017
Series: 136
The Future of the Army
3/27/2017
Series: 135
Letter to President George W. Bush et al re Predicting the Future
3/20/2017
Series: 134
The Culture of Strategic Thought Behind Russia’s Modern Approach to Warfare
2/13/2017
Series: 133
Expeditionary Land Power: Lessons from the Mexican-American War
3/6/2017
Series: 132
Running Things
2/27/2017
Series: 131
Selected Foreign Counterparts of U.S. Army Ground Combat Systems and Implications for Combat Operations and Modernization
2/21/2017
Series: 130
The Strategic Value of Conventional Land Forces
2/13/2017
Series: 129
Tooth to Tail
2/6/2017
Series: 128
Transforming the Force: The 11th Air Assault Division (Test) from 1963-1965
1/30/2017
Series: 127
Cyber Beyond Third Offset: A Call for Warfighter-Led Innovation
1/23/2017
Series: 126
NATO's Land Forces: Strength and Speed Matter
1/18/2017
Series: 125
The Institutional Level of War
1/4/2017
Series: 124
Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant v1 Chapters XXXII & XXXIII
1/4/2017
Series: 123
Landpower and American Credibility
12/27/2016
Series: 122
The US Army’s Postwar Recoveries
12/19/2016
Series: 121
The Panther Brigade in Operation Inherent Resolve
12/12/2016
Series: 120
The Area Under the Curve
12/5/2016
Series: 119
US Naval Forces Before and Beyond Battle
11/28/2016
Series: 118
The Islamic State's Militarization of Children
11/21/2016
Series: 117
Turkey’s Operation Euphrates Shield: An Exemplar of Joint Combined Arms Maneuver
11/14/2016
Series: 116
The Future Operating Environment 2050 - Chaos, Complexity and Competition
11/7/2016
Series: 115
War Goes Viral
10/31/2016
Series: 114
Mobility, Vigilance, and Justice: The US Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946-1953
11/24/2016
Series: 113
Is the Conduct of War a Business?
10/18/2016
Series: 112
Putin's Information Warfare in Ukraine
10/11/2016
Series: 111
Beyond Coastal Artillery
10/4/2016
Series: 110
The Battle of Manila (pages 91-122)
9/27/2016
Series: 109
Precision and Consequences for the Modern Battlefield
9/19/2016
Series: 108 A
Rediscovering the Art of Strategic Thinking
9/6/2016
Series: 108 B
The Strategic Development of Tactical #Leadership
9/6/2016
Series: 107
What It Means to be Expeditionary
9/6/2016
Series: 106
NATO's Next Act
8/29/2016
Series: 105
Vicksburg and Multi-Domain Battle
8/23/2016
Series: 104 A
Innovation: Past and Future
8/17/2016
Series: 104 B
The Relevance of Culture
8/17/2016
Series: 103
Cross-Domain Synergy-Advancing Jointness
8/9/2016
Series: 102 A
Into the Greasy Grass
8/2/2016
Series: 102 B
The Uncertain Role of the Tank in Modern War: Lessons from the Israeli Experience in Hybrid Warfare
8/2/2016
Series: 101
Hawks, Doves and Canaries: Women and Conflict
7/26/2016
Series: 99
The 1974 Paracels Sea Battle and China's Maritime Militia
7/11/2016
Series: 100
The Mud of Verdun
7/18/2016
Series: 98
Cheap Technology Will Challenge U.S. Tactical Dominance
7/6/2016
Series: 97
Landpower and American Credibility
6/25/2016
Series: 96
The Lure of Strike
6/22/2016
Series: 95
The Hell After ISIS
6/14/2016
Series: 94
Tactics and Mechanization
6/7/2016
Series: 93
Cyberwar in the Underworld - Anonymous versus Los Zetas in Mexico
5/30/2016
Series: 92
Strategic Landpower in the Indo-Asia-Pacific
5/23/2016
Series: 91
The Next Korean War: Drawing Lessons From Israel’s Experience in the Middle East
5/10/2016
Series: 90
A Retrospect on Close Air Support (Chapter 11 Page 535)
5/10/2016
Series: 89 A
The Future Is Growing Brighter For U.S. Combat Vehicles
6/22/2016
Series: 89 B
Reimagining and Modernizing U.S. Airborne Forces for the 21st Century
6/22/2016
Series: 88 A
Israel’s Operation Protective Edge
4/27/2016
Series: 88 B
Aerial Interdiction: Air Power and the Land Battle in Three American Wars
4/26/2016
Series: 87
Confronting the Threat of Corruption and Organized Crime in Afghanistan
4/20/2016
Series: 86
Eurasia's Coming Anarchy
4/12/2016
Series: 85
Cyber Threats and Russian Information Warfare
4/4/2016
Series: 84
The U.S. Is Losing the Social Media War
3/29/2016
Series: 83
Colombia - A Political Economy of War to an Inclusive Peace
3/21/2016
Series: 82 A
Definition of ‘Decisive’ Depends on Context
3/15/2016
Series: 82 B
How Should We Think About “Gray-Zone” Wars
3/15/2016
Series: 81
The Contemporary Spectrum of Conflict: Protracted, Gray Zone, Ambiguous, and Hybrid Modes of War
3/8/2016
Series: 80
Concepts, Doctrine, Principles from "Technology and Military Doctrine Essays (Essay 3 Page 19)
2/27/2016
Series: 79
The Sinister Shadow of Escalating Middle East Sectarianism
2/22/2016
Series: 78
Strategy and Grand Strategy: What Students and Practitioners Need to Know
2/17/2016
Series: 77
Arming Our Allies: The Case for Offensive Capabilities
2/9/2016
Series: 76
Forging Australian Land Power: A Primer
2/2/2016
Series: 75
How to Win Outnumbered
1/25/2016
Series: 74
Frontline Allies: War and Change in Central Europe
1/21/2016
Series: 73
To Change an Army
1/12/2016
Series: 72
The Use and Abuse of Military History
1/5/2016
Series: 71
ARCIC Professional Reading #29 and Professional Reading #43
12/30/2015
Series: 70
Gaming the "System of Systems”
12/22/2015
Series: 69
Chief of Staff of the Army’s Speech to the National Guard Association of the United States
12/14/2015
Series: 68
Information Warfare: What Is It and How to Win It?
12/9/2015
Series: 67
War and the Art of Governance
12/1/2015
Series: 66 A
General James 'Mad Dog' Mattis Email About Being 'Too Busy To Read' Is A Must-Read
11/24/2015
Series: 66 B
Fiction Belongs on Military Reading Lists
11/24/2015
Series: 65
How the U.S. Army Remains the Master of Landpower
11/18/2015
Series: 64
Testimony of Walter Russell Mead to the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services
11/10/2015
Series: 63
In Defense of Classical Geopolitics
11/3/2015
Series: 62
The Islamic State and Information Warfare
10/26/2015
Series: 61
Wake Up, America, to a Strategic New World
10/19/2015
Series: 60
Limiting Regret: Building the Army We Will Need
10/14/2015
Series: 59
The Use of Indigenous Forces in Stability Operations (page 69)
10/3/2015
Series: 58
Pursuing Strategic Advantage: The Utility of Armed Forces in Peace, War, and Everything In Between
9/26/2015
Series: 57
Gangs of Karachi
9/21/2015
Series: 56
Experimental Units: The Historical Record
9/12/2015
Series: 55
Governing the Caliphate: the Islamic State Picture
9/5/2015
Series: 54
Will Humans Matter in the Wars of 2030?
8/29/2015
Series: 53
The Case for Deterrence by Denial
8/25/2015
Series: 52
Precision Firepower - Smart Bombs, Dumb Strategy
8/20/2015
Series: 51
Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age
8/11/2015
Series: 50
Hybrid Warfare and Challenges
8/4/2015
Series: 49
Experimentation in the Period Between the Two World Wars: Lessons for the Twenty-First Century
7/26/2015
Series: 48
Chapter 3, Shape, Engage, and Consolidate Gains from Army Field Manual 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations
7/1/2015
Series: 47
Predicting Future War
7/12/2015
Series: 45
UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE ARMED SERVICES, Hearing, Tuesday, April 28, 2014, United States Policy on Europe
6/30/2015
Series: 44
Top Russian General Lays Bare Putin's Plan for Ukraine
6/22/2015
Series: 43
8 Unique Values: Why America Needs the Army
6/16/2015
Series: 42
Post Crimea Europe: NATO In the Age of Limited Wars
6/9/2015
Series: 41
American Landpower and the Two-war Construct
6/2/2015
Series: 40
Operations of the Natural Resources Counterinsurgency Cell (NRCC): Theory and Practice Implementing Non-lethal Unconventional Warfare Approaches in Eastern Afghanistan
5/28/2015
Series: 39
Bridging the Planning Gap: Incorporating Cyberspace into Operational Planning
5/18/2015
Series: 38
Defeating the Islamic State: A Financial-Military Strategy
5/11/2015
Series: 37
Superiority
5/5/2015
Series: 36
Clausewitz Out, Computer In: Military Culture and Technological Hubris.
4/30/2015
Series: 35
Robotics on the Battlefield Part II: The Coming Swarm
4/23/2015
Series: 34
Why Wargaming Works
4/15/2015
Series: 33
Louisiana Maneuvers (1940 - 41)
4/8/2015
Series: 32
'It Just Took a Few': the Tank in New Guinea Campaign
3/30/2015
Series: 31
The Shadow Commander
3/23/2015
Series: 30
Rethinking Operation Protective Edge, The 2014 Gaza War
3/18/2015
Series: 29
Why do we need an Army?
3/12/2015
Series: 28
DARPA: Nobody's safe on the Internet
3/2/2015
Series: 27
States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders
2/23/2015
Series: 26
The Future of Military Innovation Studies
2/16/2015
Series: 25
A Case Study in Innovation
2/9/2015
Series: 24
The Joint Force Commander's Guide to Cyberspace Operations and FireEye Cyber Threat Map
2/2/2015
Series: 23
The Power of Discourse
1/26/2015
Series: 22
Management's New Paradigms
1/20/2015
Series: 21
The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050; Chapter 10
1/12/2015
Series: 20
To Change an Army
1/5/2015
Series: 19
Where Good Ideas Come From
12/15/2014
Series: 18
Superiority
12/8/2014
Series: 18
When Superiority Goes Wrong: Science Fiction and Offset Strategies
12/8/2014
Series: 17
Thinking About Innovation
12/1/2014
Series: 17
The Anatomy of Change: Why Armies Succeed or Fail at Transformation
12/1/2014
Series: 16 A
The M1 Abrams Today Tomorrow
11/24/2014
Series: 16 B
Bringing Mobility to the Infantry Brigade Combat Team
11/24/2014
Series: 16 C
Losing Our Way The Disassociation of Reconnaissance and Security Organizations from Screen, Guard, and Cover Missions
11/24/2014
Series: 15
The Rhyme of History Lessons of the Great War
11/17/2014
Series: 14
France's War in Mali, Lessons for an Expeditionary Army
11/10/2014
Series: 13
More Small Wars Counterinsurgency Is Here to Stay
11/3/2014
Series: 12
"Big Five" Lessons for Today and Tomorrow
10/27/2014
Series: 11
The Human Dimension White Paper
10/20/2014
Series: 10
The Great Revamp: 11 Trends Shaping Future Conflict
10/13/2014
Series: 9
Threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), al-Qa'ida, and other Islamic extremists; written testimony of General James M. Mattis, USMC (Ret.), former commander of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
10/6/2014
Series: 8
Land Warfare Doctrine 1; The Fundamentals of Land Power 2014
9/29/2014
Series: 7
The Strategic Utility of Land Power
9/22/2014
Series: 6
Observations on the Long War
9/15/2014
Series: 5
The Nightmare Years to Come?
9/8/2014
Series: 4
Ensuring a strong US Defense in the future
8/18/2014
Series: 2
Toward a Secure and Stable Northern Mali
8/4/2014
Series: 1
Groupthink: The Brainstorming Myth
7/21/2014

Series: 159 2/21/2018

Acting Director MG Robert “Bo” Dyess’ Comments:

“We will do what it takes to build an agile, adaptive Army of the future. We need to listen and learn— first from the Army itself, from other services, from our interagency partners, but also from the private sector, and even from our critics. Developing a lethal, professional and technically competent force requires an openness to new ideas and new ways of doing things in an increasingly complex world. We will change and adapt.”

- GEN Mark A. Milley, “39th CSA, Initial Message to the Army”

Team,

The U.S. Army Talent Management Strategy (ATMS) defines “talent” as the unique intersection of knowledge, skills, and behaviors in every person and that talent represents far more than the training, education, and experiences provided by the Army. Talent includes the fullness of each person's life experience, to include investments they've made in themselves, personal and familial relationships (networks), ethnographic and demographic background, preferences, hobbies, travel, personality, learning style, education, and a myriad number of other factors better suit them to some development or employment opportunities than others (1). The ATMS offers that all people possess talents which can be identified and cultivated, and they can dramatically and continuously extend their talent advantage if properly developed and employed on the right teams.

With respect to talent management, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) recognizes that recruiting, developing, and retaining a high-quality military and civilian workforce is an essential component for building a more lethal force and to warfighting success. The NDS emphasizes the creativity and talent of the American warfighter is our greatest enduring strength and that cultivating a lethal, agile force requires more than just new technologies and posture changes. It depends on the ability of our warfighters and the Department workforce to integrate new capabilities, adapt warfighting approaches, and change business practices to achieve mission success.

In this week’s professional reading, “From talent management to talent optimization,” Dr. William Schiemann offers ideas of how a large organization might optimize human capital investments by thinking about how the organization manages the entire talent lifecycle, from talent attraction to recycling of talent in the future. He states that talent optimization means the organization has balanced talent acquisition, development, performance and retention strategies, processes and policies so that it maximizes the outcomes of those talent investments. He argues that leaders and managers can do this by maximizing three critical drivers of overall performance - alignment, capabilities, and engagement (ACE) - and by having the right measures in place to understand, focus, develop, and leverage human capital resources. Schiemann defines alignment as the degree to which everyone in the organization is rowing together in the same direction. Strong alignment is indicated by behaviors that are congruent with goals, customers and the brand. He argues horizontal alignment, where units working synchronously together across structural boundaries, are also quite important. He defines capabilities with the customer in mind. Capabilities is the extent to which competencies (e.g., knowledge, skills), information, and resources are sufficient to meet internal or external customer expectations. Finally, he argues that engagement is comprised of three employee factors: satisfaction, commitment, and advocacy (employee willingness and motivation to go beyond the minimal requirements of the duty description). He provides several examples of how the ACE framework can be used to evaluate and understand the effectiveness of talent processes to include talent acquisition, acculturation, performance management, retention, talent recovery, and leadership.

Dr. Schiemann concludes by offering several key recommendations. First, define talent broadly. Talent is the collective knowledge, skills, abilities, experiences, values, habits and behaviors of all labor that is brought to bear on achieving the organization’s mission. Thinking about talent broadly will allow managers to determine if they are making the right talent investments and reaping the associated rewards.

Second, think talent optimization rather than talent management. Think about the full talent lifecycle that needs to be managed. He recommends one leader or team that is responsible for overseeing the entire talent lifecycle. By doing so, he concludes, it is less likely that managers will sub-optimize talent by maximizing each talent stage or process. Functional silos that manage different aspects of the talent lifecycle can kill overall effectiveness. Make sure that these leaders have the authority to break through silos that create incongruity across the talent lifecycle.

Third, he recommends using a global talent-optimization framework, such as ACE, that can serve as a surrogate for talent optimization, and help to pinpoint where talent investments should be made (e.g., targeted managerial skills or training) and processes, structure or policies changed. Whatever framework is used, it should provide a bridge between important organizational outcomes such as turnover, customer loyalty and financial performance and investments in human capital (e.g., performance management, hiring approaches, leader development).

Fourth, pick your metrics carefully. Eschew lots of tactical metrics that only serve to confuse decisions. Use more strategic measures to prioritize where talent investments should be accelerated or reduced.

Finally, he emphasizes looking through an ACE lens enables leaders to see many of the potential disconnects or areas of misalignment in talent processes that span the talent lifecycle, resulting in sub-optimized talent and organizational outcomes. This requires leaders and managers to periodically conduct an audit of the talent lifecycle, looking for interconnection gaps and inconsistencies with an organization’s talent brand and strategy.

Dr. Schiemann’s article offers ideas important to help the Army reach its overall strategic personnel objectives of enhancing readiness, sustaining a workforce of trusted professionals, and ensuring we have diverse and integrated teams across the enterprise - active, reserve and civilian. Talent Management mitigates one of the greatest risks posed by an uncertain operating environment - mismatch in people and requirements (either not enough or too many) and losing talented people to the wider American labor market. By better understanding the talent of our workforce and the talent needed by unit requirements, the Army can more effectively acquire, develop, employ, and retain the right talent at the right time.

The Army is already looking for ways to improve. The Army’s Talent Management provides a deliberate and coordinated process to align systematic planning for the right number and type of people to meet the current and future Army talent demands. The talent demands are met through integrated implementation to ensure the majority of people are optimally employed. Advances in cognitive, behavioral, and learning sciences will improve critical thinking, increase cognitive and physical performance, foster intuition and social empathy, improve health and stamina, facilitate talent management, enhance leader training, and strengthen unit cohesion. Human performance technologies will help the Army develop adaptive leaders, resilient Soldiers, and cohesive teams that thrive in uncertain, dangerous, and chaotic environments. New pre-accessions tools hold promise for matching a recruit’s aptitude to specific military occupations and building effective teams with appropriate combinations of abilities. Blended live, virtual, constructive, and gaming training environments replicate complex operating environments and improve leader and team competence and confidence. Cognitive and physical training techniques could reduce time required for mastery of Soldier and leader skills, abilities, and attributes. And advancements in decision sciences will allow faster, better-informed decisions in an increasingly complex environment.

Sources:

  1. U.S. Army Talent Management Strategy, 20 Sept 16
  2. Army Operating Concept, TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, 30 October 2014

The following Army Warfighting Challenges are directly related to this week's topic:
#1 Develop Situational Understanding:

How to develop and sustain a high degree of situational understanding while operating in complex environments against determined, adaptive enemy organizations.

#2 Shape the Security Environment:

How does the Army influence the security environment and engage key actors and local/regional forces in order to consolidate gains and achieve sustainable security outcomes in support of Geographic Combatant Commands and Joint requirements.

#4 Adapt the Institutional Army and Innovate:

How to improve the rate of innovation to drive capability development and deliver DOTMLPF-P solutions to the warfighter at a pace that meets operational demand within the existing constraints of the acquisition and budgeting processes.

#8 Enhance Realistic Training:

How to train Soldiers, leaders and units to ensure they are prepared to accomplish the mission across the range of military operations while operating in complex environments against determined, adaptive enemy organizations.

#10 Develop Agile and Adaptive Leaders:

How to develop agile, adaptive, and innovative leaders who thrive in conditions of uncertainty and chaos and are capable of visualizing, describing, directing, and leading and assessing operations in complex environments and against adaptive enemies.

#14 Ensure Interoperability and Operate in Joint, Inter-organizational, Multinational Environment:

How to integrate joint, inter-organizational, and multi-national partner capabilities and campaigns to ensure unity of effort and accomplish missions across the range of military operations.

#19 Exercise Mission Command:

How to understand, visualize, describe, and direct operations consistent with the philosophy of mission command to seize the initiative over the enemy and accomplish the mission across the range of military operations.

#20 Develop Capable Formations:

How to design Army formations capable of rapidly deploying and conducting operations for ample duration and in sufficient scale to accomplish the mission.

Continuous feedback, collaboration, and teamwork are keys to the success of the Campaign of Learning and driving innovation in the Army. Please use the Army Warfighting Challenges as the framework to contribute your ideas and recommendations with respect to this topic to improve our ability to innovate as we develop the current and future force.

The Army Warfighting Challenges (AWFC) framework may be accessed here:

Please contribute to the Army Warfighting Challenges.

  • Public site (not requiring a CAC or password): ARCIC Website
  • MilBook collaboration site
  • SIPR Net collaboration site: https://intellipedia.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Army_Warfighting_Challenges

For previous weekly readings go to: ARCIC Professional Readings

All the best,

Bo