Professional Readings Full Archives

Series: 161
Demand Reduction
3/23/2018
Series: 160
How the Horrific 1918 Flu Spread Across America
3/9/2018
Series: 159
From Talent Management To Talent Optimization
2/21/2018
Series: 158
Tet Offensive from Karnow's "Vietnam - a History"
2/2/2018
Series: 157
The Big Picture: Combat Development Experiment Center (Video)
12/8/2017
Series: 156
An Advanced Engagement Battlespace: Tactical, Operational and Strategic Implications for the Future Operational Environment
11/29/2017
Series: 155
Adapting to Strategic Change: Organizational Change and Adaptation in the US Army
10/1/2017
Series: 154
Extending the Battlefield
10/1/2017
Series: 153
Army showcases stealthy, hydrogen fuel cell vehicle
9/18/2017
Series: 152
Objective Metropolis: the Future of Dense Urban Operational Environments
8/31/2017
Series: 151
The Strange Tale of the Norden Bombsight
8/14/2017
Series: 150
Risk Culture: Similarities & Differences between State and DoD
8/4/2017
Series: 149
Defense is from Mars, State is from Venus: Improving Communications and Promoting National Security
7/31/2017
Series: 148
Military Review October 1992
7/17/2017
Series: 147
Revitalizing Wargaming is Necessary to Be Prepared for Future Wars
7/2/2017
Series: 146
The End of the Asian Century: War, Stagnation, and the Risks to the World’s Most Dynamic Region
6/16/2017
Series: 145
Reflections on TRADOC’s Analysis of the Yom Kippur War (pages 220-225)
6/6/2017
Series: 144
Some New, Some Old, All Necessary: The Multi-Domain Imperative
5/13/2017
Series: 143
Lethality Upgrade: Why a New Stryker Variant is Needed on the Modern Battlefield
5/13/2017
Series: 142
The Indo-Asia Pacific and the Multi-Domain Battle Concept
5/8/2017
Series: 141
What the Past Teaches about the Future
5/1/2017
Series: 140
That Elusive Operational Concept
4/22/2017
Series: 139
Grant’s Disengagement from Cold Harbor (pages 176-209 found in the book Cold Harbor to the Crater)
4/18/2017
Series: 138
Countering the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Threat
4/10/2017
Series: 137
Thinking Like a Russian Officer
4/1/2017
Series: 136
The Future of the Army
3/27/2017
Series: 135
Letter to President George W. Bush et al re Predicting the Future
3/20/2017
Series: 134
The Culture of Strategic Thought Behind Russia’s Modern Approach to Warfare
2/13/2017
Series: 133
Expeditionary Land Power: Lessons from the Mexican-American War
3/6/2017
Series: 132
Running Things
2/27/2017
Series: 131
Selected Foreign Counterparts of U.S. Army Ground Combat Systems and Implications for Combat Operations and Modernization
2/21/2017
Series: 130
The Strategic Value of Conventional Land Forces
2/13/2017
Series: 129
Tooth to Tail
2/6/2017
Series: 128
Transforming the Force: The 11th Air Assault Division (Test) from 1963-1965
1/30/2017
Series: 127
Cyber Beyond Third Offset: A Call for Warfighter-Led Innovation
1/23/2017
Series: 126
NATO's Land Forces: Strength and Speed Matter
1/18/2017
Series: 125
The Institutional Level of War
1/4/2017
Series: 124
Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant v1 Chapters XXXII & XXXIII
1/4/2017
Series: 123
Landpower and American Credibility
12/27/2016
Series: 122
The US Army’s Postwar Recoveries
12/19/2016
Series: 121
The Panther Brigade in Operation Inherent Resolve
12/12/2016
Series: 120
The Area Under the Curve
12/5/2016
Series: 119
US Naval Forces Before and Beyond Battle
11/28/2016
Series: 118
The Islamic State's Militarization of Children
11/21/2016
Series: 117
Turkey’s Operation Euphrates Shield: An Exemplar of Joint Combined Arms Maneuver
11/14/2016
Series: 116
The Future Operating Environment 2050 - Chaos, Complexity and Competition
11/7/2016
Series: 115
War Goes Viral
10/31/2016
Series: 114
Mobility, Vigilance, and Justice: The US Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946-1953
11/24/2016
Series: 113
Is the Conduct of War a Business?
10/18/2016
Series: 112
Putin's Information Warfare in Ukraine
10/11/2016
Series: 111
Beyond Coastal Artillery
10/4/2016
Series: 110
The Battle of Manila (pages 91-122)
9/27/2016
Series: 109
Precision and Consequences for the Modern Battlefield
9/19/2016
Series: 108 A
Rediscovering the Art of Strategic Thinking
9/6/2016
Series: 108 B
The Strategic Development of Tactical #Leadership
9/6/2016
Series: 107
What It Means to be Expeditionary
9/6/2016
Series: 106
NATO's Next Act
8/29/2016
Series: 105
Vicksburg and Multi-Domain Battle
8/23/2016
Series: 104 A
Innovation: Past and Future
8/17/2016
Series: 104 B
The Relevance of Culture
8/17/2016
Series: 103
Cross-Domain Synergy-Advancing Jointness
8/9/2016
Series: 102 A
Into the Greasy Grass
8/2/2016
Series: 102 B
The Uncertain Role of the Tank in Modern War: Lessons from the Israeli Experience in Hybrid Warfare
8/2/2016
Series: 101
Hawks, Doves and Canaries: Women and Conflict
7/26/2016
Series: 99
The 1974 Paracels Sea Battle and China's Maritime Militia
7/11/2016
Series: 100
The Mud of Verdun
7/18/2016
Series: 98
Cheap Technology Will Challenge U.S. Tactical Dominance
7/6/2016
Series: 97
Landpower and American Credibility
6/25/2016
Series: 96
The Lure of Strike
6/22/2016
Series: 95
The Hell After ISIS
6/14/2016
Series: 94
Tactics and Mechanization
6/7/2016
Series: 93
Cyberwar in the Underworld - Anonymous versus Los Zetas in Mexico
5/30/2016
Series: 92
Strategic Landpower in the Indo-Asia-Pacific
5/23/2016
Series: 91
The Next Korean War: Drawing Lessons From Israel’s Experience in the Middle East
5/10/2016
Series: 90
A Retrospect on Close Air Support (Chapter 11 Page 535)
5/10/2016
Series: 89 A
The Future Is Growing Brighter For U.S. Combat Vehicles
6/22/2016
Series: 89 B
Reimagining and Modernizing U.S. Airborne Forces for the 21st Century
6/22/2016
Series: 88 A
Israel’s Operation Protective Edge
4/27/2016
Series: 88 B
Aerial Interdiction: Air Power and the Land Battle in Three American Wars
4/26/2016
Series: 87
Confronting the Threat of Corruption and Organized Crime in Afghanistan
4/20/2016
Series: 86
Eurasia's Coming Anarchy
4/12/2016
Series: 85
Cyber Threats and Russian Information Warfare
4/4/2016
Series: 84
The U.S. Is Losing the Social Media War
3/29/2016
Series: 83
Colombia - A Political Economy of War to an Inclusive Peace
3/21/2016
Series: 82 A
Definition of ‘Decisive’ Depends on Context
3/15/2016
Series: 82 B
How Should We Think About “Gray-Zone” Wars
3/15/2016
Series: 81
The Contemporary Spectrum of Conflict: Protracted, Gray Zone, Ambiguous, and Hybrid Modes of War
3/8/2016
Series: 80
Concepts, Doctrine, Principles from "Technology and Military Doctrine Essays (Essay 3 Page 19)
2/27/2016
Series: 79
The Sinister Shadow of Escalating Middle East Sectarianism
2/22/2016
Series: 78
Strategy and Grand Strategy: What Students and Practitioners Need to Know
2/17/2016
Series: 77
Arming Our Allies: The Case for Offensive Capabilities
2/9/2016
Series: 76
Forging Australian Land Power: A Primer
2/2/2016
Series: 75
How to Win Outnumbered
1/25/2016
Series: 74
Frontline Allies: War and Change in Central Europe
1/21/2016
Series: 73
To Change an Army
1/12/2016
Series: 72
The Use and Abuse of Military History
1/5/2016
Series: 71
ARCIC Professional Reading #29 and Professional Reading #43
12/30/2015
Series: 70
Gaming the "System of Systems”
12/22/2015
Series: 69
Chief of Staff of the Army’s Speech to the National Guard Association of the United States
12/14/2015
Series: 68
Information Warfare: What Is It and How to Win It?
12/9/2015
Series: 67
War and the Art of Governance
12/1/2015
Series: 66 A
General James 'Mad Dog' Mattis Email About Being 'Too Busy To Read' Is A Must-Read
11/24/2015
Series: 66 B
Fiction Belongs on Military Reading Lists
11/24/2015
Series: 65
How the U.S. Army Remains the Master of Landpower
11/18/2015
Series: 64
Testimony of Walter Russell Mead to the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services
11/10/2015
Series: 63
In Defense of Classical Geopolitics
11/3/2015
Series: 62
The Islamic State and Information Warfare
10/26/2015
Series: 61
Wake Up, America, to a Strategic New World
10/19/2015
Series: 60
Limiting Regret: Building the Army We Will Need
10/14/2015
Series: 59
The Use of Indigenous Forces in Stability Operations (page 69)
10/3/2015
Series: 58
Pursuing Strategic Advantage: The Utility of Armed Forces in Peace, War, and Everything In Between
9/26/2015
Series: 57
Gangs of Karachi
9/21/2015
Series: 56
Experimental Units: The Historical Record
9/12/2015
Series: 55
Governing the Caliphate: the Islamic State Picture
9/5/2015
Series: 54
Will Humans Matter in the Wars of 2030?
8/29/2015
Series: 53
The Case for Deterrence by Denial
8/25/2015
Series: 52
Precision Firepower - Smart Bombs, Dumb Strategy
8/20/2015
Series: 51
Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age
8/11/2015
Series: 50
Hybrid Warfare and Challenges
8/4/2015
Series: 49
Experimentation in the Period Between the Two World Wars: Lessons for the Twenty-First Century
7/26/2015
Series: 48
Chapter 3, Shape, Engage, and Consolidate Gains from Army Field Manual 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations
7/1/2015
Series: 47
Predicting Future War
7/12/2015
Series: 45
UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE ARMED SERVICES, Hearing, Tuesday, April 28, 2014, United States Policy on Europe
6/30/2015
Series: 44
Top Russian General Lays Bare Putin's Plan for Ukraine
6/22/2015
Series: 43
8 Unique Values: Why America Needs the Army
6/16/2015
Series: 42
Post Crimea Europe: NATO In the Age of Limited Wars
6/9/2015
Series: 41
American Landpower and the Two-war Construct
6/2/2015
Series: 40
Operations of the Natural Resources Counterinsurgency Cell (NRCC): Theory and Practice Implementing Non-lethal Unconventional Warfare Approaches in Eastern Afghanistan
5/28/2015
Series: 39
Bridging the Planning Gap: Incorporating Cyberspace into Operational Planning
5/18/2015
Series: 38
Defeating the Islamic State: A Financial-Military Strategy
5/11/2015
Series: 37
Superiority
5/5/2015
Series: 36
Clausewitz Out, Computer In: Military Culture and Technological Hubris.
4/30/2015
Series: 35
Robotics on the Battlefield Part II: The Coming Swarm
4/23/2015
Series: 34
Why Wargaming Works
4/15/2015
Series: 33
Louisiana Maneuvers (1940 - 41)
4/8/2015
Series: 32
'It Just Took a Few': the Tank in New Guinea Campaign
3/30/2015
Series: 31
The Shadow Commander
3/23/2015
Series: 30
Rethinking Operation Protective Edge, The 2014 Gaza War
3/18/2015
Series: 29
Why do we need an Army?
3/12/2015
Series: 28
DARPA: Nobody's safe on the Internet
3/2/2015
Series: 27
States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders
2/23/2015
Series: 26
The Future of Military Innovation Studies
2/16/2015
Series: 25
A Case Study in Innovation
2/9/2015
Series: 24
The Joint Force Commander's Guide to Cyberspace Operations and FireEye Cyber Threat Map
2/2/2015
Series: 23
The Power of Discourse
1/26/2015
Series: 22
Management's New Paradigms
1/20/2015
Series: 21
The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050; Chapter 10
1/12/2015
Series: 20
To Change an Army
1/5/2015
Series: 19
Where Good Ideas Come From
12/15/2014
Series: 18
Superiority
12/8/2014
Series: 18
When Superiority Goes Wrong: Science Fiction and Offset Strategies
12/8/2014
Series: 17
Thinking About Innovation
12/1/2014
Series: 17
The Anatomy of Change: Why Armies Succeed or Fail at Transformation
12/1/2014
Series: 16 A
The M1 Abrams Today Tomorrow
11/24/2014
Series: 16 B
Bringing Mobility to the Infantry Brigade Combat Team
11/24/2014
Series: 16 C
Losing Our Way The Disassociation of Reconnaissance and Security Organizations from Screen, Guard, and Cover Missions
11/24/2014
Series: 15
The Rhyme of History Lessons of the Great War
11/17/2014
Series: 14
France's War in Mali, Lessons for an Expeditionary Army
11/10/2014
Series: 13
More Small Wars Counterinsurgency Is Here to Stay
11/3/2014
Series: 12
"Big Five" Lessons for Today and Tomorrow
10/27/2014
Series: 11
The Human Dimension White Paper
10/20/2014
Series: 10
The Great Revamp: 11 Trends Shaping Future Conflict
10/13/2014
Series: 9
Threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), al-Qa'ida, and other Islamic extremists; written testimony of General James M. Mattis, USMC (Ret.), former commander of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
10/6/2014
Series: 8
Land Warfare Doctrine 1; The Fundamentals of Land Power 2014
9/29/2014
Series: 7
The Strategic Utility of Land Power
9/22/2014
Series: 6
Observations on the Long War
9/15/2014
Series: 5
The Nightmare Years to Come?
9/8/2014
Series: 4
Ensuring a strong US Defense in the future
8/18/2014
Series: 2
Toward a Secure and Stable Northern Mali
8/4/2014
Series: 1
Groupthink: The Brainstorming Myth
7/21/2014

Series: 161 3/23/2018

Acting Director MG Robert “Bo” Dyess’ Comments:

“You will not find it difficult to prove that battles, campaigns, and even wars have been won or lost primarily because of logistics.”

General Dwight D. Eisenhower

“Logistic considerations belong not only in the highest echelons of military planning during the process of preparation for war and for specific wartime operations, but may well become the controlling element with relation to timing and successful operation.”

Vice Admiral Oscar C. Badger, USN

“Gentlemen, the officer who doesn’t know his communications and supply as well as his tactics is totally useless.”

General George S. Patton, USA

“We will not have the luxury of having this massive amount of logistics behind us in future higher end, higher intensity conflict.”

General Mark A. Milley, Chief of Staff of the Army

Team,

The Multi-Domain Battle (MDB) concept describes the future vision of how the Army will fight as part of the Joint Force in a complex environment against near-peer competitors that will challenge American supremacy across all domains (land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace). A key element of the MDB concept is resilient formations that can maneuver and fight to seize and retain the initiative for periods of up to seven days without continuous supply lines or secured flanks. To be successful in a contested environment, MDB movement and maneuver cannot be restrained by the tethers of traditional supply lines and the large quantities of supplies that have been a signature of the U.S. military since the American Civil War. To break these logistical tethers, the Army must reduce demand as part of the logistical strategy to improve support to formations on the modern battlefield.

Historically, water, fuel, and ammunition constitute the highest demand signals for the Army. This week’s professional reading articles examine several of the impacts of these demand signatures. In “Refuel on the Move: Resupplying Patton’s Third Army,” Captain Daniel G. Grassi argues that logistics restrained Patton’s ability to maneuver, slowed his operational reach, and limited his desire and ability to fight on a broader front. In his interview with FRONTLINE in 2004, GEN David Perkins (then COL Perkins), described the impact of an incident of tactical demand reduction during the second "Thunder Run” to take the city of Baghdad. In this incident, while still engaged with the enemy, he directed tank engines to be shut down for extended periods of time. Describing the impact of this directive on mission command, he stated that “if you shut their engines off, every hour that the engine is shut off, it's another hour of decision time I have to make” on considering whether to continue the attack into Bagdad, consolidate current gains and establish defensive positions, or withdraw from the city.

Recently, Brigadier General David Komar, Director of Capabilities Development for the Army Capabilities Integration Center, emphasized that in addition to being a key consideration of MDB, “demand reduction is a critical component of the National Defense Strategy’s effort to modernize key capabilities with respect to fielding resilient and agile logistics. This requires the issue of demand reduction to be examined holistically, as there are several areas where it can be achieved. Demand reduction will allow the Joint Force to extend operational reach, reduce mission risk, and improve readiness, giving commanders an operational advantage to exploit windows of opportunity.

The Army Capabilities Integration Center recently published a Demand Reduction White Paper on February 21, 2018. The White Paper posits the problem statement that in order to improve combat effectiveness, extend operational reach and reduce risk, the Army must reduce demand for sustaining the force while maintaining overmatch to conduct Unified Land Operations now and MDB in the future. The purpose of the white paper is to promote thought and discussion concerning methods and capabilities required to sustain the Multi-Domain Battle force and to assist with clearly understanding and defining requirements, identifying and assessing risk, and focusing efforts on outputs and end states. The paper provides the frame work to examine the five underlying components of Demand Reduction:

  • Improve Effectiveness and Efficiency
  • Meet demand at the Point of Need
  • Employ Robotics and Autonomous Systems
  • Improve Situational Awareness
  • Cultural Change

The white paper asserts that a shift towards demand reduction is necessary for the future Army and joint force to be successful in conducting semi-independent operations. Without demand reduction, Soldiers and teams will be more vulnerable across the expanded operational environment, not just forward edge of the battlefield. The Army must integrate efforts across the DOTMLPF-P domains to achieve objectives of improved effectiveness and efficiency, meet demand at the point of need, automate tasks, and improve situational understanding. The desired end-state envisions operating forces conducting MDB semi-independently in contested environments over extended ranges. Demand reduction will facilitate operations at a tempo the enemy cannot respond to or sustain, while rapidly concentrating combat power to close with and destroy enemy forces.

If you have further questions or are interested in participating in the Demand Reduction effort please contact: COL Chris Corizzo, Sustainment Division Chief, ARCIC, (757) 501-5611, christopher.d.corizzo.mil@mail.mil; or Mr. Steven Behel, (757) 501-5544, steven.d.behel.civ@mail.mil.

The following Army Warfighting Challenges are directly related to this week's topic:
#1 Develop Situational Understanding:

How to develop and sustain a high degree of situational understanding while operating in complex environments against determined, adaptive enemy organizations.

#2 Shape the Security Environment:

How the Army influences the security environment and engages key actors and local/regional forces in order to consolidate gains and achieve sustainable security outcomes in support of Geographic Combatant Commands and Joint requirements.

#10 Develop Agile and Adaptive Leaders:

How to develop agile, adaptive, and innovative leaders who thrive in conditions of uncertainty and chaos and are capable of visualizing, describing, directing, and leading and assessing operations in complex environments and against adaptive enemies.

#11 Conduct Air-Ground Reconnaissance and Security Operations:

How Army formations conduct continuous integrated reconnaissance and security operations across multiple domains (air/land/cyberspace/space/maritime) to rapidly develop the situation while in contact with the enemy and civilian populations.

#12 Conduct Joint Expeditionary Maneuver and Entry Operations:

The Army needs formations that can rapidly deploy into contested environments, quickly transition to operations, and be sustained to maintain high operational tempo with the overmatch necessary to destroy or defeat enemy forces.

#13 Conduct Wide Area Security:

How do Army forces establish and maintain security across wide areas (wide area security) and across multiple domains to protect forces, populations, infrastructure, and activities necessary to shape security environments, consolidate gains, and set conditions for achieving policy goals.

#14 Ensure Interoperability and Operate in Joint, Inter-organizational, Multinational Environment:

How to integrate joint, inter-organizational, and multi-national partner capabilities and campaigns to ensure unity of effort and accomplish missions across the range of military operations.

#15 Conduct Cross-Domain Maneuver:

How Army forces, operating as part of a joint, interorganizational, and multinational force, train, organize, equip, and posture sufficiently to deter or defeat highly capable peer threats in the degraded, contested, lethal, and complex future operational environment.

#16 Set the Theater Sustain Operations and Maintain Freedom of Movement:

How to set the theater, provide strategic agility to the joint force, and maintain freedom of movement and action during sustained and high tempo operations at the end of extended lines of communication in austere environments.

#19 Exercise Mission Command:

How to understand, visualize, describe, and direct operations consistent with the philosophy of mission command to seize the initiative over the enemy and accomplish the mission across the range of military operations.

#20 Develop Capable Formations:

How to design Army formations capable of rapidly deploying and conducting operations for ample duration and in sufficient scale to accomplish the mission.

Continuous feedback, collaboration, and teamwork are keys to the success of the Campaign of Learning and driving innovation in the Army. Please use the Army Warfighting Challenges as the framework to contribute your ideas and recommendations with respect to this topic to improve our ability to innovate as we develop the current and future force.

The Army Warfighting Challenges (AWFC) framework may be accessed here:

For previous weekly readings go to: ARCIC Professional Readings

  1. Army Operating Concept, TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, 30 October 2014
  2. Multi-Domain Battle

All the best,

Bo