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UNIFIED QUEST 2016 FUTURE FORCE DESIGN I FINAL REPORT



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I. Introduction

Unified Quest (UQ) is the Army Chief of Staff's future study plan. UQ 2016 is a twelve-month program that seeks to explore, develop, and refine the Operations and Organizations (O&O) concepts required for the Army, as a part of the joint force, to win in a complex world. Emphasizing Anti-access and Area Denial (A2/AD), the study explored the development of Future Force Formations at four echelons (Brigade, Division, Corps, and Theater Army). The UQ study is synchronized with Unified Challenge (UC), under the auspices of F2025M: Army's Campaign of Learning, for the purpose of allowing ARCIC to inform O&O concepts at the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical levels.

The Future Warfare Division designed the Future Force Design I (FFD-I) seminar to establish baseline roles, functions, and tasks for Echelons Above Brigade (EAB). The goal for this event was to set the conditions for a subsequent event, Future Force Design II, that will expand and refine those EAB roles, functions, and tasks in January 2016. We will then test the refined concepts in the Deep Future Wargame (DFWG) in May. FFD-I achieved its stated purpose: it captured EAB roles, functions, and tasks; developed a framework for understanding EAB in 2030; and provided the insights necessary to make FFD-II a success.

This report describes the methods used during the event, discusses the outputs by group, and considers the implications of group insights for the future force. It then discusses an alternative EAB configuration that results from the aggregation of the groups' insights and applies that configuration to the identified learning demands.

II. Method

In FFD-I participants used a "Shift from a Known Point" approach to envisioning EAB roles, functions, and tasks in 2030. The event divided participants (see Annex A for a list of represented organizations) into two groups that considered EAB tasks in Europe and in North America. Given present doctrine and a 2030 scenario, participants identified tasks by echelon and warfighting functions. These tasks are primarily derived from the military demands of the 2030 scenario while remaining broadly informed by existing 2015 doctrinal task lists such as the AUTL and the UJTL. The FWD Integration and Analysis cell aggregated the participants' reported Professional Military Judgment (PMJ) in two ways. First, facilitated discussion elicited participant insights, which were recorded by a rapporteur. Second, participants created an echelon task list, which was managed by a separate observer. The two sets of group outputs were used to assess the internal validity of the study. Analysis of the groups' outputs revealed large task pools that support future consideration of alternatives to how EAB are echeloned.

FFD-I also employed questionnaires to assess future critical points of failure in a "Pre-Mortem" exercise. Participants were asked to individually imagine future catastrophic failures and record their predictions on provided sheets of paper. The I&A cell coded and sorted the responses, and at the end of the event participants were asked to rank order the ten most commonly given points of failure and identify which EAB this failure was most likely to impact. These results will be presented in Annex B.

III. Results by Group

A. Europe Group

The Europe group considered the roles, functions, and tasks of EABs in a European scenario against a near-peer competitor. The group contained representatives from across the Centers of Excellence, as well as from USAEUR and the Special Operations Forces community. A single group of 50 conducted most of the discussion, although smaller breakout groups were used to examine specific warfighting functions. The group examined Theater Army, Corps, and Division in that order, focusing less on the specifics of the scenario and more on the general doctrinal template that each echelon should employ.

1. Theater Army: Participants reported the results of recent exercises – USAEUR did a three-month study, which determined that setting the theater at Phase 0 is the most important function of an Army Service Component Command (ASCC) / Theater Army (TA). In a separate study, CASCOM found that the support requirements to set the theater in future scenarios will be considerable. However, the group noted that setting the theater was much more than logistics – it requires the maintenance of relationships, gathering and processing intelligence, maintaining the required protective posture, etc. Moreover, representatives from USAEUR noted that in the near-, mid-, and far-environment, coordination with coalition land force partners in a crisis scenario would precede the introduction of CONUS-based Mission Command capabilities. As a result, the group recommended migrating Assess the Threat & Theater Conditions; Set the Theater; Receive and Prepare Forces; and Build/Prepare the Ground Campaign Plan from the JFLCC role to the ASCC / TA role.

1A. Warfighting Function: Mission Command: The Mission Command breakout group determined a significant number of functions provided by the Theater Army architecture. The Theater Army maintains continuous situational awareness of the theater network infrastructure, to include ongoing Intelligence Preparation of the Cyber and Electro-Magnetic Environment (EME) battlefield; status of Host Nation networks and defensive preparations; and updates on Joint, Inter-agency, and Multinational Cyber/EW efforts. It acts to resist network attacks on US and Host Nations networks and to maintain a continuous readiness to support the introduction of additional capabilities to the theater. In addition to its in-theater network responsibilities, the Theater Army also provides a Theater Missile Warning C3I infrastructure and supports Wide-band Global Satellite Communications for US and allied forces.

In 2030, the Theater Army will have considerable responsibilities in the Space Domain. Space Support Elements (SSEs) are organic to the Theater Army and are the assigned planning element which provides Space Situational Awareness, Space Superiority, and Special Technical Operations. The Theater Army also manages High Altitude assets and liaison to JFCC-Space (within STRATCOM). This enables the Theater to undertake space offensive and defensive space operations to generate effects in both the relevant portion of the space domain and in conjunction with overall adversary-focused operations.

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1B. Warfighting Function: Movement and Maneuver: The Maneuver breakout group focused on the responsibilities of in-theater formations in PH0/I. These formations employ tailored packages to establish Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) bases and a forward presence. With Theater Army direction and support, they demonstrate the mobility and endurance of US ground forces, build partners and capacities to shape the security environment, conduct exercises, and create Flexible Deterrence Options (FDOs). The European group emphasized the need for a long-term stability force presence that was able to support transition across phases and could be integrated into planned future operations.

1C. Warfighting Function: Intelligence: The Intelligence breakout group focused on current intelligence requirements that they believe will endure in 2030. Intelligence assets associated with the Theater Army track indicators and warnings in support of Army requirements. To preserve the effectiveness of these systems, Theater Army intelligence assets maintain intelligence networks, establish and maintains access, create intelligence databases, and conduct fusion operations with other intelligence organizations. They also preserve intelligence readiness through the Foundry training and certification program.

1D. Warfighting Function: Fires: The Fires breakout group focused on the Theater Army's functions within its JFLCC role. Theater Army supports the steady state Air and Missile Defense requirements in a JFLCC capacity and extends those capabilities to forces that arrive in theater. Also in a JFLCC capacity, the Theater Army provides long-range surface-to-surface fires. The Theater Army coordinates with the Air Force and supports Air/Ground operations.

1E. Warfighting Function: Maneuver Support and Protection: The Protection breakout group focused on two areas of enduring importance to the Theater Army. First, the Theater Army has obligations to coordinate law enforcement, intelligence investigation, and customs/logistics security requirements with a variety of labs and agencies. Second, the Theater Army provides coordination of CBRN defense and WMD management.

1F. Warfighting Function: Sustainment: The Sustainment breakout group described functions that the Theater Army must meet in order to successfully set the theater in 2030. The group assumed that the Theater Army will still have a Theater Support Command and will execute Common User Logistics as required by the GCC. In that context, it opens the theater and conducts logistic operations at the direction of the GCC. Within this category of activities, the Theater Army advises the GCC on theater supply issues, nominates Army and MEDCOM capabilities, executes a Theater supply distribution plan, and conducts financial and contract management. It also acts as Executive Agent for a wide variety of Title 10 requirements. It provides Sustainment Mission Command, and receives and prepares Army forces' sustainment formations. Finally, the Theater Army also develops Host Nation and allied sustainment capability through exercises, and operational contracting plan, and the conduct of sustainment operations in support of Multinational partners.

1G. Warfighting Function: Engagement: The Engagement breakout group highlighted the central importance the Theater Army plays in steady-state engagement

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activities. The Theater Army provides persistent influence to counter irregular threats. It also does so with a reduced footprint and employs engagement multipliers that increase the effectiveness of larger scale military exercises and activities. The Theater Army works with Special Operations Forces and CONUS-based organizations to provide foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, and military information support operations, and civil-military operations. This requirement is expected to grow in 2030.

2. Corps/Division: When the group examined the scenario, they found that the important distinction was not between Corps and Division, but between JTF and JFLCC. The group found that it was inadvisable for a single headquarters to assume both of these roles, especially at the scope traditionally associated with Corps operations. However, in 2030 the participants assumed that a Corps or Division would operate according to the FARG-II Home Station Mission Command Concept (HSMCC), raising concerns about the robustness and deployability of Mission Command capabilities. In particular, the requirement to coordinate a wider area of operations over longer distances is likely to strain signal / data capacity. Additionally, for large-scale non-contiguous multiple point-of-entry operations like those envisioned in the scenario, the higher headquarters will need an increased ability to control warfighting formations and capabilities.

2A. Warfighting Function: Mission Command: Building on the insights of NIE/AWA, the Mission Command discussion of Corps and Division in major operations focused on the difficulty of weighting efforts and repositioning forces in response to changing circumstances. The group assessed the Corps'/Division's ability to exercise mission command over all units in an assigned area of operations to be at significant risk in 2030.

2B. Warfighting Function: Movement and Maneuver: Related to the conversation about Mission Command, the Movement and Maneuver subgroup was concerned about how to address the requirement to execute and assess land operations. The group stated that in 2030 movement control will be a significant task and participants assumed that in 2030 a Corps will have an Expeditionary Sustainment Command in a Direct Support role to provide movement control throughout the JOA.

2C. Warfighting Function: Intelligence: The Intelligence breakout group noted that many of the contemporary intelligence challenges will persist in 2030. Intelligence units will support geospatial intelligence fusion, biometrics and forensics collection, and the collection and analysis of police intelligence and targeting. The requirements for cyber capabilities (both offensive and defensive) at the operational and tactical level are expected to grow in 2030. Finally, the group noted that the Corps and Division are not joint headquarters until constituted as JFLCC or JTF, which led them to assume the necessary joint "plugs" will exist in these headquarters prior to their employment even if the capabilities do not.

2D. Warfighting Function: Fires: The Fires breakout group identified overmatch as the critical issue in 2030. In 2030, the group believed that a loss of air superiority, a robust qualitative and quantitative threat from adversary UASs and long-range fires, and restrictions on munitions and ROE will degrade the relative effectiveness of fires. The Field Artillery Brigades (FABs), as presently envisioned, will provide target location in conjunction with other ISR platforms and will support the Joint Targeting Board process

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for the allocation of joint fires across the Area of Operations. The Air Defense Brigade will serve as the Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) in the Joint Operations Area, but as many participants noted, ADA formations do not have the ability to support the weight of the future anti-UAS fight and smaller tactical formations do not have organic anti-UAS platforms.

2E. Warfighting Function: Maneuver Support and Protection: The Protection group noted that how the Corps fights in 2030 will be critical to developing O&Os for Military Police, Engineer, and CBRN Brigades. In 2030, there will be a growing need for CBRN defense (to include recon, decon, and biological agent detection), counter-WMD, and WMD elimination and disposal. In current force projections, these remain low-density specialties, which will result in capacity shortfalls in the event of a homeland crisis. There will also be, in the face of adversary hybrid strategies, the need for support area security, police and corrections capacity, criminal investigations, customs operations, and detention. Finally, engineers will face complex challenges with counter-mine and counter-obstacle operations, construction and repair in a wide variety of settings, and contract construction management.

2F. Warfighting Function: Sustainment: The Sustainment group assessed that Corps and Division sustainment operations will be largely unchanged between 2015 and 2030. The G4 cell in each headquarters will be responsible for the coordination of sustainment with the enterprise-managed Theater Enabling Commands and their assigned units. Participants noted that this creates significant mission command challenges, particularly in terms of unity of effort and battlespace management.

2G. Warfighting Function: Engagement: Army Special Operations Forces support Corps and Division Engagement operations through both surgical strike operations (achieving effects without alienating the population through a broader application of violence) and special warfare, which includes unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, military information support operations, and civil-military operations. Civil Affairs and PSYOP Battalions provide planning capability, assets, and reachback to CONUS-based capabilities. This is critical to the establishment of a Civil-Military Operations Center and the creation of regionally specific PYSOP support. Proposed O&Os for the 2030 force propose an Active Component PSYOP formation to support Conventional Forces that will provide a bridge capability while specialized Reserve Component formations are mobilized. In addition, the group projects organic PSYOP planners at Division and BCT HQs.

B. Homeland Group

The Homeland scenario asked participants to consider the roles, functions, and tasks of Theater Army, Corps, and Division in a complex emergency including a large-scale natural disaster and a series of terrorist attacks employing weapons of mass destruction. This scenario exercised the range of Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), all three echelons, and both Homeland Defense (HD) and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) requirements. A large group of participants considered the scenario in terms of major lines of effort and discussed the challenges presented by policy and the law when operating in the Homeland. They then divided into smaller functional teams to examine the particular tasks performed under each warfighting function.

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1. Theater Army: As one participant noted, ASCC / TA roles are highly theater specific in terms of “how” the organization discharges its responsibilities. Thus, outside of representatives from ARNORTH and participants with experience in Homeland operations, there was a great deal of confusion about how the Army operates in DSCA and HD operations. Much of the first afternoon was spent working through policy and legal issues, developing understanding about what the Army can and can’t do, and applying general principles to the particular scenario. Participants report that the capabilities of the Theater Army are consumed by its ARFOR responsibilities, which exceed staff capacity. In 2030, when the complexity of the threat is projected to increase, it is likely the management of both the particularities of the NORTHCOM AOR and the functional requirement to manage diverse and on-going HD tasks and capabilities will require either an expanded Theater Army or a fourth reserve component Corps headquarters.

1A. Warfighting Function: Mission Command: The role of Mission Command elements of the Theater Army in HD/DSCA is to both establish the command and staff relationships required to manage the Army components of crisis response and to integrate a large number of interagency partners and other “atypical teammates.” This requires the employment of Digital Liaison Teams, comprised of the required technical experts and the appropriate DSCA software suite. Theater Army also establishes, defends, and reinforces networks with cyber and signal forces. Because of the diversity of actors and networks, this poses serious challenges to spectrum management, schemes to protect key assets and the coordination and delivery of services.

1B. Warfighting Function: Movement and Maneuver: For the crisis scenario under consideration, the Maneuver breakout group determined that there was a large demand for aviation support. This requires a Theater Aviation Sustainment Group, a Theater Airfield Operations Group, and General Support Aviation for heavy lift, aeromedical CASEVAC and firefighting capabilities. These capabilities support needs that are unmet by civilian aviation and satisfy the DoD’s requirement within the National Response Framework to lead Search and Rescue operations. The group determined that the Theater Army may also be called on to provide maneuver units to conduct Wide Area Security, reinforce civil authorities and disaster response efforts (e.g. firefighting), and provide defense operations and reconnaissance.

1C. Warfighting Function: Intelligence: As the Intelligence breakout group observed, military intelligence activities are highly restricted in the Homeland. Nonetheless, the Theater Army has important functions to perform in the intelligence warfighting function. It can perform ISR in support of DCSA, provide a secure communications infrastructure, liaise with other intelligence agencies, and provide oversight of Army intelligence activities. It manages the Intelligence Enterprise with the Theater Army staff and its MI Brigade. It also provides an independent mechanism to achieve situational awareness for the commander.

1D. Warfighting Function: Fires: The Fires breakout group focused primarily on the role that AAMDC plays in the NORTHCOM AOR. In DSCA/HD, ADA sensors support both defense of the Homeland and border security operations. AAMDC can also manage airspace operations in the event that civilian airspace management systems are

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degraded or destroyed. The group did not identify a requirement for surface to surface fires. As a result, Fires capabilities were decomposed into manpower, transportation, and C3 assets that can provide support to a wide variety of activities undertaken with civil authorities in the lead.

1E. Warfighting Function: Maneuver Support and Protection: In the given scenario, adversaries operating in the homeland procured radioactive material and built dirty bombs, which they detonated in population centers and at embarkation points for expeditionary forces. Since the scenario involved the employment of radiological weapons in the Homeland, the Protection working group identified significant CBRN responsibilities. Theater Army must provide Defense Coordinating Officers (DCOs) to establish liaison with FEMA. It must identify CBRN targets, engage in operations to render devices safe and eliminate WMD. And, as described in the scenario, it must support consequence management in coordination with interagency partners. In addition to the need to manage CBRN response, the Theater Army has the ability to provide forces to protect critical infrastructure, coordinate the repair and restoration of damaged infrastructure, and provide unique capabilities for remote firefighting and flood control.

1F. Warfighting Function: Sustainment: The Sustainment working group captured tasks for the Theater Sustainment Command and the Theater Army staff. The Theater Army has the capability to provide maritime, air, and ground transportation in support of mass evacuation and other operations. It provides a full suite of logistic capabilities, synchronization, and command and control systems to be employed by civil authorities in support of the concepts outlined in the annexes to the National Response Framework. Importantly, the group highlighted the ability of the Theater Army to coordinate a supply of potable water to large populations on short notice.

1G. Warfighting Function: Engagement: The Engagement working group noted important Theater Army responsibilities both within the Homeland and elsewhere in NORTHCOM. Abroad, the Theater Army coordinates a critical Security Cooperation program, coordinates with international partners from Canada and Mexico, and coordinates a liaison with SOCNORTH. Additionally, the Theater Army coordinates information operations with federal agencies on an ad hoc basis through the Joint Information Center, provides a CMO/Interagency coordination cell, coordinates with state emergency response management agencies, and engages with the Army National Guard and state governments.

2. Corps/Division: Both Corps and Division were “problem-solving” echelons in this working group. As one participant noted, a Mission Command Battle Lab experiment found that there was very little overlap between Corps and Theater Army. The functions performed by a Corps in DSCA and HD center around the provision of national capabilities and low-density formations to civil authorities. That said, these tasks are difficult and require training and rehearsal. One participant noted that a III Corps Homeland exercise revealed multiple challenges associated with employing a headquarters to perform unfamiliar tasks. In addition to the Mission Command of subordinate elements supporting ESFs, the headquarters is responsible for establishing liaison with a wide-variety of unfamiliar interagency leads, working with rapidly mobilized RC units, and addressing the challenges of mobilization in an environment in

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which natural disaster and security concerns may inhibit the ability of formations mobilize and deploy quickly.

2A. Warfighting Function: Mission Command: The Mission Command breakout group determined that in DSCA/HD, the Corps and Division tasks are tailored to the ESFs required of the JTF/JFLCC by the lead agency coordinating the response. In all cases, the Army must establish a headquarters capable of synchronizing assets and supporting the independent network and communication demands of the mobilized force. That headquarters then provides coordination across formations and asset types to achieve effects for the lead agency. Notably, the group did not restrict the headquarters function to the mobilization of forces to be assigned to other organizations – given the scope of the emergency, the challenges of network interoperability, and the demands that a surge of Army assets would place on state and local C3I capabilities, the headquarters retains mission command of mobilized forces.

2B. Warfighting Function: Movement and Maneuver: The Movement and Maneuver group noted that the requirements for the Division and Corps mirror those at the Theater Army level and are primarily centered on the provision of aviation and manpower to the lead agency. The distinguishing factor among echelons is the geography and number of assets involved in the emergency.

2C. Warfighting Function: Intelligence: The Intelligence breakout group reported that the Intelligence staff at Division and Corp is adequate to perform the tasks required during DSCA/HD. However, given the complexity of the issues involved, there will be an increased demand on the Staff Judge Advocate and additional training requirements for intelligence personnel to outline authorized intelligence tasks in the Homeland. There is, however, a need for ISR to support both DSCA and HD. At the Corps level, the group suggested that an MI BDE be added to the scenario with a full suite of R&S capabilities.

2D. Warfighting Function: Fires: Like Movement and Maneuver, Fires capabilities at the Corps and Division level in DSCA/HD are quite similar to those performed at Theater Army. However, in this case the Theater Army retains control of the AAMDC / ADA / Airspace control capabilities, and lower echelons' Fires formations are disaggregated into their constituent capabilities and employed in a non-standard role.

2E. Warfighting Function: Maneuver Support and Protection: The Protection breakout group identified critical tasks that the Corps or Division must perform in each of the 14 ESFs with a DoD role. Chief among these are the establishment of control measures and movement control in the unit area; providing CBRN, firefighting, and other capabilities; establishing liaison and temporary facilities for emergency management; facilitating interstate displaced person evacuation; technical assistance in the protection, evaluation, repair, and restoration of damaged infrastructure; and manpower and support as required by the lead agency.

2F. Warfighting Function: Sustainment: The Sustainment breakout group emphasized that Sustainment systems will operate in the Homeland the same way they do in other theaters. That is to say, they will be managed on an enterprise basis, with a TSC attaching an ESC to the Corps and the Corps, through the ESC, managing transportation assets down to the Division. This is also the case for the MEDCOM(DS), through which

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medical services are managed and delivered by the ASCC to lower echelons. That said, the group also identified some key tasks to be performed by echelons below ASCC: these formations provide potable water; coordinate logistics within the JOA; provide fatality management support; provide fuel distribution points; coordinate transportation across domains; and synchronize a sustainment architecture through a resourced JLENT.


2G. Warfighting Function: Engagement: The Engagement breakout group identified four groups of tasks: coordinate IO with the lead agency; coordinate CMO / establish a CMOC; coordinate with state emergency management and the USARNG; and establish liaison with SOF. The group was aware of the restrictions on MISO in the Homeland, but pointed out that limiting the Engagement actions to dissemination support would meet legal requirements and provide an important capability to civil authorities. Current shortages in Active Component GPF MISO and the lack of organic CA or MISO assets at Division and Corps would create challenges in generating Engagement capability quickly.

IV. Organization A/B Concept


Both the North America and Europe groups identified two large pools of tasks that EABs perform in order to address the challenges of the 2030 world. The first pool is constituted by on-going missions that require a continuous forward presence and the ability to exercise mission command over a diverse set of permanently assigned and continuously employed capabilities. Aggregating these sets of tasks, the functions in this pool fall primarily under “Prevent/Shape”. In the second pool, groups identified a set of tasks that emerge on a contingency basis, but that require the focused application of expeditionary capabilities to an adversary or natural disaster. Aggregating these tasks, the functions in this pool are best placed under the “Win” aegis. By deriving functions from the distinct pools of tasks that the participants identified, FFD-I suggests the need for two distinct types of organizations that perform roles which serve those functions.

Thinking in this way is critical in order to shift from an echelon-based approach to problem-solving to a problem-based approach to echelonment.

Throughout the late Cold War, the Army maintained a significant forward presence in Europe and the Pacific. Of importance to this discussion, positioning headquarters at each echelon in theater enabled them to share responsibilities in Phase 0 and I. Thus, American deterrence operations could rely on the full suite of mission command and enabler capabilities resident at Division and Corps. For example, in REFORGER exercises, formations and mission-command elements deployed from CONUS to link up with headquarters, equipment sets, and friendly formations that were already in theater. In the event of war, divisions and corps would have assumed a greater portion of the overall effort as CONUS-based forces arrived in theater. As post-war stabilization took hold, divisions and corps could return to CONUS and the theater could resume the level of activity characteristic of Phase 0. This process is depicted below:



After the Cold War, the Army transitioned from a Forward Deployed to an Expeditionary Army. Unlike the model depicted above, in this arrangement the Theater Army was responsible for preparing to accept CONUS-based forces without the benefit of a forward-deployed division or corps formation. These expeditionary headquarters would be based outside the theater and rotated, along with modular BCTs through the theater as operations demanded. This system is entirely reasonable if the workload of the theater is reduced to a level that can be handled by a single headquarters. However, as reported in FFD-I, Phase 0/I requirements have remained quite significant. Thus, the Expeditionary model in practice looks like the chart below, with substantial responsibilities falling on the Theater Army in Phase 0/I, which taper off in the Phases II, III, and IV.



This shift in the disposition of the Army occasioned a number of studies to consider alternative arrangements for Echelons Above Brigade. One approach, conceived in the early 2000s and known as UEx/UEy, addressed the problem by merging Corps and Division tasks under a single echelon called a UEy. Visually, this would combine the bottom two layers of the chart above. The remaining tasks (the dark blue on the chart) would be the responsibility of UEx, and consisted primarily in the coordination of the activities of extremely large and generally autonomous Brigade Combat Teams. In the end, the UEy was rejected as too large and unwieldy.

A similar alternative was tested by the Joint and Army Experimentation Division in FY12, only in this specification the functions of the Theater Army were collapsed into a Corps headquarters, which retained responsibility for managing the flow of forces into theater and of the activities of those forces in a Joint Operations Area. Experimentation found that the span of control issues presented by this configuration were insurmountable, and recommended Theater Armies tailored by region in coordination with the GCC and Corps that focused on warfighting responsibilities.

Most recently, the Mission Command COE update to AWFC #14 (Ensure Interoperability and Operate in a Joint, Interorganizational, and Multinational Environment), suggested that all three extant Corps headquarters should be aligned to GCCs, made responsible for the production of the war plans they will execute, and transformed in standing joint headquarters. This approach moves us full-circle, so that a “virtual” forward formation performs Phase 0/I tasks from home station and relieves the Theater Army of some of its responsibilities to shape the security environment and set the theater.

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Common to all these approaches is the timeframe in which they are to be operationalized. They respond to the demands of the present by asking: how can we optimally organize what we have right now given a set of immediate problems? However, as the Future Warfare Division, we have the mandate to scout the future in support of the Army's Force 2025 Maneuvers. Thus, we have the space to step back and ask: what is it that we need to do in the future, given the emerging problems of 2030?

The careful thinking in the research described above suggests the broad outlines of a solution space. The major problem the Army faces is the challenge of fighting a near-peer adversary with very short LOCs using an expeditionary force. As JAED put it, "we are developing a highly capable Army that relies heavily on capabilities derived from a fragile foundation of enablers." Setting this foundation and managing the rapid accumulation of force in theater is an essential task, currently performed by the Theater Army. Given the challenges in logistical throughput and the necessity to rely on joint, interagency, and multinational partners identified in FY12 studies, there is a clear requirement for a stable, enduring foundation that creates a security environment conducive to expeditionary operations. However, given the reality of scarce resources and future threats of uncertain provenance, we want the ability to allocate forces against a shifting constellation of contingency requirements.

Prior to exploring specific DOTMLPF-P solutions, it is useful to think about the tasks that an organization dedicated to enduring, foundational regional requirements must perform vice the tasks that an organization focused on deploying on a contingency basis on short notice to deter and defeat committed adversaries. Considered broadly, the two organizations and the tasks they perform look like the following:

A. Organization A

The problem: Increasing adversary capability to conduct effective hybrid warfare, expanded theater responsibilities, and the A2/AD threat limit the effectiveness of a CONUS-based land force.

The Army Operating Concept (along with other service and joint concepts) envisions solving this problem through the use of partners, diverse capabilities, and rapid, simultaneous operations from home station to overwhelm the adversary's ability to respond effectively. The function of the Organization A is to set the conditions for the successful application of that conceptual solution.

Organization A is forward deployed and positioned as close to the geographical region in which it operates as possible. In order to perform the Prevent/Shape function, Organization A must actively and continuously manage partnerships, employ assigned formations to achieve sustained effects, and maintain a continuous ability to assure access for CONUS-based capabilities in the event of a major conflict or regional contingency. For overseas regions, the tasks which comprise its Prevent/Shape function include:

1. Actively manage regional partnerships
2. Counter adversary Prevent/Shape activities
3. Set conditions for the rapid introduction of CONUS-based capabilities

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4. Manage and employ national and theater-level assets
5. Provide Mission Command for ground forces and, if necessary, assume command of warfighting units prior to the arrival of Organization B Headquarters

For North America, the tasks which constitute Organization A's Prevent/Shape function include:

1. Air and Missile Defense
2. Network and Cyber defense
3. Intelligence support to law enforcement (outside the US)
4. Actively manage partnerships with American officials and RC forces

B. Organization B

The problem: Modern warfare requires tailorable capability sets to overcome adversary adaptation, agility, and innovation; however, training and readiness requires standardization and specialization imposes financial costs and limits flexibility.

Joint and Army doctrine envisions the creation of ad hoc organizations tailored to their mission sets, defined as JTFs, JFLCCs, or ARFORs depending on the set of tasks they are assigned to perform. As a result, Organization B is an expeditionary, contingency-focused headquarters. It has no organic warfighting units, but instead serves as a standing headquarters that can provide Mission Command to assigned formations in order to synchronize their activities to achieve simultaneous effects. In 2015 terms, the function of Organization B is to provide mission command in either a JTF or JFLCC role.

In Major Operations, the tasks that Organization B will perform can include:

1. Assume Mission Command of task-organized contingency response forces
2. Conduct Combined Arms Maneuver / Wide Area Security through subordinate formations
3. Joint Capable (can serve in what are presently called JTF and JFLCC roles)

In a Homeland Defense / Defense Support to Civil Authorities mission, Organization B would perform a similar Mission Command function, with tasks including:

1. Mission Command of mobilized forces
2. Direct coordination with established FEMA / state / other civil HQs
3. Integrate national capabilities in support of FEMA operations

V. Way Forward

The Organization A/B framework requires additional testing and validation before moving from tasks to solutions. For instance, it is entirely possible that PACOM and CENTCOM operate on a different basis than EUCOM and NORTHCOM (for instance, the proximity of the GCC and Theater Army headquarters to likely JRSOI areas.) This

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would argue for more regional specificity and less inter-theater flexibility across the force. Alternatively, it is possible that the participants in FFD-I are atypical and did not accurately portray the tasks their organizations will undertake in the 2030 world. If that was the case, these findings would lack external validity. Given the trends in the literature, these outcomes seem unlikely; however, given the scope and significance of the issues involved additional validation seems prudent.

Thus, we will continue to test this framework in FFD-II, to be held in January 2016. Theater Army, Corps, and Division tasks, functions, and roles will be evaluated against 2030 scenarios in the Pacific, the Middle East, Europe, and North America. We will use different participants, and will expand the event from two to five days. We will present this framework and the Warfighting Function-based findings of FFD-I for participants to review, revise, reject, or build upon in order to deepen and broaden our learning about Echelons Above Brigade in 2030.

VI. Decisions and Running Estimates

A. Decision 1: Should each echelon have the ability to conduct independent operations – i.e., are these headquarters or formations? Running Estimate: Organization A has roles, functions, and tasks that require permanent formations. The capabilities controlled by Organization B are rapidly task-organized and mission-tailored. It is only a headquarters.

B. Decision 2: Are all Theater Armies, Corps, and Divisions designed the same? Running Estimate: No. Organization A is tailored by theater. Organization B headquarters can be built identically, although there may be cost-savings in having units of varying size/capacity available for worldwide deployment.

C. Decision 3: Should Corps and Divisions be regionally aligned? Running Estimate: No. Groups pointed to the value of regional alignment. However, much of this effect can be generated by the Organization A, creating additional flexibility in force management of Organization B.

D. Decision 4: What is the appropriate total force mix? Running Estimate: Organization A should be primarily Active Component, with the exception of identified RC liaison supporting RC integration (Homeland) and the State Partnership Program (OCONUS). Organization B should have varying levels of AC/RC mix across the headquarters.

E. Decision 5: How is the force optimized across the ROMO? Running Estimate: Organization A optimizes itself for PH 0-II and V. Organization B optimizes for PH II-IV.

F. Decision 6: What are specific capability requirements? Running Estimate: Task-generated capability requirements have been generated by echelon. Further analysis is required.

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G. Decision 7: What are the command relationships and responsibilities for each echelon? Running Estimate: Organization A controls forces in theater until a sufficient Organization B Mission Command capability is established. At that point, the Organization B is commanded by the GCC and the Organization A provides support and is responsible for Theater support requirements.

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ANNEX A: Participating Organizations

The following organizations participated in the Future Force Design I Seminar:

Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2

Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve

U.S. Army Europe

U.S. Army North

U.S. Army Materiel Command

U.S. Army Special Operations Command

U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command

U.S. Army Health Readiness Center of Excellence, The U.S. Medical Department Center and School

The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School

U.S. Army War College

U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM)

U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate

U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, Command and General Staff College

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Analysis Center

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, DCS G-2

ARCIC, Force 2025 Directorate

Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), Future Warfare Division

ARCIC, Joint and Army Concepts Division

ARCIC, Joint and Army Experimentation Division

ARCIC, Joint and Army Models and Simulations Division

ARCIC, Science and Technology Division

ARCIC, Joint Interdependency Coordination Division

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ARCIC, Force Design Division

ARCIC, Deputy Chief of Staff, Architecture Integration and Management Division

TRADOC, Sustainment Center of Excellence (SCoE)

TRADOC, SCoE (Australian Liaison Officer)

TRADOC, U.S. Army Soldier Support Institute (SSI)

TRADOC, Maneuver Support Center of Excellence

TRADOC, Cyber Center of Excellence

TRADOC, Fires Center of Excellence

TRADOC, Aviation Center of Excellence

TRADOC, Mission Command Center of Excellence

TRADOC, Intelligence Center of Excellence

TRADOC, Maneuver Center of Excellence

Special Operations Center of Excellence

1st SF Command (Airborne)

XVIII Airborne Corps

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For additional information on Unified Quest Future Study Plan
Contact Future Warfare Division, Army Capabilities Integration Center,
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Eustis, Virginia 23604

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